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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Give me your Engineers, your Ph.D.s, yearning to fund my Welfare State.
by
Mariana Medina
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2010
Nathan Jensen and Andrew Sobel, Chairs
Points systems, immigration policies in which potential immigrants make an applica-
tion to enter the country and then are selected on the basis of their skills, age, and oc-
cupation, have been proven to be more successful attracting high-skilled immigrants,
but very few countries have implemented them. This is particularly paradoxical since
high-skilled immigrants are more beneficial in fiscal terms: they are expected to pay
more taxes than low skilled immgirants, and not depend heavily on government pro-
vided welfare. My core argument is that left of center governments in liberal welfare
states implement points systems during a fiscal crisis as a mean of raising revenue for
the state, staving off painful cuts in government spending.
Using statistical modeling, I study the timing of the implementation of selective
immigration policies. I find that the presence of a liberal welfare state, a left of center
government, and a fiscal crisis at the same time, make the implementation of these
reforms more likely, while individually, each of this variables cannot explain the timing
of the implementation of these policies. My dissertation also includes qualitative
case studies on the development of immigration policy in different types of welfare
states, where I focus on the political and economic environments in which immigration
policies were implemented in different countries accross history, particularly selective
immigration policies.
ii
This project turns some of the literature on globalization and domestic politics
on its head. Rather than examining how globalization constrains the nation-state,
globalization, in terms of immigration, can help solve domestic problems. This has
implications for the study of the political economy of immigration, and can help
provide insights into broader discussions on globalization and the state.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Policy divergence in
immigration
In the second half of the XX Century we observed a global movement towards
liberalization of trade and capital flows, but increased immigration control. In the
migration literature, some have argued that countries’ immigration policies are con-
verging because of similar domestic pressures from labour shortages. This literature
fails to show evidence of convergence. In theory we would expect to see convergence
in both trade and immigration policies because the conventional knowledge is that
they have the same effect on labor markets. Mundell (1957) was the first to argue
that commodity movements are to some extent a substitute for movements of factors
of production like capital and labor.1 So, individuals who are affected by immigration
would also be affected by trade and the coalitions to restrict or advance both issues
would be the very similar. Industrialized countries have similar factor endowments,
1Factors of production are resources employed to produce goods and services. In general terms
there are three factors of production: land, labor, and capital.
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so in order to answer the question is necessary to go beyond Mundell to understand
what explains the different policy choices. Further, we would expect to see policy
convergence regarding labor flows in labor scarce and capital abundant countries. In
reality, that is not the case. Industrialized countries, who have similar factor endow-
ments have a wide range of policies.2 While a majority of the studies regarding trade,
fiscal and monetary policies find evidence of increased policy convergence, for immi-
gration policy the evidence is at most limited. Heichel, Pape, and Sommerer (2005)
summarize the findings of the literature on policy convergence for diverse issues, from
banking regulation to social policy (table 2, pages 820-824). For immigration policy
they found that most studies find limited convergence (Heichel, Pape, and Sommerer,
2005).
In this project I look at a largely unexplored element of the nexus between domes-
tic politics and globalization: the political economy of immigration. While numerous
scholars in Political Science, Sociology, and Anthropology have examined how iden-
tity shapes immigration policy, important questions remain. Economists have paid
more attention to immigration, mostly focusing on the wage effects of immigration,
and a smaller number of recent studies examining the fiscal policy impact of immigra-
tion. This dissertation focuses on the last of these elements, the fiscal consequences
of immigration. Yet, rather than focus on the economic impact of immigration, I
explore how the fiscal needs of the state determine the timing of immigration policy
reforms. My core argument is that the fiscal contribution of immigrants is shaped by
the character of the immigrants (high-skilled or low-skilled) and the type of welfare
state. Countries with relatively small welfare states can use high-skilled immigration
as a tool to raise revenue for the state. Thus, left of center governments can enact
2These different policies are described in great detail in the OECD International Migration Out-
look www.oecd.org/els/migration/imo
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certain immigration policies during a fiscal crisis as a mean of raising revenue for
the state, staving off painful cuts in government spending. This dissertation turns
some of the literature on globalization and domestic politics on its head. Following
what Gourevitch (1978) calls “second image reversed3,” rather than examining how
globalization constrains the nation-state, globalization, in terms of immigration, can
help solve domestic problems. This has implications for the study of the political
economy of immigration, and can help provide insights into broader discussions on
globalization and the state.
Introduction
Domestic policies have historically been used as a response to global economic
crisis, and are cited as one of the causes of convergence in global policies. For ex-
ample, Meyers (2002, 132) argues that “global economic cycles” are an important
factor behind restrictions or liberalizations in immigration policies. Because a poor
international economy affects more than one country, one or more countries might
face incentives to reduce the number of immigrants at the same time, which could
possibly lead to convergence (Meyers, 2002). I argue that while economic downturns
may bring convergence in the implementation of immigration control policies,4 the
mechanism a country choose to do so will depend on its domestic economic and politi-
cal institutions. The argument goes along with Eichengreen and Irwin (2009) findings
3Referring to an approach in which the international system is not only a consequence of domestic
policies and structures but a cause of them (Gourevitch, 1978, 911)
4Brochmann and Hammar (1999) define immigration control as the “rules and procedures gov-
erning the selection, admission and deportation of foreign citizens. It also includes the rules that
control foreign citizens once they visit or take residence, including control of their employment”
(Brochmann and Hammar, 1999, 9).
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for the post Great Depression era. Their study is not focused on immigration policy,
but on trade restrictions and they find that while the conventional knowledge is that
all countries restricted trade flows in that era, some did (those who remained in the
Gold Standard), and some did not (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2009, 2-15).
For immigration policy, the options when facing a fiscal crisis are to either restrict
the number of immigrants or reform policy to favor immigrants who would pay a
high tax rate. In this case, the domestic institution that varies among countries to
alleviate fiscal deficits is not monetary policy autonomy but the welfare state. In very
generous welfare states, immigrants would need to pay a very high tax rate in order
to provide deficit alleviation, which might decrease their incentives to migrate, as will
be discussed later.
Types of immigration policies
According to Chaloff and Lemaitre (2009) “There are two principal ways of re-
cruiting highly skilled workers from abroad. One is demand driven, through employer
requests. The other is supply-driven and involves inviting candidates to apply and
selecting them on the basis of certain characteristics, among them age, educational
attainment, language proficiency and occupation, for which points are assigned. Can-
didates having more than a threshold level of points are then granted the right to
establish residence” (Chaloff and Lemaitre, 2009, 2). An example of demand-driven
immigration policy for high-skilled workers would be the H1-B visa in the United
States,5 while an example of supply-driven policy would be the Canadian points sys-
tem. We can categorize policies further as those that “select” immigrants according
5I will describe this type of visa later in this dissertation.
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to their skills6 and those that select their immigrants on the basis of family ties,
which tends to reinforce low-skilled immigration.7 Out of the thirty countries that
have ratified the convention of the OECD, only four countries currently have supply-
driven immigration policies, attracting mostly high-skilled workers. Those countries
are Canada,8 Australia,9 New Zealand,10 and Great Britain.11
The lack of supply-driven policies systems is particularly paradoxical since through
experiments (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010), survey data (Hanson, 2005) and in terms
of their macro economic effects (Schou, 2006), there is evidence indicating that in-
dividuals of all education and economic levels prefer high-skilled immigrants to low-
skilled immigrants and that the economic effects of high-skilled immigration are more
beneficial. If both high and low-skilled individuals favor high-skilled immigration, we
would expect countries to adopt policies that are less opposed to high skill immigra-
tion and restrict low skill immigration, but only a handful do.
In order to provide incentives to attract highly educated individuals, and avoid
large flows of unskilled labor, some countries have established supply-driven immi-
gration systems (points systems) a policy we observe in only a handful of countries.
6These are mainly points based systems, where potential immigrants are given points according
to their characteristics and skills. Applicants who get enough points to get to a specific threshold
are granted a visa. These system exist in Canada, New Zealand, Australia and most recently the
UK. The United States, France and Germany tried to implement a points system in the last decade,
unsuccessfully.
7From now on, when I talk about “selective immigration policies” I mean policies that select
immigrants on the basis of skills.
8Canada adopted a points system in October 1, 1967(Hawkins, 1988, 11), (Richmond, 1976, 188)
9Australia adopted a points system in 1973 (Richmond, 1976, 190), (Grattan, 1993, 130)
10New Zealand adopted a points system in April 17,1990 (Farmer, 1996, 5)
11Great Britain adopted a points system in December 2001, but it came gradually into force into
force until 2008 when it was fully implemented (Somerville, 2007, 30-33).
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Under a points-based selection, applicants are awarded points based on criteria such
as education, occupational skills, and knowledge of the national language(s) and age.
Applicants that get enough points to reach a certain threshold are allowed to immi-
grate legally. That does not include refugee applications, which are granted under
different criteria. Evidence indicates that these policies do make a difference in the
average skill level of immigrants. Defoort (2007) finds that if France would adopt a
system similar to the one in Canada, “the percentage of immigrants that are high-
skilled would increase progressively from 15.8% in 2000 to 61.3% in 2050, while it
would only increase to 22.8% if the status quo remains” (Defoort, 2007, 153).12
There are some normative concerns regarding whether it is ethical to “select”
immigrants according to their skills, or any other characteristics, on the grounds that
these criteria are inevitably discriminatory and unfair. Opponents of supply-driven
policies have called them “a experiment in social engineering” and argued it would be
a “caste or class based immigration system’13” The problem is that any immigration
policy that favors group A and limits group B is going to “discriminate” against a
B. This, however, uses the term discrimination merely to mean non random choice.
The degree to which a criteria is ethical depends on whether the it is related to some
relevant characteristic for the society that is receiving the immigrants. For example,
an immigration criteria that restricts the entrance of women would be, according
to Carens, less ethical than a criteria that restricts on the basis of education levels
because unlike gender, schooling is an attribute that can be changed. He compared
12The original text is in French and it was translated by the author of this dissertation.
13Speech given by then Senator Barack Obama on June 6, 2007 when introducing an initiative with
Senators Menendez and Feingold to sunset the points system that was proposed in the Comprehensive
Immigration Bill of 2007, which ended in cloture.
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this to college admission, an area in which test scores are an ethical selection criteria,
but race is not (Carens, 2003).
Most OECD countries have some policy directed at attracting high-skilled workers.
In most cases, it is a demand-based policy in which the employers take the initiative
to invite immigrants. The request is conditional on an employment test to ensure that
no resident is available to fill the job vacancy adequately, as is the case in the United
States for H1-B visas. In supply-driven systems successful candidates are given the
right of permanent residency and many arrived without guaranteed employment. The
selection of the immigrants does not fall on the employers but on the policy makers
who determine the points allocation and the people who decide to apply for a visa. As
a consequence, visas such as the H1-B are not substitutes for a points system because
they are temporary, don’t provide for citizenship or residence status, are capped, and
require a US company to sponsor the applicant (Shachar, 2006).
One could argue all immigration policies are merit-based, since all countries at-
tempt to attract to some extent high-skilled immigrants. But, not all countries attract
them to the same extent or prioritize the recruitment of high-skilled foreign workers
over other types of immigrants. Belot and Hatton (2008) measure the selectivity
of immigration policy in OECD countries and find that those with points systems
attract a higher percentage of high-skilled immigrants, as evidenced by Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Foreign born high-skilled workers
Cost Country Percent Foreign Born Percent Foreign Born High Skilled
Australia 26.9 37.9
Austria 13.8 11.3
Belgium 12.0 17.4
Canada 22.4 38.0
Denmark 7.5 19.4
Finland 2.7 18.9
France 11.7 18.1
Germany 13.4 14.9
Italy 4.1 12.2
New Zealand 22.5 34.9
Norway 8.1 22.3
Sweden 14.4 22.3
United Kingdom 9.5 30.5
United States 14.3 22.8
Furthermore, demand-driven systems are designed to attract immigrants that em-
ployers have hired, which might or might not be the most qualified, and might or
might not be net contributors to the welfare state. In contrast, points systems are
designed to attract those immigrants that have the highest skills that because of their
age will be net contributors to the welfare state for the longest period of time. Table
1.2 shows how the points are alloted in the four countries that have points systems
(Chaloff and Lemaitre, 2009, 23).
8
Table 1.2: Allotment of points under different selective immigration systems
in 2008
Characteristic UK/HSMP Australia/GSM Canada/SW New Zealand/ SW
Language ability 10 15-25 0-24 (16+8) Obligatory
Sufficient funds 10 Obligatory
Age (younger = more points) 5-20 15-30 0-10 5-30
Qualifications/ Academic 30-50 5-25 0-25 50-55
Skilled Occupation 40-60
Work experience 5-10 0-21 10-30
Recent earnings 5-45
Spouse/ partner skills 5 0-10 50
Shortage occupation 15-20 20
In-country work experience 5 10 0-10 5-15
Regional study 5
Designated area sponsorship 25
Job offer 0-10 50-60
State/ territory of settlement 10 10
Professional Language Skill 5
Number required 95 100-120 67 100-140
Pool-Pass Pool-Pass
Selective immigration systems have consequences beyond selecting high-skilled
immigrants. Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) study the impact of age at immigration
for Canada and find that immigrants who arrived to Canada at an earlier age have
higher earnings. This is similar to what Economist Robert D. Lee declared in a hearing
in the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Judiciary Committee in the United States
in 1997 arguing the fiscal impact of immigration depended on the age and education
of the immigrants:
Fiscal impact varies with age at arrival of immigrant. Immigrants arriving
in their 60’s cost taxpayers a total of about $150,000 a piece. But less than
5 percent of immigrants are over 65 at arrival and most immigrants arrive
at younger ages when total contributions are very positive. Fiscal impact
also varies with education. Immigrants who arrive with less than high
school cost $10,000 apiece. Those with high school contribute $50,000
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positive, and those with more than high school contribute $200,000 a
piece.14
Belot and Hatton (2008) study the factors that drive the educational selectivity of
immigration in the OECD. They measure immigrant selectivity as the log of the ratio
of the share of high-skilled immigrants divided by the share of high-skilled natives in
the country. Larger selectivity means that the countries select immigrants more highly
skilled than their population. If selectivity approaches one it means the country selects
immigrants that have very similar skills as the country’s population. Low selectivity
means that the country’s immigrants have lower skills than the population. Belot
and Hatton ultimately find that geographical proximity and language are the main
determinants of their measure of educational selectivity. This would assume implicitly
that policies have no effect on immigrant selection, but the data shows some relevant
patterns. These data show that with the exception of New Zealand, countries with a
points system are more likely to have immigrants who are more educated than their
own populations. Their measure, however, is problematic. Since they measure the
selectivity, relative to the native population, countries with lower average education
levels relative to the rest of the sample, such as Ireland, Portugal and Hungary seem
more “selective” even though their immigrant population is not necessarily more
highly skilled, while countries like New Zealand with higher average education levels
seem less selective even though their immigrant population is not necessarily less
skilled than for the rest of the sample (Barro and Lee, 2000). In contrast, Cerna
(2009) focuses only on political institutions and the preferences of high and low skill
labor in the receiving countries. She predicts that “the countries with more restrictive
immigration policies will be those with Proportional Representation systems, high
14Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, On examining the Economic and Fiscal Im-
pact of Immigration in the United States, September 9, 1997. Serial No. J-105-45
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union density, and highly centralized associations of unions and employers” (Cerna,
2009, 156). In contrast with Belot and Hatton, she does not test her hypotheses
or presents data to support them, but she makes an important contribution to the
knowledge of high-skilled immigration policy by bringing to light the importance of
political factors for immigration.
Are selective immigration policies generally effective? Borjas (1991) studies the
impact immigration had in Canada and the United States from 1959 to 1981. In
the 1960s their immigration policies diverged since Canada changed its policy to
stress skills (points system) while the United States stressed family reunification. He
finds that the average skills of immigrants in Canada are on average higher than
for immigrants in the United States. A drawback of selective immigration systems
is that they would have an impact on the national origin mix of the immigration
flows. Borjas (1999) constructs a thought experiment. If the United States had had
a points system between 1985 and 1990 emphasizing education (high school level),
English proficiency and age, around forty-one percent of the legal immigrants to the
United States in the same five years would not have gotten enough points to migrate.
Furthermore, almost 75% of Mexicans would have failed to enter, compared with 14%
of Germans and 18% of Indians (Borjas, 1999, 195). That does not mean the system
would be equivalent to the national origin quotas that existed in the postwar era,
in which non-educated white people could immigrate more easily than a non-white
person with a graduate degree. The quotas are still a demand-driven policy, while
the points systems are supply-driven.
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Selective immigration as fiscal policy
In the face of a fiscal deficit, a welfare state can use immigration policy as an
alternative to welfare state retrenchment. While right of center parties traditionally
would opt to cut government spending in the face of a fiscal crisis which would imply
shrinking the welfare state, left of center parties tend to prefer other alternatives.
In countries where a potential high-skilled immigrant would pay more in taxes than
what she would use in government provided welfare, left of center governments can
use points systems to select immigrants with those characteristics and alleviate the
fiscal deficit.
In sum, I argue that the interaction of three features increases the likelihood that
a country enacts a points system:
1. A liberal welfare state,
2. A fiscal deficit,
3. A left of center government.
Liberal Welfare States can be characterized as less “generous” welfare states in the
sense that most people need to have employment to receive social welfare. Further-
more, in these countries the welfare state is not universal, the bulk of the recipients
of social welfare are lower income groups, and the bulk of the taxes to fund it come
from higher income groups because liberal welfare states have, in general, a more
progressive taxation system (Cusack and Beramendi, 2006). Therefore, high-skilled,
high-income immigrants to these countries will be net contributors to social welfare
programs. As a consequence, those governments that want to maintain or expand
social welfare in these countries are likely to favor high-skilled immigration in times
of fiscal scarcity. But, which governments are those? In a Liberal Welfare State,
selective policies for high-skilled workers are more likely because in those systems
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the fiscal cost of the social welfare provision is relatively low. These countries tend
to have mostly means-tested programs instead of universal welfare provision. That
implies that a high-skilled person is less likely to receive welfare benefits, but more
likely to pay a high level of taxes.
An immigration policy that is selective on skills is beneficial in financial terms
even in times of economic boom. Immigrants affect a country’s fiscal system in many
ways. Like all the residents in a country, an immigrant pay taxes on their work and
on the goods they consume. While the taxes that a low-skilled immigrant pays might
be small, for high-skilled immigrants, the amount of taxes is more substantial, partic-
ularly in their most productive years. A situation of fiscal crisis makes immigration
policy reform since it would reduce the political costs of implementing a points system
and would make the alternative of increased spending less viable. For example, in
times of fiscal surplus, it might be hard to convince constituents that they need to
share’ with newcomers, even if they are high-skilled, especially if the welfare state is
not threatened. If there is a fiscal crisis, and shrinking the welfare state is the only
alternative to tax increases, a selective immigration policy would be politically easier
to sell since the median voter is not making higher tax payments, but is receiving
potentially the same amount of welfare. That increases the likelihood of a country
enacting a points system.
Finally, a left of center government is more likely to push for skill-selective im-
migration policies since the potential high-skilled immigrant would not be competing
for employment with the median voter from the left. Also, according to the Roy
model capital owners would oppose higher inflows of low-skilled immigration which
would increase their returns since these factors are complimentary. Furthermore, in
industrialized countries extreme right parties tend to hold anti-immigration platforms
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(Mudde, 1999) and governments from left of center parties are less likely to form a
coalition with them.
Theory
The rationale for the theory can be simplified by a few equations. If Ti represents
the taxes a high-skilled immigrant would pay, Wi the welfare they would receive from
the government, and Tn and Wn the equivalent for natives, then if:
• Ti < Wi + (Wn − Tn)⇒ Tax increase
And if:
• Ti > Wi + (Wn − Tn)⇒
But, it can be simplified even further. The high-skilled immigrants do not need
to solve the fiscal crisis, it is enough if they make it better, as follows:
• Ti < Wi ⇒ Tax increase
And:
• Ti > Wi ⇒ Attempt to implement a points system
Under the first version, the fiscal benefits are larger and as a consequence a points
system is even more likely. However, that doesn’t mean another type of policy that
attracts high-skilled immigrants but is less selective than a points system would not
bring any fiscal benefits. Under the simplified version the flow of high-skilled immi-
grants still benefits the government’s income, even if the fiscal deficit is not solved.
So the country would still be better off with a policy that attracts more high-skilled
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immigrants. In other words, immigration implies a fiscal cost only when immigrants
use more welfare than the taxes they pay. The immigration policies of the different
types of welfare states will differ not only because of their fiscal needs but also because
of the incentives they provide for high and low-skilled immigrants to reside in their
country.
This rationale applies for any policy that attracts high-skilled immigrants, either
a demand driven policy or a points system, however, I decide to focus on the latter in
order to have a more parsimonious theory. Since the points system has been shown to
be by far the most extensive of these policies -because they bring immigrants of higher
skills and in larger amounts- (Belot and Hatton, 2008; Borjas, 1991, 1999; Green and
Green, 1995) I focus on points systems. Furthermore, as can be seen in the case
studies in chapters 3 and 4, less generous high skilled immigration policies such as
the H1-B visas in the United States in 1990, the French Cards of Skills and Talents
in 2006, and the German Green Card in 2004, have uniformly been implemented
as a second step after failed attempts to implement a points system, so these very
simplified equations still capture the incentive structure for policy makers in countries
faced with fiscal crises.
The argument implies that there is a moral hazard problem since it immigrants
might take advantage of the welfare state of the receiving country. One might argue,
however, that the welfare states that need more fiscal income are the social demo-
cratic welfare states. It is, however, harder for those countries to attract high-skilled
immigrants to begin with given the fact that their income, once taxes are discounted,
would be lower than in a liberal welfare state. Schou (2006) finds evidence supporting
this argument for Denmark,and Storesletten (2003) for Sweden.
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Review of the literature
Previous studies on welfare states and the fiscal consequences of immigra-
tion
Empirically, there is some evidence supporting the argument that high and low-
skilled immigrants have different effects on the welfare states. Borjas (1999) finds
that immigrants are more likely to receive welfare than natives. Specifically, in the
early 1990s the fraction of immigrants on welfare exceeded that of natives by about
seven percent. He argues that the reason that occurs is the socioeconomic differences
between the two groups: “Adjusting for household size alone reduces the welfare gap
to 6 percentage points. If one further adjusts for differences in the educational attain-
ment, age, and gender of the household head, the welfare gap falls to 2 percentage
points.” (Borjas, 1999, 112-113).
Storesletten (2000) argues that selective immigration in the United States should
be able to mitigate part of the fiscal burden associated with the aging of the pop-
ulation. He finds that “to the extent that an immigration reform that involves the
admission of 1.6 million 40-44-year-old high-skilled immigrants annually is feasible,
the government can choose between this reform and an income tax hike of 4.4 percent
points. In comparison, the number of high-skilled 25-49-year old immigrants required
to balance the budget is 1.8 million, or 0.70 percent of the population annually.”
(Storesletten, 2000, 314) He does a similar analysis for Sweden, a traditional welfare
state and find that in that case immigrants impose a larger fiscal burden and are less
beneficial in fiscal terms than immigrants in the United States (Storesletten, 2003).
The difference, of course, between the United States and Sweden is the type of welfare
state they have.
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Previous studies also show that the type of welfare state affects the incentives to
immigrate to a certain country. Cohen and Razin (2008) find that the generosity of
a welfare state adversely affects the skill composition of immigrants under free im-
migration but it has a positive effect under controlled immigration. Since low-skilled
immigrants may put a strain on the welfare state, “voters in an aging population
might opt for an immigration policy that is more liberal and that upgrades the com-
position of the immigration” (Cohen and Razin, 2008, 3).
Fiscal deficits and immigration
The adverse effects of low-skilled immigration on welfare states are worsened by
environments of fiscal crisis, which provides policy makers with incentives to move
away from the status quo. Hollifield (1992) describes a similar phenomenon for France
and Germany during the 1970s. Rising energy prices as a result of the Arab oil em-
bargo contributed to inflation an unemployment causing a recession. Confronted with
the first large increase in unemployment after World War II, France and Germany
restricted immigration and suspended the recruitment of foreign workers. My argu-
ment, instead, is that some governments facing a fiscal deficit will not reduce the
number of immigrants, but instead move towards a system that selects immigrants
on the basis of skills. A historical example is the literacy test implemented in the
United States early in the XX Century. Goldin (1993) studies immigration restric-
tions in the United States from 1890 to 1921, particularly the literacy test which can
be considered a precedent of the current immigration policies that select immigrants
according to their skills. She finds that almost all serious calls for the literacy test
were preceded by economic downturns.15
15The literacy test was an exam administered to physically able adults to asses their ability to
read. It generally consisted of reading several sentences of the constitution in any language chosen
17
Left of center governments and fiscal policies
One of the main arguments this dissertation makes is that, under left of center
governments in liberal welfare states, supply-driven policies can substitute a tax in-
crease, yet obtaining the same fiscal gains. It is therefore important to analyze under
what conditions the left and right of center governments differ in their tax policies.
Traditionally, left and right of center governments have reacted to economic down-
turns differently (Hibbs, 1977). The core constituency of left parties generally holds
most of their wealth as human capital and occupy jobs of low status, so in a recession
they are likely to be the first ones to become unemployed. Following this logic, left of
center governments are more likely to approve a point system of immigration, even
in times of economic bonanza to avoid large fiscal deficits in times of crisis. Right of
center governments, under this framework would be indifferent towards immigration
policy as long as it does not affect inflation.
Left of center governments and selective immigration policies
Finally, I argue left of center governments are more likely to enact a points system,
because right of center parties would rather cut public spending when they face an
economic contraction. The traditional argument about macroeconomic policies and
political parties is that right wing parties will try to avoid high inflation while the
left wing parties will try to avoid unemployment (Hibbs, 1977). Cusack (1999) in
contrast argues that there is a different rationale in place. Since the constituency of
the left is more economically vulnerable, they are more willing to use fiscal policy
by the potential immigrant. It was finally approved in 1917 when the Senate overrode a Presidential
veto.
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as a tool to increase economic growth, whereas the right is hesitant about using this
fiscal tools because that means interfering with the workings of an efficient market.
Another reason why right of center governments might be less likely to enact
a points system is that an increase in the inflow of low-skilled immigration -scarce
factor- would make the returns to capital -abundant factor- greater, according to the
Stolper- Samuelson theorem. For example, Timothy Kirkhope, conservative member
of the European Parliament, published a report called Building a Fair Immigration
System as a response to the implementation of a selective immigration policy in
the U.K. where he says that: “The business community may benefit from cheap
labour, especially in the short term, but low-paid, low-skilled British workers, many
of whom are British-born from settled immigrant communities, lose out from fresh
immigration.”16
Previous studies find that the spending of both anti and pro immigration interest
groups have a significant impact on immigration policy. Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra
(2007) find that “industries with higher lobbying expenditures on immigration have
a larger number of visas approved by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).’
In addition, industries with lower union membership rates have a larger number of
H1-B visas approved by the DHS” (Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra, 2007, 19). If we
extend the analysis to other liberal welfare states, and there is no reason to think
interest groups work differently in the United States than in the United Kingdom
or Canada, industries or interest groups who spend more of their resources lobbying
legislators are more likely to affect legislation. If returns to high-skilled labor increase
with greater low-skilled immigration, then capital owners will lobby to increase the
latter. The interest groups who are likely to support left of center parties, such as
16Page 29, available at: http://www.conservatives.com/pdf/kirkhopecommission.pdf
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labor unions, want to increase the returns to low-skilled labor which they can achieve
by increasing high-skilled immigration and restricting low-skilled immigration. The
logic behind this argument comes from the Roy model. Roy (1951) explained how
the concentration of skills in different occupations affects the distribution of earnings.
In a two occupations scenario, he concludes that if conditions are such that we can
differentiate the best workers in each occupation while at the same time leaving
sufficient competent workers for the other activities, an increase in the demand for
the product in any kind of industry will clearly cause productivity in that occupation
to fall and in all others to rise. As a consequence, the left of center parties, who want
to make their median voters wages higher, and receive more lobbying funds from
the relevant interest groups will promote a points system, which would decrease the
demand for native high-skilled labor and as a consequence increase the productivity
of low-skilled labor. Also, left of center parties are less likely to form a coalition with
extreme right parties, which tend to have an anti-immigration platform.
Alternative hypotheses
Political institutions
Since the four countries that have enacted selective immigration policies are mem-
bers of the Commonwealth of Nations, one might think that the establishment of
similar immigration policies is due to path dependence, since most of the political
institutions of these countries were inspired in their counterparts from Great Britain.
If that were the case, however, we would expect the United Kingdom to be the first
one to implement a points system and inherit it to its former colonies, but the UK
was the last country to implement it. Furthermore, the common institutions of these
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countries -Westminster System-17 are important policy determinants in many cases.
There are, however, fifty-three members of the Commonwealth and we only observe
four cases. If the path dependence argument were right, we should observe more
countries with immigration points systems. There are other theories which deal with
the question of what determines the implementation of different immigration policies.
Effects of immigration in the labor market
A common argument among some economists is that the effect of an inflow of
workers reduces wages. In order to avoid that, restrictive immigration policies are
implemented. An increase in the stock of immigrants is an expansion of the supply of
labor in the receiving economy. This, however, assumes a unique labor market for both
natives and immigrants, which is not realistic. Some sectors will compete to a larger
degree with the immigrants in the labor market while others will be almost immune.
Unless the immigrants come from a society with the same factor endowment than the
receiving country, the last assessment is more generalizable. Roy (1951) explained how
the concentration of skills in different occupations affects the distribution of earnings.
Moreover, the effect of immigration on labor is also affected by the mobility of other
factors of production. Following Mundell, in a country with scarce labor, if a country
puts up a tariff to protect the scarce factor in the absence of immigration, wages
will increase. But if labor is mobile and can move across borders, then immigration
will limit the trade induced wage increase, and wages will converge between the two
countries. By the same logic, an immigration policy designed to protect domestic
labor will be undone by free trade or capital movements abroad seeking cheaper labor
inputs. Absent a prohibitive restriction of trade, the relationship and trade-offs across
17New Zealand, however, has a mixed electoral system since the mid-1990s.
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trade, and the mobility of labor still hold (Rybczynski, 1955) and all this is consistent
with the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. The Hecksher-Ohlin model
argues with two factors of production, for example capital and labor, given an increase
in trade, the wages of the factor that, relative to the rest of the world, that society has
in abundance will go up, and the wages of the scarce factor will go down. If we extend
this logic to immigration, we would expect that an increase in the stock of immigrants
in a country will reduce the wages of the scarce factors, and increase the wages of
the abundant ones. For example, in a country that is abundant in high-skilled labor
(capital intensive industries) and scarce in low-skilled labor, an increase in the flow of
immigrants will benefit the high skill workers, and negatively affect those with a lower
skill level. Furthermore, we would predict emigration to come from labor abundant
countries towards labor scarce ones. There is a caveat. Even inside one factor of
production different industries have varying levels of integration with global markets,
and the Hecksher- Ohlin model assumes almost perfect factor mobility, which might
not always be a viable assumption. Another model of international trade that is
widely used in the Ricardo-Viner model. It assumes that at least some factors cannot
move between sectors of the economy, so their fortunes fall and rise together whether
they are the same type of factor or not.
The empirical evidence showing whether the factor endowments framework ex-
plains successfully policy makers decisions is mixed. Medina (2007) finds for the
United States Senate between 2005 and 2006 that Senators from states that rely
heavily on manufacturing and that have higher average education levels are more
likely to be in favor of immigration liberalization, but the partisan identification of
Senators was also a determinant of the direction of their vote. Paradoxically, the Re-
publican Party, who usually supports trade liberalization is more likely to be oppose
immigration liberalization. This is consistent with Hix and Noury (2007) who look
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at the passage of six pieces of migration and immigrant integration legislation in the
Fifth European Parliament (1999 to 2004) and find that the main determinant of
he direction of Parliamentary votes is the position in the left-right dimension of the
Members of Parliament, and not economic variables such unemployment levels.
This framework relies on the assumption that trade and immigration are substi-
tutes, as Mundell stated. Hatton and Williamson (2005), however, describe what
they call a “dual policy paradox”: Today’s labor scarce economies have open trade
and closed immigration policies, while a century ago they had just the opposite. If
these policies were substitutes, there would be a coalition in favor of both trade and
immigration and both policies would be restricted at the same time. They argue
this is due to a reduction in the cost of migration, macroeconomic shocks and finally
because in the Nineteenth Century immigrants might not have been a burden on the
welfare state. Moreover, if Wellisch and Walz (1998) insight is right, and countries
prefer free trade to free migration because of the existence of the welfare state in
modern societies, we can infer that even when these issues are economic substitutes
as Mundell stated they are not policy substitutes. The effect of immigration in the
labor market is smaller than the theory predicts. Furthermore, the evidence points
out that high-skilled labor has a positive or null effect on wages. If policy makers
were thinking about the labor market when deciding policy, more countries would
have supply-driven policies trying to attract high-skilled labor. As mentioned above,
this is not the case. Most countries have demand-driven systems in which previous
immigration skill patterns are reinforced. The answer to the determinants of immi-
gration policy is then not in the factor endowments of the country or on the strength
of racism but on the fiscal effects of immigration.
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Ideology and Xenophobia
Another common argument about policy making of immigration policy is that
the rationale behind a policy is not economic, but ideological or xenophobic. One
argument is that the reason liberal states accept “unwanted” immigration is that
in some states, particularly European, feel an obligation towards certain immigrant
populations, such as members of former colonies. Joppke (1998) argues also that
“accepting unwanted immigration is inherent in the liberalness of liberal states. Under
the hegemony of the United States, liberalism has become the dominant Western
idiom in the postwar period, indicating a respect for universal human rights and the
rule of law”(Joppke, 1998, 292-293).
Nonetheless, the United States, perhaps even more than other countries, has tried
to avoid unwanted immigration for decades increasing security along the border, pun-
ishing employers and deporting illegal immigrants, the opposite of what he argues the
“liberal values” would imply. Furthermore, if his argument were correct all liberal
democracies would have the same policies regarding unwanted immigration. Nothing
further from the truth: there is a wide variance on immigration policies across liberal
democracies: quotas, point systems, family based systems, among others. The liter-
ature establishing racism or a certain ideological bent as a motive for immigration
restrictions hasn’t effectively tested their hypotheses or convincingly made an argu-
ment that competing hypotheses are not muddling their theories. Furthermore, these
ideologies and xenophobia exist in every country to a certain degree, but we don’t
see a convergence in immigration control policies. Finally, some researches argue that
the factor endowment of a country is what determines an immigration policy. In the
case of immigration, we would expect individuals in the societies that use labor inten-
sively to oppose immigration because of the threat of losing their jobs to immigrants
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or to see their wages reduced. However, the owners of those labor intensive industries
would be in favor of immigration, and if there is a larger supply of workers, there
would be an incentive to create more labor intensive industries, therefore creating
new jobs in that region. For example, an assembly line worker in a region with abun-
dant manufacture industry might fear the arrival of more workers. If the latter accept
to work for a lower salary than him, he might lose his job. But, if there is a large
number of assembly line workers in that region, investors from other places will have
an incentive to build a factory in that region, therefore creating more job opportuni-
ties for manufacturing workers. If we assume that politicians are reelection seekers,
then they will try to do whatever helps them achieve that goal. We would therefore
expect policy makers from regions abundant in labor -particularly low-skilled labor-
18 to favor immigration liberalization, and policy makers from regions where labor is
scarce to oppose it.
18The Roy model would predict that if immigration is unregulated, most immigrants would be
low-skilled.
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Chapter 2
Testing the hypotheses
There is little debate about whether a country has the right to decide which criteria
to use to determine its immigration policy. Even in 1892, the United States Supreme
Court stated that “It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation,
to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions or to admit them only in
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe (Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659).1” Countries, however, differ in the criteria they
choose and the timing of their implementation. In any quantitative large-N research
the analysis depends on the ability of the author to the concepts with appropriate
quantitative indicators and models. At first, it might seem like the obvious choice
for this dissertation would be to create a measure of countries with and without
points systems. That, however, does not reflect the theoretical concept. The research
question is not what determines if a country has a points system -that can more easily
1Taken from Money (1999)
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be done reading a cross national description of the immigration control policies like
the International Migration Outlook, published every year by the OECD- but under
what conditions and timing such systems are adopted.
This study goes further than previous analysis by focusing on the timing of the
implementation of selective immigration policies, besides the type of countries that
are more likely to do so. Previous analysis, focus on the institutional determinants of
immigration policies, in particular electoral systems (Cerna, 2009). Electoral systems
are static institutions, they change only rarely. As a consequence, if we use type of
electoral system as the main explanatory variable, it is harder to explain the timing
of the implementation of the policy since it does not change often enough. The same
could be said about hypothesis related to culture (Joppke, 1998). Liberal ideals have
been present in the hegemonic powers, the United States and Great Britain, for over
a century. This makes it hard to argue the hegemonic ideals are the reason countries
reform their immigration system towards more selective policies in a specific period
and not another.
While the type of welfare state of a country does not vary significantly across
time, the fiscal deficit and the party in government do change often. This allows
me to explain the timing of the implementation of the reforms, and not only what
kind of countries would implement selective immigration policies. The purpose of
this chapter is to test whether Liberal Welfare States with left of center governments
that face fiscal crises are more likely to implement a points system. This means the
theory relates to the timing of the implementation. For that reason, I consider the
appropriate strategy is to measure the time it takes to change the status quo for a
points system given a set of covariates and use event history modeling, also called
duration or survival modeling. The different names stem from the different types of
applications in which this type of models have been used. For example, in engineering
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they have been used to study how long until a component fails? (duration). In
epidemiology they are commonly used to determine the lifespan of a subject, given a
set of constrains (survival).
Each of these questions has in common the notion of timing, but survival models
are still somewhat rare in Political Science. Carter and Signorino (2009) suggest that
the Cox Proportional Hazards model -the most common duration model- is equivalent
to a complementary log-log model with time dummies. Using a logit or cloglog model
with time dummies, however, entails some risks, so Carter and Signorino suggest
including t, t2, and t3 as regressors. The logit regression model would then take the
form:
Pr(yi,t = 1) =
1
1 + exp[−(xi,tβ + αiti + α2t2i + α3t3i )]
(2.1)
where s(ti) = α1ti+α2t
2
i +α3t
3
i is a cubic polynomial approximation to the hazard
(Carter and Signorino, 2009, 16-17).
The data
The database spans from 1960 to 2007 and includes eighteen OECD countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States. My database starts in 1960 because for the sample,
data is not available before that year.2This should not cause estimation issues because
the first country to implement a selective immigration policy did so in 1967, seven
years after the start of the sample. Furthermore, I will offer qualitative data before
2Much of this data comes from the Comparative Entitlements Dataset
http://www.sp.uconn.edu/ scruggs/wp.htm which starts in 1970, and the Comparative Welfare
States Data Set http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/welfareaccess.htm
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1960 in the following chapter to compensate for the lack of historical quantitative
data.
Even though all of these countries are industrialized economies, I consider there is
not selection bias because the criteria for the country selection are not related to my
response or dependent variable. The argument is not that the level of industrialization
of a country makes a country more likely to implement a points system. In fact, there
is no reason to conclude that it would be detrimental for a middle or low-income
political economy to implement a points system. It would, however, be ineffective.
High-skilled workers will migrate, holding everything else constant, only when their
potential net income in the country where they would immigrate is larger than the
net income in the country where they live. Since the wages in middle and low income
economies tend to be lower than in richer political economies, it is unlikely that
immigration flows will be large enough to make it a relevant political and economical
issue that policy-makers pay attention to. It is more likely therefore that in low and
middle-income countries emigration is one of the salient issues.
Hypotheses and operationalization of variables
The purpose of this study is to find why countries implement a points system and
when. Therefore, the response variable is the implementation of points systems in
a certain year. This is measured in the following way: Ycy = 1 when the country c
implements a points system in year y. While there are only four cases, that is the
totality of points systems, so I have the entire population of countries with this policy.
Furthermore, each of the implementations are in different periods of time, so there is
no year (or decade even) with more than one implementation.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that the presence of a fiscal crisis in a
liberal welfare state with a left of center government. As a consequence I will test
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my hypothesis with a three term interaction of fiscal crisis, left, and welfare state.
Because the variables for fiscal crisis and left of center party make sense only in
comparison with either other periods in time I centered them by country. I did not
do the same for the type of welfare state, since it only varies marginally during the
period of study.
They are measured in the following way:
• Fiscal crisis : (Public income - Public expenditures)cy - average (Public income
- Public expenditures)c
• Left : % legislative seats occupied by left of center parties in country c in year
t - average % legislative seats occupied by left of center parties in country c
• Welfare State : Decommodification index cy
There are both theoretical and statistical resons for centering these variables.
From a theoretical point of view, the existence of a fiscal deficit is not tantamount
to a fiscal crisis for several reasons: the deficit might be small, and a country might
regularly have fiscal deficits -because of the structure of its welfare state, type of
government, or other structural reasons- which might not imply a crisis in the sense
that the deficit is not endangering the fiscal health of the government. The same
argument can be made for the presence of left of center governments, which are more
common in some countries because of structural reasons -electoral systems, political
cleavages, etc.- There are also statistical reasons for centering these variables. Smith
and Sasaki (1978) explain how in multiplicative interaction models centering the vari-
ables decreases multicollinearity between the multiplicative terms and its components,
and suggest centering around the mean so that the effect increases with deviations
from the most frequent or expected values. For that reason, centering variables in
multiplicative terms is a common norm in statistics.
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I also included variables traditionally included in the literature. Some of them are
hard to measure. For example, the concept of culture is hard to define and measure,
since it includes lanuage, religion, and traditions. In this case, I used a measure
common in the literature which is the percentage of protestant population. While
this measure is not perfect, given that some authors such as Freeman (1995) state
that English speaking societies have different immigration policies since their societies
were created by immigration -in particular, former colonies- there is a large overlap
between societies where English is the main language and those where the majority
of the population is of protestant origin. I also included a measure of federalism,
since Schaltegger and Feld (2009) finds that the fiscal adjustemnts necessary after a
fiscal shock or crisis are harder to implement in a federal system than in a centralized
one. Finally, I also included a measure for electoral system, since Cerna (2009) argues
countries with proportional representation have less generous high-skilled immigration
policies. The operazionaliation of the variables is:
• Culture ≈ % the population that is protestant (Stulz, 2003)
• Federalism : 0= central, 1= weak federalism, 2= strong federalism (Schal-
tegger and Feld, 2009)
• Electoral system ≈ Gallagher index of electoral disproportionality LSq =√
1
2
∑n
1=1(Vi − Si)2 (Gallagher, 1991).
The results if running a logit regression, including t1, t2, and t3 as regressors are:
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The first important point is that the statistical significance of the components of
the multiplicative terms does not change from the interactive model to the simple
model. There are, however, two issues that are important to mention before inter-
preting the results of this regression. First, the coefficients or β’s in the logistic
regression model do not measure how the mean of Y , our response or dependent vari-
able, changes when X1, one of our explanatory or independent variables, changes by
one unit when all other predictors are held constant, as would be the case in a linear
model. Rather, it models the changes on the mean of Y as transformed by a logit
link, defined as ln µ
1−µ (Agresti, 2002; Jaccard, 2001). Since the logit coefficients are
odds, which are not as intuitive as a linear relationship, it is easier to interpret them
by transforming them into estimated probabilities, as King, Tomz, and Wittenberg
(2000) suggest.
The second important issue is that since this is an interactive model, in order to
estimate the effect of a having at the same time the three conditions mentioned in
the theory (a liberal welfare state, a fiscal crisis, and a left of center government) it
would be incorrect to estimate how the probability of implementing a points system
in a certain year using only the first coefficient. Rather, it is important to also take
into account the effect of this variables by themselves and in the two-way interactions
(Kam and Franzese, 2007; Jaccard, 2001). For example, if I wanted to estimate the
probability of implementing a points system in country i and year j, when this country
has a decommodification value of 2, a left seats value of 3, and a fiscal crisis value of
43, and for simplicity’s sake every other variable has a value of 0, then, the estimation
would be:
3These values represent only a hypothetical example.
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logit(pi) = 8.971−0.00005(2∗3∗4)+0.005(2∗3)−0.0002(2∗4)+0.0009(3∗4)−0.263(2)−0.026(3)+0.003(4)
(2.2)
Taking these two important issues into consideration, and to make it easier to
understand the results of the model, I estimated the probabilities of implementing a
points system under different conditions, using the methodology described in King,
Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000). Specifically, I estimated how the probability of im-
plementing a points system changes when we move from from the maximum to the
minimum levels of the three variables of interest, when holding everything else at the
mean. The results are:
Table 2.2: Estimated probabilities of points system implementation
Liberal welfare state Coorporatist welfare state
Fiscal Crisis No crisis Fiscal crisis No crisis
Left 0.96-0.99 0.90-0.92 0.66-0.67 0.66-0.68
Right 0.80-0.82 0.75-0.79 0.63-0.65 0.49-0.55
As we can see in Table 2.2, when a country has a liberal welfare state, a left of
center government, and a fiscal crisis the probability of implementing a points system
is extremely high, 0.98. This probaility is higher when these three conditions are
present than when only any combination of two occurs. For example, the probability
that a liberal welfare state with a fiscal crisis and a right of center government imple-
ments a points system is lower, at 0.81. Out of the three variables, the type of welfare
state seems to be the one with the largest impact in the probability of implementing
a points system. In summary, Table 2.2 shows evidence supporting the theory pre-
sented in Chapter One. While any country would benefit from the implementation
of a points system, it is more likely that liberal welfare states, and specially those
with fiscal crisis and a left of center government implement this system. Regarding
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the control variables, none of them are statistically significant, with the exception
of t1, t2 and, t3 indicating that running a survival model was appropriate and that
the theories currently present in the literature failed to explain the why and when of
points system implementation.
Conclusions
Using large-N statistical analysis I was able to reject the null hypothesis and show
that the presence of three conditions -a left of center government, a liberal market
economy, and fiscal deficit- increase the probability that a country to implement a
selective immigration policy and that the theory presented earlier complements the
current state of the literature on high-skilled immigration policy.
Furthermore, this analysis sheds light at the issue of policy convergence. While
the factor endowment of a country is useful explaining the policy convergence we
have observed in the last half of the XX Century regarding the liberalization of trade
and financial markets, it is not nearly as effective for immigration. This contradicts
the conventional knowledge in Economics introduced by Mundell in 1957 about the
substitution between trade and the movement of other factors of production such as
labor. It also shows that there has not been convergence in immigration policy, but
divergence.
Data Appendix
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Chapter 3
Liberal Welfare States: United
States and Canada
The implementation of selective immigration policies is more likely to occur
in times of fiscal crisis, much more so in countries where the welfare state is not
universal. In countries where the welfare state is universal, a high skilled immigrant
is equally costly for the public coffer than a low skilled immigrant. As a consequence,
there are less fiscal incentives to implement a policy that attracts more immigrants,
regardless of their skills. Since the type of welfare state is a fundamental component
of which immigration policy is selected it is important to differentiate between welfare
systems.
In the academic literature, there are several categorizations of welfare states based
on distinct aspects of the economy. The more widely known are four frameworks: The
Power Resource Theory (Esping-Andersen, 1990), the Varieties of Capitalism (Hall
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and Soskice, 2001), the Asset Based theory (Iversen, 2005), and the“Hybrid Theory”:1
Welfare States and Production Regimes (Huber and Stephens, 2001).
Liberal welfare states (LWS), are according to Esping-Andersen (1990) those that
minimize decommodification, defined as “the degree to which individuals, or families,
can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independent of market participa-
tion” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 37). Some of the LWS are Canada, the United States,
and the United Kingdom.
There is an overlap between Liberal Welfare States and what Hall and Soskice
(2001) call a Liberal Market Economy (LME) where “firms coordinate their activities
through hierarchies and competitive market arrangements” (Hall and Soskice, 2001,
8). The typical LME are the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland,
and Australia.
Iversen (2005) categorizes welfare states according to the composition of people
skills and their specificity. Countries that invest in more general (mobile) skills require
less social protection than countries than invest in industry specific skills which are
more vulnerable to external shocks (Iversen, 2005, 18). Some of the countries that
invest more heavily in general skills are the United States, Ireland, and Canada.
Huber and Stephens (2001) try to bring together both the Varieties of Capitalism
theory of production regimes and Esping-Andersen’s categorization of welfare states
into a single classification of regimes. They divided the less generous welfare states
into liberal welfare states (Canada, Ireland, United Kingdom, and the United States)
and “ antipodean wage earner” welfare states (Australia and New Zealand). Australia
and New Zealand are included in a different category because of their history. Before
the 1950s they had some of the most developed welfare systems, but since Labor was
1While I call this theory hybrid, the authors do not give it that name
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not in power for most of the period between 1950 and 1972, they went from “welfare
state leaders” to “welfare state laggards” in twenty years (Huber and Stephens, 2001,
114). The outcome however, is a liberal welfare state, but one where wages and
the arbitration system are determined by the state rather than markets (Huber and
Stephens, 2001, 112).
All of these categorizations are based on different aspects of political economy,
but the cluster of countries that fall on the less generous category, however we call it,
is composed by the same set of countries. These regimes can be characterized as less
“generous” welfare states in the sense that most people need to have employment to
receive social welfare. These are welfare states based on the idea redistribution instead
of providing insurance. In these countries the welfare state is not universal. The bulk
of the recipients of social welfare are lower income groups, and the taxes to fund
it come from higher income groups (Cusack and Beramendi, 2006), therefore, high-
skilled/high-income immigrants will be net contributors to social welfare programs.
Those governments that want to maintain or expand social welfare in these coun-
tries are likely to favor high-skilled immigration in times of fiscal scarcity. But, which
governments are those? And why don’t they always implement a points system?
There have been previous studies linking different types of welfare state with differ-
ent immigration policy. Bucken-Knapp (2009) explains how in Sweden, a Coordinated
Market Economy in a Social Democratic welfare state, policy makers have been hes-
itant to liberalize skilled immigration at the request of employers facing shortages,
because doing so might endanger the “Swedish model” of full employment. Menz
(2009) argues that in LMEs where labor markets have been de-regulated, immigrants
are allowed if they can cope with the conditions offered by those jobs, while CMEs
see immigrants as a way to address some economic shortcomings, particularly in the
service sector. As a consequence, he argues that “different systems of political econ-
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omy will seek to influence governments to adopt labor migration policies that reflect
the profile of immigrants deemed complementary to national production strategies”
(Menz, 2009, 12).
This literature, however, does shed light on variation in immigration policies
among countries with similar welfare state systems. I argue that in order to un-
derstand why countries implement points systems for immigration, we need to under-
stand not only the type of welfare state, but also the economic and political situation
the country is facing. Very similar political economies, such as the United States
and Canada have divergent immigration policies. I argue that while their “produc-
tion strategies”, using Menz’s terms, are alike, the divergence in how they deal with
high-skilled immigration is due to the political and economic environment in which
the immigration reforms were proposed and enacted. I will show evidence to support
this argument by describing the fiscal and political situation of both countries when
high-skilled immigration policies were proposed and enacted.
In this chapter I will describe the historical evolution of immigration policy in the
United States and Canada. These two countries have similar welfare systems, but
different immigration policies. My hypothesis is that this difference stems from the
contrasting timing of fiscal crisis and government ideology.
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3.1 The United States
The U.S. is one of the main countries of immigration. On aggregate numbers, the
United States receives more immigrants than any other country,2 but only one fourth
of the foreign born population in the country is highly skilled, a figure that pales
when compared to Canada or Australia where approximately 38% of the immigrants3
are highly skilled (Belot and Hatton, 2008, 28).
The “pull” factor, or the economic attractiveness of the U.S. for high-skilled im-
migrants is not the problem. The Global Migration Barometer4 using information on
GDP, access to capital, the ease of starting a business and several other variables of
importance for high-skilled immigrants ranked the U.S. as the most attractive country
(Australia was the third, and Canada the sixth). This study also ranked the acces-
sibility for migrants, based on government policy towards immigration and the ease
of hiring immigrants, among other issues, the U.S. ranked seventh, while Australia
and Canada were ranked first and second respectively (Global Migration Barometer,
2008, 9).
The cause for this disconnect in the United States is its immigration policy. Unlike
Australia and Canada, its current immigration policy does not include a “points
system,” which has been proved more effective to attract high-skilled immigrants.
The purpose of this section is to use a process tracing methodology, defined as
“the method [that] attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal
chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the
2The proportion of the population that is foreign born, however, is higher in many other countries.
3In this case, I am using immigrant and foreign born as synonyms, though I am aware the figures
might differ slightly when we take into account naturalization.
4http://corporate.westernunion.com/barometer.html
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outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennet, 2005, 206), to describe the
conditions under which the implementation of quasi - selective immigration policies
succeeded, and the implementation of points systems failed, focusing particularly on
times of economic crisis.
Early immigration policy
The Panic of 1817 and the “public charge” of immigrants
The crisis
The Panic of 1819 was the first depression in the United States. Before the War,
the US imported most manufactured goods, particularly from Great Britain, and had
a mostly agricultural economy. The War allowed domestic producers to develop a
manufacturing industry given the impossibility of importing. However, when the war
ended Americans began importing manufactured goods once again, fueled by inflation
and the credit expansion from banks. At the same time, domestic producers found
it almost impossible to compete with European industries. The number of banks
increased dramatically, and so did credit. This boom helped establish the New York
Stock Exchange in 1817, and with it the beginning of investment banking.
The banks started having problems to continue specie payment (payment in gold
or silver), and in the Fall of 1818 the external debt for the Louisiana Purchase had
to be paid in gold by the Bank of the United States. In face of this, the Bank started
restricting lending in its branches which contracted the money supply and caused the
“Panic of 1819” (Rothbard, 2007, 1-27).
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Political Parties
By 1815 and 1816, the Democratic party machine of New York City, better know
as Tammany Hall was in control of both the state legislature and the city councils,
according to Myers (2005, 37). Tammany Hall relied heavily on immigrants: The
“bosses” would help immigrants find jobs, pay for funerals and weddings, among
other things in exchange for votes.5 This might explain why instead of outright re-
stricting immigration (which would affect their votes), they decided instead to charge
a tax. Also, if we consider “honest graft” to be some combination of welfare services
and corruption,6 the Tammany bosses in City Council would benefit politically from
having extra taxes to provide more “services” to their voters.
Selective immigration policy
Immigration policy at the national level didn’t really exist in 1819, and neither
did welfare states as we know them today7 but according to Zolberg (2006, 11) local
governments in New York City, where most immigrants arrived, authorized municipal
5A great piece on how this party machine worked is “Plunkitt of Tammany Hall. A
Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics” by William Riordon, available at
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/plunkett-george/tammany-hall/index.htm .
6In “Plunkitt of Tammany Hall,” George W. Plunkitt differentiates between honest and dishonest
graft, arguing Tammany bosses only get involved in honest graft. In chapter 1, he explains:
“My party’s in power in the city, and it’s goin’ to undertake a lot of public improvements. Well,
I’m tipped off, say, that they’re going to lay out a new park at a certain place. I see my
opportunity and I take it. I go to that place and I buy up all the land I can in the neighborhood.
Then the board of this or that makes its plan public, and there is a rush to get my land, which
nobody cared particular for before. Ain’t it perfectly honest to charge a good price and make a
profit on my investment and foresight? Of course, it is. Well, that’s honest graft.”
Chapter 1 available at
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/plunkett-george/tammany-hall/index.htm
7Huber and Stephens (2001) cite the beginning of the development of welfare states in the early
XX Century.
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officials to demand a bond not exceeding $3,000 for each immigrant likely to become a
“public charge,” and a head tax from passengers and crew to finance medical facilities.
During the XIX Century, the welfare state was minimal to non-existent. In other
words, even less generous than the most liberal of welfare states today. This goes
with accordance with the theory stated in chapter one. The least generous welfare
states are the ones expected to implement selective, or in this case “proto selective”
immigration policies.
While these measures cannot be considered policies that select immigrants on the
basis of their skills, they are selective on the basis of fiscal burden. They shed light
to the relationship between the welfare state and immigration. Immigrants that are
a burden on the public coffers become a concern when the economy is in poor shape,
and as a consequence governments try to limit the fiscal impact of immigration.
The “head tax” on immigrants was later declared unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court, on the argument that many of the immigrants arriving in the
Ports of New York and Boston -who also implemented head taxes- might not establish
residency in those cities, and as a consequence, they might never become a public
charge. Justice Grier said that “. . . the State should not be allowed to tax those who,
on examination, are found not to be within this description . . . ”8
In the years to follow, there were very few changes to immigration policy either
at the local or the national level, but movements in the business cycle were usually
followed with movements in immigration flows in the same direction, with the no-
table exception of the Civil War years. After the Civil War, the relation between
immigration flows and business cycles became even more evident.
8Smith v. Turner, Health Commissioner of Port of New York and Norris v. City of Boston
(1849), 48 U.S. 282, available at Abbot (1924, 151)
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The Literacy Test
The Panic of 1893 and the Literacy Test
The crisis
The Panic of 1893 and the subsequent depression came at the climax of the struggle
over the gold standard. In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act.
This bill allowed buying and coining silver in small quantities, and it increased the
fears that the United States would leave the Gold Standard. This lead to a depletion
of Treasury gold stocks. Moreover, external debt had to be paid in gold, so New York
banks traded their silver reserves for gold buying Treasury notes that were paid in
gold. This led the gold reserves below the accepted limits causing a panic (Hoffmann,
1956; Noyes, 1894; Rockoff, 1990).
One of the first alerta that a crisis was coming was the failure of the Philadelphia
and Reading Railroad, and once the crisis had erupted the Northern Pacific Railway,
the Union Pacific Railroad and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad also went
bankrupt. As a consequence, unemployment increased, which combined with the lost
savings from the Panic meant several workers abandoned their houses because they
could not afford their mortgages. All of these events had fiscal consequences. For
one, the bankruptcy in the railroad industry reduced the levels of tax collection, and
while a welfare state per se did not exist, there were several strikes asking for a relief
job program, which increased the fiscal tension. The contraction lasted until 1897,
according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.9
9http://www.nber.org/cycles.html
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Political Parties
In 1896, the Democrats met in Chicago to nominate a presidential candidate. The
economy was in terrible shape, so the Democrats were divided between those that
supported the gold standard, leaded by President Cleveland that tried to repeal the
Sherman Act, and those favoring a bimetallic standard. The latter won and nomi-
nated William Jennings Bryan, who promoted unlimited coinage of silver (Rockoff,
1990). He was supported by the Farmers’ alliance from the Midwest and West, but
those regions were highly competitive since the pro-tariff platform of the Republi-
can candidate, McKinley, appealed to rural voters and provided for an increase in
government income, very necessary in the middle of a depression (Hiscox, 2001).
In 1896, there was also an electoral “realignment” in the United States, when
the Democratic vote declined everywhere outside the South. The argument is that
Democrats and Jennings Bryan populist platform alienated urban voters. The Re-
publicans presented trade protectionism -specially tariffs- as a way to protect urban
workers and argued the Democratic government had brought up the economic prob-
lem since Grover Cleveland won the 1892 election and used the Democratic majority
to lower tariffs.10 According to Zolberg (2006, 221), the German and Irish immi-
grants were the urban sources of Democratic support, so the party maintained a
positive stance towards immigration, and against the “Literacy Test”, even when la-
bor groups started to oppose it (Higham, 1952). The pro-tariff Republican candidate,
McKinley won the election and the discussions over immigration were left alone for
some years.
By the time the contraction ended, the United States had a Republican govern-
ment (McKinley as President with Republican majorities in both chambers), and
10More information on this realignment can be read in Stonecash and Silina (2005)
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a divided Democratic Party, making it politically hard to find enough support to
approve the literacy test.
Selective Immigration Policy
The position of American businesses towards immigration started to change in the
1890s. Before, most employers considered cheap immigrant labor as necessary for their
businesses to succeed, but following the Panic of 1893, the high unemployment levels
and demand for relief made employers to start to support restricting immigration on
the basis of literacy or financial means, so that only those who had the financial means
to succeed would immigrate (Solomon, 1989). The literacy test was to be administered
to adults to assess their education. It consisted of reading several sentences of the
Constitution in any language, and some of the bills required that the immigrant be
able to write the text he or she could read. Some bills contained a financial test, in
which adult males had to have savings of 25 dollars, or approximately nine weeks of
income in Europe, but they never received serious deliberation in Congress (Goldin,
1993, 3).
According to Heald (1953, 292), several business organizations in Boston, New
York, Chicago, and St. Louis in 1893 and 1894 submitted proposals for a literacy
test to the National Board of Trade. Labor also favored selective immigration after
the crisis. The American Federation of Labor and the Knights of Labor, two of the
main labor organizations of the time came out in favor of the literacy test in 1897,
but had not done so before (Goldin, 1993, 4).
In 1894, the Immigration Restriction League was created with a focus on promot-
ing the literacy test and leaded by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. In 1895 the League
wrote a bill requiring all European immigrants to be alphabetized upon admission in
the United States. The bill was introduced in the Senate in December by Sen. Lodge
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and in the House by Rep. McCall (both Republicans from Massachusetts). Another
bill was being discussed at the same time, supported by Francis A. Walker. The
Walker proposal was to impose a ten-dollar tax against each immigrant. The League
considered that would discriminate against poor immigrants too clearly. Since many
states included already literacy requirements for voting, the League considered the
Literacy Test was a strategic way to slow down immigration without openly discrim-
inating any group (Fairchild, 1917; Solomon, 1989). In the words of Senator Lodge:
“This measure, if adopted, will exclude a large portion of the present immigration,
and with few exceptions, will tell exclusively on the most undesirable portions of
immigration alone.11”
The bill passed in the House, overwhelmingly, since the rural Democrats aligned
with the Republicans. In the Senate, the Republicans waited until the election of
William McKinley to vote on the Literacy Act, worried it might alienate the urban
coalition of business and labor. The majority of the votes were in the cities, along with
the bulk of immigrant voters. After McKinley was elected, the senate voted its own
version of the test. The final conference report was approved by large portion of the
House of Representatives (217-36), but received much less enthusiastic support in the
Senate (34-31), because the new bill included the prohibition on temporary foreign
migrant labor12 which affected the industrial interests, particularly in New England.
As a consequence, even Senator Lodge voted against the final version. Even when the
Republicans had majority after the 1896 election, they could not jeopardize losing
11Senate, Committee on Immigration, Report no. 290 (to Accompany S. 2147), 54th, April 2,
1896, 2.
12The Corliss amendment purported to stop transitory immigration. Sen. Corliss, from Michigan,
directly aimed his amendment to Canadian day laborers (Fairchild, 1917, 453).
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industrial support. The bill was supported mostly by rural Senators, from states that
benefited from the prohibition of migrant labor (Zolberg, 2006).
In March 2, 1897 outgoing President Grover Cleveland vetoed the bill13, strongly
opposing the Literacy Test under two arguments. First, he argued in favor of the
status quo. In his words:
“It is said, however, that the quality of recent immigration is undesirable.
The time is quite within recent memory when the same thing was said of
immigrants who, with their descendants, are now numbered among our
best citizens.”
And second, he made an argument on the basis of security, arguing low-skilled
immigrants were less likely to be agitators:
“. . . , it is infinitely more safe to admit a hundred thousand immigrants
who, though unable to read and write, seek among us only a home and
opportunity to work than to admit one of those unruly agitators and
enemies of governmental control who can not only read and write, but
delights in arousing by inflammatory speech the illiterate and peacefully
inclined to discontent and tumult. Violence and disorder do not originate
with illiterate laborers.”
The House voted to override the veto on March 3, by a vote of 193 to 37, but the
Senate was too divided, partly because of the efforts of industry groups such as the
steamship companies, and no action was taken, so the bill died (Fairchild, 1917, 454).
The fact that both labor and capital were in favor of selective immigration goes
against the idea that preferences towards the immigration can be explained by the
factor endowment. While the returns to capital were expected to increase with a large
flow of labor, and wages of native workers to decrease, as would be predicted by the
Hecksher-Ohlin model, both factors formed a coalition in favor of the Literacy test.
13The text of the veto is available in the American Presidency Project website:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=70845
47
Also, it is clear from President Cleveland’s veto that the support or opposition
to the Literacy test was not based in fiscal concerns. There was no modern welfare
state as we know it today14, and the immigration restrictions that were proposed,
including the Literacy test, were only superficially related to the fiscal situation of
the country and more with security concerns and keeping the support of urban voters-
both industry owners and immigrant voters-.
Furthermore, the realignment of 1896 favored Republican, partially because of the
failure of the tariff decreases under Democratic President Cleveland. The increase in
tariffs that followed had a much larger fiscal impact that the implementation of the
Literacy Act would have had, particularly after the League decided to support it in-
stead of the Walker proposal, which clearly had fiscal purposes. After the realignment
in 1896, the Republican majority under McKinley approved the Dingley Tariff which
increased general import duties (Hiscox, 2001, 55).
While my theory is that the least generous welfare states that are facing fiscal
crises are more likely to implement selective immigration policies, in 1896-1897 the
Republican Party had just regained control of the legislature, and the Democratic
Party was divided between the urban voters in the North that opposed immigration
restrictions and the rural voters in the South and Midwest which favored them.
During this period, the McKinley government did respond to the domestic eco-
nomic crisis using international economic tools, but the chosen tool was tariff in-
creases, and in specific the Dingley tariff. Trade restrictions were also politically more
viable, since they benefited a larger Republican coalition: both the industrial groups
in New England-that opposed the bill because of the Corliss Amendment- and the
14Huber and Stephens (2001, 169) cite the establishment of “antipodean” welfare states after
World War I. Egal and Sobel (2009, 162) explain that unlike some European countries the US
lagged and did not enact the Social Security Act until 1935.
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rural voters in the Midwest and the South-that supported immigration restrictions-
were united in their support of tariff increases. In contrast, 1898 when the House of
Representatives tried to consider a version of the Literacy test that had been recently
approved in the Senate, there were not enough votes to even put the bill to consider-
ation (101 votes in favor of the consideration vs. 104 against) (Goldin, 1993, 5). This
sheds light to the political multidimensionality of immigration versus trade.
The implementation of the Literacy Test
The crisis
In the period during which the Literacy Test was in the public debate there were
two financial panics, the first in 1907 and the second in 1914.
In 1906, some evidence started to emerge that indicated that consumers were
willing to take risks in real estate and other speculative activities, as a consequence of
the improvement of stocks that started in 1904 and reached its highest point in 1906.
Then a downward movement started in January of 1907, and stocks reached their
lowest point during the panic, in October. According to Johnson (1908), the causes
of the crisis were the exhaustion of capital funds by wars and financial speculation,
and was particularly acute in 1907 because banking institutions had made “unduly”
advances on securities, and had not increased their cash reserves (Johnson, 1908, 461).
This crisis was the largest one, before the Great Depression.15
15In 1914, the fear that the United States would abandon the Gold Standard pushed the world
value of the dollar. As a consequence, foreigners who owned bonds and stocks worth billions of
dollars, tried to sell them to raise dollars and demand gold. The crisis started in July 27 because the
exchange rate increased four cents above the gold export point. On July 31, the Treasury Secretary
McAdoo asked the New York Stock Exchange to close, so that US stocks couldn’t be sold and bank
reserves of gold wouldn’t be endangered. In August, McAdoo invoked the Aldrich-Vreeland Act,
allowing banks to create currency. That way, a bank facing a sudden loss of currency could create
bank notes to meet demand. The Stock Exchange was opened on December 12. This allowed the
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Parties
The economic crises of 1904, 1907-1908, and 1914 brought a great interest on the
economic consequences of immigration, particularly among labor groups. Interest-
ingly, the economic recovery that followed each of these recessions didn’t reduced the
public attention towards selective immigration. According to Lane (1984) several fac-
tors increased the support for selective immigration in the Wilson presidency among
labor groups and the Democratic party, which had been pro immigration before.
Among those are the unemployment and wage decreases that ensued the recessions,
which made labor groups doubt whether the economy could accommodate more work-
ers. Additionally, the possibility of American involvement in World War I generated
arguments favoring the literacy test (Lane, 1984).
The Republicans, supported still by the Immigration Restriction League and Sen-
ator Cabot Lodge based their arguments more on anthropological and ethnical ar-
guments. In 1907, President Roosevelt created a commission of Senators, Repre-
sentatives and public experts to analyze immigration. The board included Senators
Dillingham, Lodge, and Lattimer and Representatives Howell, Bennett, and Burnett.
The presence of Lodge assured that the Immigration Restriction League could su-
pervise the Dillingham Commission. After much bickering in the Commission, on
December 15 of 1915 the commission answered in favor of the literacy test. The
arguments, however, had less to do with economics and more with the “moral su-
periority” of certain races. According to Solomon (1989), the argument was that
new immigrants (from Ireland, and Southern and Eastern Europe) “came to America
only to better themselves economically in contrast to their predecessors, who sought
country to avoid a panic as large as the one in 1907, along with the existence of the Federal Reserve,
created the year before (Silber, 2007).
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political and religious freedom” (Solomon, 1989, 198). Their materialistic ambitions,
it was argued, proved the thesis of their moral inferiority.
The Dillingham Commission’s report was significant in providing support for the
literacy test, both for Democrats and Republicans, in the last (and successful) attempt
to implement a literacy test for immigrants in 1915.
Selective immigration policy
There were many attempts to implement the Literacy Test after the Cleveland
veto, as we can see on table 3.1. In the 1900s there were even some votes to remove
the Literacy Test in 1906, before the Panic of 1907. The second veto to the Literacy
Test came from President Taft in September 14, 1913, as a response to the Burnett
Literacy Test Bill with a very short veto message:
“I cannot make up my mind to sign a bill which in its chief provision
violates a principle that ought, in my opinion, to be upheld in dealing
with our immigration. I refer to the literacy test. For the reasons stated
in Secretary’s Nagel letter to me, I cannot approve that test”16
The letter from Charles Nagel, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, argued
that the Literacy test would not only restrict the immigration of “undesirables” but
also of desirable individuals that because of lack of opportunities in their countries
are not literate, but that given the chance to learn how to read and write would do
it.17
Congress attempted to pass the bill over the veto, before the new Congress and
the new President -Woodrow Wilson-took office. The attempt was successful in the
16Abbot (1924, 211)
17The text of the letter is available at Abbot (1924).
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Senate where the outgoing Republican majority and seven Democrats supported it,
but failed in the House by five votes (Fairchild, 1917).
Less than two years after President Wilson took office, Congress passed a bill
very similar to the one that was vetoed two years before18. This bill was successfully
passed in both the Senate-50 to 7- and the House -227 to 94-, but was vetoed by Pres-
ident Wilson, who had received significant electoral support from immigrant groups
(Fairchild, 1917, 457). His response was similar to the previous veto messages related
to the Literacy Test, and he was hesitant about selecting immigrants, not reducing
the flows. In his words:
“The literacy test and the tests and restrictions which accompany it con-
stitute an even more radical change in the policy of the Nation. Hitherto
we have generously kept our doors open to all who were not unfitted by
reason of disease or incapacity for self-support or such personal records
and antecedents as were likely to make them a menace to our peace and
order or to the wholesome and essential relationships of life. In this bill it
is proposed to turn away from tests of character and of quality and impose
tests which exclude and restrict; for the new tests here embodied are not
tests of quality or of character or of personal fitness, but tests of opportu-
nity. Those who come seeking opportunity are not to be admitted unless
they have already had one of the chief of the opportunities they seek, the
opportunity of education. The object of such provisions is restriction, not
selection.”19
While according to Fairchild (1917, 458) the bill had enough support in the Senate
to override the veto, but it was never given the opportunity because the House failed to
override the veto-261 to 136-. Thirteen Democrats that had originally voted in favor
of the Literacy Test changed their vote. Joseph Patten, a lobbyist for the Immigration
Restriction League argued that the secretary of the President, Joseph Tumulty had
18“Revive Immigration Bill” New York Times, Sept. 18, 1913.
19Veto Message, January 28, 1915. Available at the American Presidency Project:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65386&st=veto+message&st1=
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“dangled” a possible federal judge appointment before tho of these Congressmen and
offered some other patronage deals for the rest (Zeidel, 1986, 332).
Two years later, a similar bill was proposed-known as the Burnett bill-by both the
Senate and the House, now with the approval stamp of the Dillingham Commission.
Furthermore, with World War I well underway, some Republicans-Patten, amongst
them-argued the Literacy Test was necessary because the end of the war in Europe
would bring an increase in immigration flows (Fairchild, 1917; Lane, 1984; Zeidel,
1986). That argument, however, was not the one that convinced the Democrats that
had voted against the bill two years before to finally support the bill, but the effects
of the depression of 1914, when the country was barely recovering from the crisis in
1907 and 1914. (Lane, 1984). This is consistent with the hypothesis presented in the
theory of chapter 1.
The debate began on December 11, 1916. The opposition to the bill came from
Democrats who focused on sustaining the Wilson veto. Those in favor of the Literacy
Test were able to get a voice vote, instead of a roll-call. That way, the opponents
of the bill could not measure the likelihood of sustaining the veto. The Burnett bill
was passed on January 8, 1917, and twenty-one days after, President Wilson vetoed
the bill. In his veto message, close to the last one, he argued that “Test of quality
of purpose cannot be objected on principle, but tests of opportunity surely may be”
(Abbot, 1924, 215),(Zeidel, 1986, 340).
The veto was overridden in the first week after, receiving support from both
parties. According to Goldin (1993), while the Democratic Party had majorities in
both the Senate and the House, different legislators had been elected in the election
of 1916 and many of the opponents were “voted out of office.” If the vote had taken
place before the election it would not have passed over the veto (Goldin, 1993, 9).
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The supporters of the bill came from the urban-northeastern states (the Immi-
gration Restriction League was created in Boston) and the Southern states where
anti-foreign sentiments grew. With the exception of Louisiana, the Southern states
where united in favor of the Literacy Test, and only parts of the urban Northeast and
Midwest were against it. According to Goldin (1993, 23-24) the main determinants of
the vote were the percentage of foreign workers in the district and the average wage.
Richer and more urban districts were more likely to oppose the test. This explains
the regional patterns of support.
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Points systems
Immigration Act of 1990
During most of the XX Century, immigration policy reforms were based mostly
on racial considerations, and not the fiscal impact of immigration or the skill level
of the immigrants. In 1921, national origins quotas were implemented, but by the
1960s the United States was in the middle of the civil rights movement, and a policy
based on race was becoming harder to defend. In 1963, President Kennedy introduced
legislation to eliminate, in phases, the national origin quotas. This proposal faced
opposition in Congress and no actions were taken at the time. In 1964, Congressmen
Emanuel Celler, a Democrat from New York and Phillip Hart, a Democrat from
Michigan proposed a bill that would become the 1965 Immigration and Nationality
Act. This bill eliminated the national origin quotas and created a family based system
(Gimpel and Edwards, 1999; Zolberg, 2006).
The crisis
In 1989, the year George H.W. Bush’s presidency started, the fiscal deficit in the
United States was 2.73% of the GDP.20, and in the same year the federal budget debt
was $2.8 trillion dollars, as much as three times larger than in 1980.21 While during
the Republican National Convention, when he was eleceted as candidate, he famously
said:
20http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/93/07/9307pp.dat
21http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/bush/essays/biography/4
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“Congress will push me to raise taxes, and I’ll say no, and they’ll push,
and I’ll say no, and they’ll push again, and I’ll say to them, “Read my
lips: no new taxes.””22
This proved harder since he had to maintain a restricted agenda in order to main-
tain the fiscal deficit in a manageable level. During the budget negotiations for the
1991 budget, in 1990, the President had to renege on his promise on June 29, 1990.
During a press conference, he declared that since the deficit was larger than usual,
tough decisions had to be made o avoid “draconian cuts in defense, student grants,
and a wide array of other necessary domestic services.” When he was questioned by
the press about whether he was breaking a promise he made to voters, he responded:
“I’d say I take a look at a new situation. I see an enormous deficit. I
see a savings and loan problem out there that has to be resolved. And
like Abraham Lincoln said, I’ll think anew. I’m not violating or getting
away from my fundamental conviction on taxes, anything of that nature,
not in the least. But what I’ve said is on the table, and let’s see where
we go. But we’ve got a very important national problem, and I think the
President owes the people his judgment at the moment he has to address
that problem. And that’s exactly what I’m trying to do.
Look, I knew I’d catch some flak on this decision – just those two words
– but I’ve got to do what I think is right, and then I’ll ask the people
for support. But more important than posturing now or even negotiating
is the result. Do we continue to provide jobs for the American people,
and do we continue to provide economic growth, and do we try to stop
saddling the generations on the way up, the young people, with absolutely
unacceptable deficits?”23
At the same time this budget negotiations were occurring, the country was wrapped
in the “Savings and Loans” (S & L) crisis. Inflation rose during the War in Vietnam
and, as a consequence, interest rates rose until the early 1980s. Also, there was a
22On Language; Read My Lips, by William Safire, New York Times, September 8, 1988.
23http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18650&st=&st1=
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deregulation of the financial institutions at the federal and local level, so these in-
stitutions engaged in riskier investments. Furthermore, in 1982 real state investors
received tax breaks that benefited commercial real estate investments, even if they
were high risk. In 1986, however, these tax breaks were withdrawn. As a consequence,
in the end of 1986 the Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was
declared insolvent. In August of 1987, the Financing Corporation (FICO) was created
by Congress to issue long term bonds to fund the FSLIC. By 1989, when the legisla-
ture started talking about points systems, FICO had only obtained 8.2 billion dollars,
which was insufficient to deal with the problems in the S & L industry. So finally, in
August of 1989, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989 (FIRREA) was approved in Congress to start taxpayers’ involvement in the
solution of the crisis. FIRREA also created the “Resolution Trust Corporation” to
resolve troubled “thrifts”, originally between 1989 and 1992, but it was extended until
1995 (Curry and Shibut, 2000; Kane, 1992).
Curry and Shibut (2000) calculate that the total cost of the S & L crisis for
taxpayers was 91.3 billion dollars (Curry and Shibut, 2000, 29), but by the time the
debate on immigration started in Congress in 1989, 296 savings associations insured
by the FSLIC had be declared insolvent by the FSLIC. According to information from
the same authors, by 1989 the assets lost were (Curry and Shibut, 2000, 27):
Table 3.2: Savings & Loans Crisis: Insolvent associations insured by the FSLIC
Year Number Assets (millions of dollars)
1986 54 16, 264
1987 48 11, 270
1988 185 96, 760
1989 9 725
Total 296 125, 019
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Parties
The proposal to implement points systems came months after George H.W. Bush
was sworn in as President. The 1988 came after a steady decline in Democratic
support that started in 1980 and continued during the Reagan Presidency. This was
also the first election in fifty years in which voters partisan identifications were evenly
divided before the election (Shanks and Miller, 1991, 131).
While this seems to point out at a Republican President with very strong support
and no problems winning the election, he didn’t not perform as well as expected.
According to Shanks and Miller (1991, 131), Bush’s margin of victory was 40 % less
than Reagan’s four year before, even though Bush had the advantages brought by a
strong incumbent from his party, and a drop in Democratic identifications.
Some of the hypotheses about the determinants of Republican vote in 1988 have
to do with “patriotism” (Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz, 1992), and the promise not to
increase taxes made by Bush during a time of economic distress (Shanks and Miller,
1991), particularly because of the aforementioned S & L crisis, among other consid-
erations. Bush received 53% of the popular vote, while Dukakis got 45.6%, however,
the Democrats hold a plurality of 55% in the Senate and 60% in the House.
This relatively weak position was somewhat dangerous during times of fiscal crisis,
which might explain why retracting from the campaign promise of not raising taxes,
which could not be sustained, was so controversial, and so damaging in the 1992
campaign.
Selective immigration policy
In 1989, some senators who had become dissatisfied with the result of the elimi-
nation of national origin quotas in the 1960s started working on a bill. Their concern
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was that the family based system that was implemented then favored Latin American
immigrants, and affected immigrants from other nations, such as Ireland. Further-
more, the immigration policy didn’t reflect the economic needs of the United States
(Biden, 1989). The bill was introduced by Senators Edward Kennedy, Democrat from
Massachusetts, Alfonse D’Amato, Republican from New York, Christopher Dodd,
Democrat from Connecticut, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat from New York,
and Alan Simpson, Republican from Wyoming on February 7, 1989.
In Kennedy’s words, the system was rigid and several nations were “shortchanged”
by the system.24. This bill created a new category: “independent immigrants” for
people with skills scarce in the United States. These 54,000 additional visas would be
assigned through a point allocation system, citing the successful examples of Australia
and Canada (the only countries that implemented point systems before 1989). The
allocation that was proposed is the following (Biden, 1989, 5):25
Table 3.3: Points system proposal in S. 358
Criteria Maximum points Percent of total
Age: 10 13
10 pts. for age 21-35
5 pts. 36-45
Education: 25 33
10 pts. for high school
10 pts. for BA
5 pts. for graduate school
Occupational demand 20 27
Occupational training or work experience 20 27
Total 75 100
24Senate votes to revise visa allocations, CQ Almanac 1989 (Washington Congressional Quarterly
1990) http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal89-1138708
25Minimum points needed 75
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According to Gimpel and Edwards (1999), several amendments were made in
committee. The annual visa limit for independent immigrants was set at 120,000 and
the English language stimulation was removed because of the pressure of Hispanic
and Asian groups, and because in the media it received the treatment of a racially
based policy instead of an economically based one26, and because it received public
support from some questionable interest groups, such as the Pioneer Fund whose goal
was to popularize “applied genetics.”27
Furthermore, some senators opposed the English requirement arguing that their
ancestors came here without knowing the language, such as Senator Leahy, a Demo-
crat from Vermont, who argued that he could not be objective since “his grandparents
immigrated from Italy without knowing English and his wife was French and didn’t
know English when she arrived”. 28 At the end, the English requirement proved so
controversial that the only votes against deleting the English language requirements
were Senators Simpson and Thurmond.
On July 13, the bill was voted in the floor with the amendment mentioned above.
It was passed by 81 votes in favor, 17 against and 2 abstentions. The votes didn’t
follow clear partisan lines:
Table 3.4: Distribution of votes for S 358
Party Aye Nay NV
Democratic 41 14 2
Republican 40 3 0
Total 81 17 2
26English Issue Hides immigration, population agenda, Mesa Tribune, October 21, 1988
27Official English attracting bizarre followers, Mesa Tribune, October 22, 1988
28Senate votes to revise visa allocations, CQ Almanac 1989 (Washington Congressional Quarterly
1990) http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal89-1138708
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The votes cannot be predicted with high confidence levels on the basis of geog-
raphy. The senators that voted nay were: Breaux (D-LA), Bumpers (D-AR), Byrd
(D-WV), Conrad (D-ND), Cranston (D-CA), Exon (D-NE), Ford (D-KY), Gore (D-
TN), Heflin (D-AL), Helms (R-NC), Hollings (D-SC), Inouye (D-HI), Mikulski (D-
MD), Reid (D-NV), Rudman (R-NH), Shelby (D-AL), and Wilson (R-CA).29
The House’s version of the legislation was introduced March 19, 1990. The spon-
sors were Bruce Morrison, Democrat from Connecticut, and 32 other representatives
from several states and different parties. There were several differences between the
House and Senate proposals, allowing 100,000 more visas than the Kennedy-Simpson
bill would. Furthermore, instead of a points system, it established 65, 000 tempo-
rary worker visas (H1-B) with a maximum six-year stay (Usdansky and Espenshade,
2000).
However, Rep. Eliot Engel, Democrat from New York, introduced a bill (H.R.
4230)in a few days before (March 8), in order to establish a preference immigration
point system based on: age; occupational demand; occupational training and work
experience; prearranged U.S. employment; education; and knowledge of U.S. gov-
ernment and history. The amendment was co-sponsored by Reps. Martin Fros, a
Democrat from Texas and Stephen Solarz, also a Democrat from New York. The bill
was not voted, but sent to the House Committee on Judiciary on March 8 and then
on March 14 to the Subcommittee on Immigration Refugees and International Law
and never reached the floor.30
In contrast with the Senate, one of the main debates in the floor in the House
was about the federal government reimbursing states for the costs of immigration
29http://thomas.loc.gov/
30http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d101:HR04230:@@@L&summ2=m&#status
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programs, a fiscal debate. Rep. Lamar Smith, a Republican from Texas, introduced
an amendment to reimburse the costs for states (H.AMDT 803). He submitted the
proposal on October 2, 1990 and it was voted the same day, with the following
outcome:31
Table 3.5: Distribution of votes for H.AMDT. 803
Party Aye Nay NV
Democratic 13 238 6
Republican 40 130 6
Total 53 358 12
According to Gimpel and Edwards (1999, 190) these occurred parallel to the
budget negotiations, in which President Bush was facing a blockade from House
Democrats, since the President had just reneged on his campaign promise of “no
new taxes” so Republicans like Smith were worried of the costs of a new spending
initiative in that environment. The final version of the bill was voted on October 3,
1990. The votes were:32
Table 3.6: Distribution of votes for H.R. 4300
Party Aye Nay NV
Democratic 186 65 6
Republican 45 127 4
Total 231 192 10
The House bill was significantly different from the Senate bill. The first one didn’t
include a points system, and granted 800, 000 visas annually, instead of the 630, 000
31http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1990/roll401.xml
32http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1990/roll406.xml
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in the Senate bill. Moreover, the President publicly expressed he preferred the Senate
version, while the media favored the House bill (Zolberg, 2006, 379).
The House changed the bill number from H.R. 4300 to S. 358 in order for the bill
to be able to go to a joint Senate-House conference to reconciliate the two versions.
The Senate reached a compromise with no points system, and annual number of visas
set at 700, 000 of which 520, 000 are family based. While this seems closer to the
House version, Sen. Simpson, the main negotiator from the Senate in the conference,
however got an important concession: special visas for those willing to invest over
one million dollars in a new company and hire at least 10 Americans (Gimpel and
Edwards, 1999, 193)
The new version of the bill was approved on October 27, and the vote was dis-
tributed as follows:33
Table 3.7: Distribution of votes on the Conference Report S 358 in the Senate
Party Aye Nay NV
Democratic 51 3 1
Republican 38 5 2
Total 89 8 3
In the House the votes were:34
Table 3.8: Distribution of votes on the Conference Report S 358 in the House
Party Aye Nay NV
Democratic 171 54 32
Republican 93 64 18
Total 264 118 50
33http://www.senate.gov/
34http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1990/roll530.xml
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In both cases, it seems clear the bill got majoritarian support from both parties,
with less support in the House. This evidence indicates that high-skilled immigration
was not sold as a partisan issue in 1989-1990. The fact that the two main sponsors of
the bill in the Senate were Kennedy and Simpson strengthens this argument. While
the attempt to implement a point system failed, at that point, at least, it seemed
that the creation of H1-B visas was seen as an alternative, albeit less transforming of
the status quo, to a points system.
The 1990 Immigration reform was clearly being discuss in a time when, fiscally,
high-skilled immigrants were more desirable, but when politically a more selective
immigration system, such as a points system, was politically inviable. As a conse-
quence, a “second best” choice was implemented: a temporary worker program for
high-skilled immigrants. This informs our understanding of when such policies take
place, in many cases, after an attempt to implement a “points system” failed for
political reasons.
Comprehensive Immigration Reform bill of 2007
The crisis
In 2001, when the George W. Bush presidency started, the United States had a
balanced fiscal budget. Between 2001 and 2007, however, the effective tax rate in the
country went from 39% to 35%35, partly due to a series of tax cuts. Between 2001
and 2006 the tax cuts had a direct cost of $860 billion, and an effect on the deficit
of $929 billion (Price, 2005). Along with the tax reductions, the increased defense
spending due o the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, caused fiscal pressure. However, it
35http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=213
65
was seen by some more as a sign of deepening financial globalization, than a cause of
concern.36
By 2007, there were signs that a fiscal and financial crisis could come in the
United States, but there was not generalized concern. According to Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009), former Chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, argued the U.S. current
account deficit, caused by sustained United States’ borrowing from other countries,
that reached over 6.5% of the GDP in 2006 was not a primary risk factor “simply
a reflection of a broader trend toward global financial deepening that was allowing
countries to sustain much larger current account deficits and surpluses than in the
past” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 208-209). They also contend that among academics
and policy economists there was also a wide gamut of opinions about whether the
current account deficit was sustainable. In parallel, there was also a policy debate on
whether the explosion of housing prices was a cause of concern.
By the time the immigration debate on points system took place, in June of 2007,
the consensus opinion seemed to be that there were no big reasons to worry. In April
2007, the International Monetary Fund concluded that “risks to the global economy
had become extremely low and that, for the moment, there were no great worries”
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 214).
As a conclusion, while ex post, the economy seemed pretty fragile at the time of
the immigration debates in June of 2007, at the time there didn’t seem to be a gen-
eralized sense of urgency about the economy, and the priority at the time was not to
avoid an economic crisis. As a consequence, the fiscal impact of the implementation
of a points system would not resonate as much as in the midst of a crisis, where the
36Fir an outstanding description of the factors that led to the 2007 financial crisis, see Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009).
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consensus is that something needs to be done to ameliorate the deficits.
Parties
The immigration debate came with a brand new Congress, the 100thafter the
midterm election of 2006. This was the first time in twelve years that both the
Senate and the House had Democratic majorities.37
In the Senate, 30% of the senators were newly elected in that election, and while
the Democrats had majority, it wasn’t very strong, because it relied on two indepen-
dents, and it was far from being able to beat a filibuster. There were 49 Democratic
seats, 49 Republican, and 2 independents-Lieberman (CT) and Sanders (VT)- who
voted with the Democrats.38.
In the House, only 11% of the Representatives were newly elected members-fifty
seats- and again the Democratic majoritarian status was stronger than in the Senate,
but it was still fragile and the House was heavily divided. There were 233 Democrats
and 202 Republican members of the House in the 100th Congress.39
In conclusion, the political environment in 2007 was characterized by divided gov-
ernment, which makes policy reforms difficult in general; a President with relatively
low approval ratings; an opposition which was not strong enough to defeat a filibuster
or overcome presidential vetoes; and a very competitive presidential campaign was
about to start. Politically, this does not seem to be the optimal environment for a
37Dems Make History. Now Comes the Hard Part, NPR, January 4, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6725955
38Source: Federal Election Commission,
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2006/federalelections2006.shtml
39Same source as the Senate data
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controversial immigration reform that would move the status quo from a family based
policy to a points system.
Selective immigration policy
In June 18, 2007 Senators Edward Kennedy, Democrat from Massachusetts, and
Arlen Specter, Republican from Pennsylvania, proposed an immigration reform bill
(S. 1639) that included the creation of a points system for immigration in the United
States in section 502 of the bill, which is titled “Increasing American Competitiveness
Through a Merit-Based Evaluation System for Immigrants.” The proposed allocation
of points can be seen in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 (Wasem and Haddal, 2007, 30-31):
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The allocation of points in this proposal is even more stringent than the ones
observed in the countries with points systems, but while some of the discussion on
the bill related to the points system, the majority of the public attention was on other
areas, such as the alleged “amnesty” for illegal immigrants.
This proposal, and the points system, received strong support from President
Bush, contrary to the hypothesis presented in Chapter 1. In a statement of adminis-
tration policy, he said:40
“The Administration strongly supports Senate passage of the bipartisan
immigration reform proposal under consideration on the Senate floor. The
proposal offers a much-needed solution for our Nation’s broken immigra-
tion system. This proposal would deliver an immigration system that is
secure, productive, orderly, and fair. The Administration applauds the
members of the Senate who worked in the spirit of bipartisanship over the
past months to address this critically important issue . . .
For future immigrants wishing to come to the United States permanently,
the proposal would revamp our immigration system and establish a new
merit-based process, which takes into account job skills, economic needs,
education, and English proficiency.”
The proposal did, however, receive opposition from immigrant groups, particularly
Hispanic, and some members of both parties, particularly Democrats who might have
wanted to distance themselves from the President’s position. An amendment was
proposed by Democratic Senators, Barack Obama of Illinois, Robert Menendez of New
Jersey and Russel Feingold of Wisconsin. This amendment proposed to implement
the points system only provisionally for five years.
40Statement of Administration Policy: S. 1348 - Secure Borders, Eco-
nomic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 May 23, 2007,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75114
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In his speech, Sen. Obama, expressed his concerns about the points system, calling
it a “new experience in social engineering” with no evidence that it would work. He
also expressed that religious and social organizations support the amendment:41
“And they support the amendment because the new points system shifts
us too far away from the value we place on family ties and moves us
toward a class-based immigration system where some people are welcome
only as guest workers, but never as full participants in our democracy.
Indeed, the practical effect of the points system is to make it more difficult
for Americans and legal permanent residents with family living in Latin
America to bring them here.”
It seemed to be the case that the sponsors of this amendment were afraid of
losing the electoral support of Latino interest groups if this reform were to be passed.
Since most immigrants in the United States are Latin American, the reduction of
the family based policy would affect Hispanics the most, since they are the ones that
would be unable to bring their extended families to the United States. Furthermore,
the education level of Latin American immigrants is on average lower than the level of
education of Asian immigrants (Borjas, 1999), for example, so while the latter would
in theory benefit from a skills based policy, the former benefit from a family based
policy.
This amendment angered many, particularly in the Republican side, who felt that
this amendment would make the bill less “bipartisan” and endanger the likelihood
it would be approved. Senator Lindsay Graham, Republican from South Carolina,
who helped develop the bill, publicly expressed his frustration, and argued that if
Republican constituencies were not going to receive what they wanted, deportation
of all illegal immigrants, in order for the deal to approve the reform to exist they would
41The speech was found at Obama’s senate website which
is now inactive, but is available through internet archive at:
http://web.archive.org/web/20071012012358/obama.senate.gov/speech/070606-
obama initiativ 3/
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need to offer them reassurance that in the future the immigration system would be
different.42
At the end of this bickering, the amendment didn’t pass, but the partisan rift did
grow. The vote on the amendment was distributed in the following way:43
Table 3.11: Distribution of votes on the Obama Amendment No. 120
Party Aye Nay NV
Democratic 39 8 2
Republican 1 47 0
Independent 2 0 0
Total 42 55 2
The points system didn’t receive much attention afterwards, but the bill became
more unpopular. Interviewed by the New York Times, James Gimpel, a political
scientists who wrote a congressional history of immigration-that has been cited pre-
viously in this chapter-said that:44
“People on opposite sides of the political spectrum, in effect, banded to-
gether to defeat the middle, restrictionists on the right were always against
the bill because they opposed any legalization for illegal immigrants. Busi-
ness groups and their allies, including advocates for immigrant rights, lost
much of their ardor for the bill because of changes made in the legislative
process.”
Senator Kennedy asked Sen. Harry Reid, the Majority Leader, to delay a cloture
vote, which he opposed.45 The cloture vote came on June 28, and the vote was
42http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2007/06/sweet blog extra obama graham.html
43http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfm.cfm?
congress=110&session=1&vote=00200
44“Kennedy Plea Was Last Gasp for Immigration Bill”, New York Times, June 9, 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/09/washington/09immig.html?pagewanted=1&th&emc=th
45Same the last one.
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rejected -in other words, the filibuster could not be defeated-. The distribution of
votes was:46
Table 3.12: Distribution of votes on Motion to Invoke Cloture on S.1639
Party Aye Nay NV
Democratic 32 15 1
Republican 13 37 0
Independent 1 1 0
Total 46 53 1
This vote “killed” the bill. The distribution of votes seems to indicate that there
was a division among partisan lines, with Republicans wanted to reject the cloture
and Democrats in favor of it. There were, however, notable exceptions in both parties.
In this case, the points system was not promoted as a way to improve the fiscal
situation of the country, and unfortunately it was part of a broader proposal that
included issues of illegal immigration and amnesty.
Conclusions
The purpose of this case study is to show how the intervening variables I describe
in my theory: the political parties in power and the existence of a fiscal crisis affect
the selection of immigration policy in the United States from the XIX Century to the
present.
While federal immigration policy as we know it today is a phenomenon of the XX
Century, even before that era I was able to find evidence of a “political business cycle”
of sorts related to immigration policy. The “public charge” head tax implemented in
46http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote
cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=1&vote=00235
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1819 in New York City exhibits that immigration policy is a fundamentally fiscal issue.
While racial or ethnic concerns changed dramatically in the almost two hundred years
covered in this case study-concerns over Canadian day laborers crossing the border
are unheard of today, and were present in the Literacy Test discussion-the concerns
about the impact of different types of immigrants in the economy remain.
Moreover, as the twenty years long legislative back and forth over the implemen-
tation of the Literacy Test shows, fiscal and financial crises, particularly repeated
ones as was the case in the early 1900s in the United States, trigger a change in how
both policy makers and interest groups view immigration policy. While in the 1890s,
labor unions were opposed to the Literacy Test, at the end of the debate in 1917, they
supported it, and while in 1917 President Wilson enjoyed a Democratic majority in
both chambers, the interests of the Democratic constituency were more in line with
a Literacy Test, particularly after the concerns about potential massive labor inflows
after World War I.
The 1989-1990 debate over the implementation of a points system provided further
evidence of the impact of financial and fiscal crises over immigration policy prefer-
ences. Since the country was in the middle of the Savings and Loans crisis, the fiscal
consequences of the 1986 immigration reform that gave amnesty to millions of immi-
grants became clear and was an integral part of the debate. While the implementation
of a points system became politically inviable, the 1990 reform is useful to inform the
theory presented in chapter 1. When either political or economic intervening factors
are not conducive to the implementation of a points system, a drastic change of policy
from family based to skill based, temporary high-skilled worker programs or visas,
such as the H1-B in the United States, are a second best solution. As a consequence,
these type of policy changes are expected to occur also in the presence of fiscal crises
that might endanger the survival of the welfare state.
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Finally, the fascinating immigration debate in 2007 shows that there needs to
be a consensus over the precarious state of the economy and the need to be fiscally
responsible to be able to politically sell a points system. While the sponsors of the bill
discussed the future fiscal impact of the reform, the opposition to the points system
came not for economic reasons or disagreement over the different fiscal impact of high-
skilled and low-skilled immigrants, but for electoral concerns, disguised as worries
over changing a status quo that “functioned” for many years. Moreover, since the
points system was included in a comprehensive immigration reform proposal that
included “amnesty” programs, the proposal became politically inviable, and concerns
over ameliorating the fiscal deficit were not a present as they could have been in the
legislative debate.
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3.2 Canada
For Canada the problem of survival as a separate political entity, and beyond that, the
prospect of growth to a stature commensurate with the physical endowment of the country,
have always implied an active concern with immigration and immigration policy.
David Corbett, “Immigration and Canadian Politics”
Canada is, like most countries in the Americas, a nation of immigration. In many
ways, immigration issues have moved historically parallel to the United States. Immi-
gration, however, was even more essential in the nation building strategy for Canada
than for almost any other country. The nature of Canadian immigration policy was
also always consider economic and fiscal, unlike the United States and some Euro-
pean countries in which ethnic and cultural considerations historically have played a
more important role. Studying the history of Canada’s policies regarding immigration
makes it quite clear why points systems were created and first implemented there. In
a way, it seems like history was destiny for Canada’s current selective immigration
policy.
The Political System of Canada
The Canadian political system has not changed dramatically since the Confeder-
ation, the process by which the British provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New
Brunswick and Quebec joined creating a country. It is a federal system, where the
head of state is the King or Queen of England, who has a representative in Canada
the Governor-General. Canada has a bicameral legislator. The Senate is elected by
the Governor-General, but the House of Commons is elected through direct elections
in single member districts. The Prime Minister is the Head of Government and is
elected through a parliamentary party caucus, and ministers are chosen by the Prime
Minister from the House of Commons (McGillivray, 2004; Cairns, 1968). The party
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system in Canada is more complicated. Even though the single member electoral
system creates a tendency towards a bipartisan system according to Duverger’s Law,
Canada has a multiparty system with strong parties. This is a result of an additional
political cleavage besides the liberal-conservative dimension, the Francophone-English
speaking division. As a consequence, the electoral system favors small parties with
geographically concentrated support, and discourages those with nationally diffuse
support (Cairns, 1968, 62). According to Reitz (2004), there are no prominent anti-
immigration parties in Canada, but the Liberal Party -strong in Quebec and Ontario-
have had historically the most pro-immigration record (Reitz, 2004, 112).
Below, I will describe the evolution of immigration policy in Canada, a tradition-
ally liberal welfare state. My theory is that fiscal crisis and left of center governments
make it more likely to implement this type of policies. However, these events have
occurred more than once in Canadian history. In this section, I will describe how
economic crises in Canada influenced immigration policy towards a points system
when the conditions were ideal.
Open doors: The Post-Confederation XIX Century
The crisis
After the Confederation in 1867, the Canadian economy was peripheral, and the
economic cycles were similar to the American ones. The size and severity of the
contractions, however, was much smaller in Canada. Moreover, there were no bank-
ing collapses in Canada, similar to those experienced in the United States in the
same period (Chambers, 1964). The monetary and banking system provided then an
additional source of stability.
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In terms of the balance of payments, Hartland (1960) finds that capital inflows
were greater then outflows. The magnitude of the inflows was also very important
for the economy -around 30% of gross investment (Hartland, 1960, 719)-. Several
factors helped the Canadian economy in this regard. First, the value of exports per
capita grew by more than ten times in the period. As a consequence, the agricul-
tural exporting sector, played an important counter-cyclical influence in the period.
(Chambers, 1964; Hartland, 1960). Additionally, the amount of capital brought to
Canada by immigrants reached its highest importance in this period, both as a total
of current credits and per capita (Hartland, 1960, 722).
There were, however, some periods of contraction. In 1873, wheat prices decreased,
which affected Canadian exports. Also, the leader of the American lumber ring,
Dodge and Company, failed and this firm had substantial Canadian interests. While
this economic contraction was long -almost three years-the effects were uneven and
notable counter cyclical currents originated in agriculture, since grain and animal
exports achieved historically high levels throughout the crisis (Chambers, 1964, 397-
399).
There was a second contraction in the early 1880s. After the summer of 1882,
stock prices went down and so did the total value of exports that went downwards in
1883. Agricultural exports, nonetheless, provided again a counter-cyclical current and
by October of 1884 agricultural exports had recovered strongly. As a consequence,
this contractions was modest in amplitude and duration (Chambers, 1964, 400).
Finally, in 1893 while the United States had a financial panic, it did not spread
to Canada Chambers (1964) finds that in the 1893-1896, several indicators showed
expansion such as bank clearings that rose consistently through those years; urban
building activity increased, by about 3.5%; and grain and flour prices improved in
these years, even with a poor harvest in 1894.
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In this period, immigration policy was seen as one of many economic policies de-
signed to establish a national economy, along with the completion of transcontinental
railways, restrictions on manufactured imports to foster the development of national
industry, and the adoption of land policy to expand the Confederation to the west
(Green and Green, 1999). It was then selective, but not necessarily restrictive, immi-
gration policy.
Political Parties
Left of center parties are more likely to implement selective immigration policies
when they face fiscal crises. That combination of events was sometimes present in
this era, when along with the periods of economic progress and contraction described
above, the Conservatives and Liberals switched power back and forth. John A. Mac-
Donald, a Conservative, was the first Prime Minister after the Confederation, and
served from 1867 to 1873.47 MacDonald’s main focus was on populating the West
and North-West territories, fearing the expansionist tendencies of the United States,
and he was responsible for the ambitious recruitment practices in Canada and the
beginning of the railway extension to the west. In 1871, he added British Columbia to
the Confederation and Manitoba was created. The second election took place in 1872,
at this points the Liberals had accepted the Confederation and MacDonald asked for
five more years to finish the job of consolidating the Confederation. The election was
very closed, the Conservatives won 174 seats, while the Liberals obtained 167 (Beck,
1968, 21). The first federal election with secret ballots took place in 1874, after what
came to be known as the “Pacific Scandal.” In the 1872 election, MacDonald sold the
47The 1867 election was more like four local elections in isolation. Of the 181 members of Parlia-
ment, 147 came from Ontario and Quebec (Beck, 1968, 1).
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charter to build the railway in return for campaign contributions. In 1873, the Lib-
eral Party obtained evidence to prove this and MacDonald resigned (Knowles, 2007).
As a consequence, the Liberal candidate, Alexander Mackenzie won the election with
around 67% of the seats, winning in all regions existent at the time, even Quebec
which usually voted Conservative (Dean, 1949; Beck, 1968).
Mackenzie only governed one term, and in 1878 MacDonald went back to power.
The campaign wasn’t centered on immigration issues, but on trade issues. While the
Liberal Party opposed tariffs, MacDonald ran a “protective tariff” campaign, western
expansion, and transcontinental railways, Moreover, while in government, the Liberals
lacked national cohesion (Beck, 1968; Dean, 1949; Knowles, 2007).
In 1896, Mackenzie’s Minister of InIand Revenue, Wilfrid Laurier, became Prime
Minister. The 1896 election was very close. The Conservative candidate, Charles
Tupper won the plurality of the popular vote, but Laurier and the Liberals obtained
more seats. Laurier had a more protectionist platform in terms of trade, which helped
him attract Conservative votes, and received the support from Quebec, his province,
that usually voted for Conservatives, representing the transformation of the French
Canadians from Conservative to Liberal. This election is considered the first “critical
election” in Canada, because it was a decisive election in every one of the provinces,
even the young British Columbia. It ended the Conservative dominance, also because
it represented the nationalization of the party system, and Liberal representation re-
mained virtually fixed after that election for a long time (Blake, 1979).
Selective Immigration Policies
The economic and political developments in Canada during the Nineteenth Cen-
tury affected the development of immigration policies in the expected direction.
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Canada was scarce in labor and capital, but abundant in land. For both political par-
ties, immigration was a priority in order to populate the West, but the Liberal Party
favored more selective immigration, as predicted, but both demanded an increase in
the number of immigrants. When the United States had already started restricting
immigration through the Literacy Test, the Canadian government implemented an
aggressive and expensive campaign to attract immigrants to Canada. While Cana-
dian immigration policy at the time was one of “open doors,” there were priorities,
based on the economic needs of the country.
Dunae (1984-1985) explains that this campaign was directed by the Department
of Agriculture and focused on attracting agricultural workers, promoting specially
Manitoba and the North West Territory because the land was more inhabited than
in the East; and women. Local and National governments sent agents to Europe to
recruit immigrants. The first agents were posted as early as 1859 in England (Dunae,
1984-1985, 19), and 1872 in Antwerp and Paris (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998, 80).
These agents would disseminate information about Canada through fliers, etc. Many
of these agents, however, sometimes provided exaggerated information and were more
detrimental than beneficial to the cause.
Several European countries had emigration restrictions, which made it harder to
attract them to Canada. Therefore, in 1897 the “North Atlantic Trading Company”
was created. The goal was to have European shipping agents to clandestinely direct
agricultural settlers to Canada for a larger bonus (Knowles, 2007, 92). The com-
pany also received bonuses for female domestic workers and family members (Kelley
and Trebilcock, 1998, 120). Five years later it was dissolved, but the company was
responsible for 50,000 new immigrants (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998, 136).
In 1896, Clifford Sifton was appointed Minister of Interior. One of his goals was to
implement a “selective” policy to favor agricultural migrants (Kelley and Trebilcock,
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1998; Knowles, 2007; Timlin, 1960). He was convinced agricultural exports were the
key to prosperity, so in a memorandum to Laurier, he said (Knowles, 2007, 85):
“Our desire is to promote the immigration of farmers and farm labourers
. . . It is admitted that additions to the population of our cities and towns
by immigration [are] undesirable from every standpoint and such additions
do not in any way whatsoever contribute to the object which is constantly
kept in view by the government of Canada in encouraging immigration
for the development of natural resources and the increase of production
of wealth from these resources”
Besides agricultural exports, one of the economic priorities was the extension of
railroad lands. In 1880, the Canadian Pacific Railway Company agreed to construct
the transcontinental railway, which would stimulate movement of labor towards the
West. The two policies were mingled: Railroads were seen as a way to place im-
migrants48 in developing regions where their crops would provide for new sources of
revenue and the newcomers would adapt to the Canadian environment (Avery, 1972).
When railway companies required labor, the government would increase its re-
cruitment efforts abroad, but many times European immigrants were not prepared
for the low wages and living conditions. As a consequence, the government started
recruiting Asian workers. This went against the preferences of some political groups
and labor organizations, worried about the low wages. Businessmen, however, fa-
vored them as “the ideal worker for an expanding economy” (Avery, 1972, 139) and
opposing the head tax. The government aligned with business interests that argued
“either you must have this labour or you cannot have a railway”(Avery, 1972, 138)
and argued the immigration was temporary so the opposition was unwarranted. By
1891, however, they constituted 10% of the population of British Columbia (Avery,
1972).
48The immigrants working specifically on railroads were called “Navvy” (Avery, 1972)
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In summary, in the late Nineteenth Century Canada had a selective immigration
policy, that favored a set of skills -farming and railroad construction-. While there
were few fiscal crisis in the period, there was another type of economic crisis, in this
case the economic development of the country and the population of the west.
Unlike later periods, discussions of the welfare stare were not present in the debate
since it had not been created, making the fiscal argument less relevant, particularly
when tariffs were imposed as part of the national development strategy. Hiscox (2001,
108) asserts that while soon after the Confederation tariffs where a partisan issue -
with Liberals against them and Tories in favor- in the 1890s, when Laurier, a Liberal,
became Prime Minister he adopted a pro-tariff platform. Since the United States was
increasing tariffs at the time (the Dingley Tariff specifically), Laurier introduced the
“Dominion Tariff” in 1897 to give preference to British imports and impose duties at
higher rates for the United States.
The closing of the open doors: Early XX Century
Political Parties
During this period, Laurier was Prime Minister, serving until 1911, when Robert
Borden, a Conservative won the election on the issue of free trade (reciprocity), and
the participation of Quebec in the newly formed Canadian Navy.49. In 1911, Canada
went from a liberal majority of 50, in a Parliament of 221, to a Conservative majority
of 47 (Johnston and Percy, 1980, 712). The Laurier government had signed a “Reci-
procity” agreement with the United States and then President Taft, which provided
for free trade of most agricultural products between the two countries. The winners
49French Canadians considered it surrendering to British interests, since they would have to par-
ticipate in all British Wars, Also, it was considered for some a religious issue between Catholics in
Quebec and British Protestantism (Beck, 1968, 120-121).
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from globalization were capital owners and those the farming areas in the prairies in
the center and west of Canada. Labor lost from trade liberalization. Manufactur-
ing employees, nonetheless, were to lose from reciprocity, along with transportation
workers and financial institutions. The other issue in the campaign, which evolved
from the “Reciprocity Agreements” were the annexation fears that the Conservatives
exploited, particularly among British born Canadians that were afraid Canada would
be annexed to the United States, and lose its ties to Great Britain (Johnston and
Percy, 1980).
Both Laurier and Borden favored immigration, and the political divisions in the
election were not based on this issue. As a matter of fact, Kelley and Trebilcock (1998,
161) argue that once in power the Conservatives did little to change immigration pol-
icy, and oversaw the admission of more immigrants than any other period to that date.
The crisis
While Canada was relatively impervious to the financial panics in the United
States in the nineteenth Century, the same cannot be said of the 1907 Panic, when the
collapse of the Knickerbocker Trust Company in New York City triggered a financial
panic in Canada. Money demand in Canada peaked always during the crop harvesting
season when western farmers were required to acquire loans to move the crop to
the east. According to Rich (1989), in 1907 there were at least two complications
that caused the Canadian Financial Crisis in 1907. First, because of poor weather
conditions, the crop was harvested later then usual. Second, because of the financial
situation in the United States, Canadian banks’ gold supply was tightened so lending
was held back. At the time, Canada had no central bank, but the government issued
“Dominion notes” that could be redeemed for gold. That was the only monetary
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tool the government could use to influence cash reserves. This tradition changed in
1907 when the Canadian government became the lender of last resort and provided
temporary liquidity to banks through an emergency issue of Dominion notes (Rich,
1989, 136).50
While the economic contraction didn’t last long, it did triggered an increase in
the debates over immigration policy, starting the end of the open immigration. This
fact was further worsened by World War I, when “enemy aliens” became a political
issue.
Selective immigration policies
Two consequences of the crisis were directly related to immigration. The first
one was the Vancouver Riot, a rally organized by the Asian Expulsion League, which
attracted thousands of protesters, and caused much destruction. It prompted the
establishment of an emigration quota of four hundred a year Japanese immigrants
to Canada that the Japanese government implemented after much prodding from
Canada. Canada didn’t impose the quota herself to avoid upsetting business interests
(Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998; Timlin, 1960).
The second one, which is more relevant for the theory put forward in the first
chapter, was an unusual flow of British immigrants, some of which were funded by
charitable organizations or public funds to leave Great Britain after they became
unemployed. This caused some suspicion among Canadians that the British were
trying to reduce their poverty rates. According to Timlin (1960, 523), “the provision
50As a consequence of the 1907 crisis, in 1914 the Canadian government passed the Finance Act
of 1914, where the government acquired the authority to make advances to banks against collateral
(Rich, 1989, 136).
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’No English need apply’ multiplied in Canadian advertisements for labor.” As a
consequence, the Order in Council, in 1908 established that no person could enter
Canada as an immigrant if their trip had been paid by a charitable organization, unless
that organization was previously approved by the Canadian government (Timlin,
1960, 523). This became a new interpretation of the 1906 Immigration Act, in which
the Orders in Council were allowed to “prohibit the landing of any specified class of
immigrants.” While this provision seemed too general to be relevant two years before,
after the 1907-1908 it became the main policy tool for selective immigration.
Furthermore, to calm concerns about immigrants becoming dependent on public
services, the Canadian government approved a provision which stated that all immi-
grants landing in Canada had to posses $50 if arriving in the winter season, or $25 at
other times of the year, unless they had prearranged farm employment, or had proof
of financial support from friends or family in Canada (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998,
137). This supports the idea that immigration policy is interdependent from the
welfare state, and the hypothesis that selective immigration policies that are fiscally
beneficial are likely to be implemented in times of fiscal crisis. These restrictions are
very clear examples of how situations of fiscal contraction, caused in this case by a
banking rescue, change the immigration priorities in policy makers. While Canadian
policy was selective since the nineteenth Century, favoring the skills of farmers and
navvies, after the 1907-1908 recession, it became selective both on skills and on the
effect of immigrants on the welfare state, supporting the theory presented in chapter
one.
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The Great Depression
The crisis
As was the case during the XIX Century, the Canadian economy was heavily
dependent on the international economy. In the in the years before the Great Depres-
sion there was an economic boom across all sectors and regions in Canada, combining
the agricultural production in the now established West and an industrial revolution
with advances in manufacturing. Wilson (2006) argues that immigration, trade, and
investment created a cycle of productivity, and changed the factor endowment. An
increase in productivity and technology -partly due to transportation advances which
benefit from the immigration of the navvy, among other issues- triggered incentives
to invest in Canada, bringing capital to the country. This inflow of resources then
provided incentives for further immigration. In summary, Canada became a very
globalized economy, and one in which the aspects of globalization fed each other.51
In 1928, exports of merchandise were 22% of the national economy, and the United
States took 38% of them. Most of the exports were agricultural products, such as
wheat, flour, lumber, and pulp wood. Moreover, a big part of the Canadian economic
boom depended on foreign borrowing. From 1926 to 1930, 47% of total interest paid
on bonds was paid to non residents (Safarian, 1959, 4-50). Canada was fortunate not
to run into a banking crisis. Banks were commercial, for the most part, and they were
not allowed to tie their funds in long term or non liquid loans, which included real
estate. The few non liquid investments were securities -mainly government bonds-
which were liquidated after the stock market crash. Additionally, the banks could
increase their liquidity through the use of Dominion notes.
51For a very detailed description of the Great Depression in Canada see: Safarian (1959)
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As a consequence of the heavy dependence on the global economy, and on the
United States, the depression hit Canada particularly hard. In 1933, gross national
expenditures in constant dollars52 were seventy percent of the 1929 national expen-
ditures, and fifty six percent in nominal prices. Exports in 1937 were half of what
they were in 1929 and that year consumer expenditure was still 14% below the 1929
level. Worst of all, in 1933, one fifth of the labor force was unemployed (Safarian,
1959, 3,45).
The Canadian economy was hit so severely because of several reasons. In times
of economic crisis, people consume less perishable goods, and Canada’s main exports
were agricultural products. Furthermore, the largest trade partner of Canada was the
United States, where the crisis originated, followed by Great Britain whose economy
also weakened severely.
Not only trade decreased, but so did foreign investment which had financed a
large portion of the industrialization of Canada during the twenties. To top it off, the
establishment of a western settlement, for the most part was finished. As a conse-
quence, the great explosion in investment on railways that occurred in earlier years,
had lost its impetus.
Political Parties
The last election before the depression took place in 1925. An alliance of Liber-
als and Progressives formed a minority government, in which the Liberal candidate,
William Mackenzie King was elected Prime Minister for the second time. The election
was very close, the Conservatives actually won more legislative seats than the Liber-
52The base year is 1935
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als. Mackenzie called for elections that year, because he feared his party might lose
the government if he waited for longer. His opposition, leaded by Arthur Meighen, the
previous Prime Minister focused on the Liberal government lack of accomplishments
(Beck, 1968).
This election brought the Canadian electoral system back to a mostly bipartisan
system. The distribution of seats is described in Table 3.13 (Sharp, 1926, 114):
Table 3.13: 1925 Canadian Federal Election
Province Liberals Conservatives Progressives Labor Independent Total
Prince Edward Island 2 2 4
New Brunswick 1 10 11
Nova Scotia 3 11 14
Quebec 60 4 1 65
Ontario 12 69 1 82
Manitoba 1 7 7 2 17
Saskatchewan 15 6 21
Alberta 4 3 9 16
British Columbia 3 10 1 14
Yukon 1 1
Total 101 117 24 2 1 245
The campaign wasn’t run on big issues. Beck (1968, 163) even said there was no
clear-cut issue in the election of 1923, and immigration was not an exception. While
tariffs were high since the war years, which caused an exodus of 300,000 Canadians
to the United States in 1924, and other types of taxes were held also at the war
levels. The Liberal government also proposed an increase in freight rates, which had
been in place since the 1897 when Prime Minister Laurier implemented them. These
issues were cause of concern among the exporting sectors particularly farmers in the
West. Liberals, however, framed their campaign on the claim that without an effective
majority, it was impossible to govern efficiently, while the Conservatives focused on a
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“tariff to save Canada”, while the Progressives ran their campaign on free trade and
public ownership of railways (Sharp, 1926).
Another election was called in 1926, when some problems were revealed on the
Customs Department following the investigation of a special committee. The results
of the investigations revealed many problems inside the department that King had
failed to correct. The Liberals wanted to blame the former Minister of Customs, but
the Conservatives did not accept that and introduced an amendment condemning
the whole cabinet. On June 25, King lost control of Parliament and resigned before
facing a vote of censure (Beck, 1968).
The election ended up being beneficial for the Liberals. The results are in table
3.14 (Beck, 1968, 188):
Table 3.14: 1926 Canadian Federal Election
Province Liberals Conservatives Progressives Others Total
Prince Edward Island 3 1 4
New Brunswick 4 7 11
Nova Scotia 2 12 14
Quebec 60 4 1 65
Ontario 26 53 2 1 82
Manitoba 11 4 2 17
Saskatchewan 18 3 21
Alberta 3 1 11 1 16
British Columbia 1 12 1 14
Yukon 1 1
Total 128 91 20 6 245
In 1930, Prime Minister Mackenzie King dissolved the Parliament and called for
election, probably hoping for a reelection before the effects of the depression in Canada
hit rock bottom. With the Progressives, he had been able to address legislation, and
the Conservatives had changed leadership. Instead of his arch-enemy, former Prime
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Minister Meighen, the Conservatives had chosen R.B. Bennett. Mackenzie proposed a
budget -known as the Dunning budget- that year which gave trade preference to Great
Britain, that beside increasing trade, soothed Conservative fears about separatist
tendencies. It was retaliation against the Smoot Hawley tariff the United States was
about to implement (Beck, 1968, 192). Even though the stock markets had crashed,
he thought the situation was reasonably good.
Richard Bennett, the Conservative candidate ran a campaign based on economic
nationalism and trade restrictions to compete with the United States and fight the
unemployment caused by the economic depression. He argued “I will use tariffs to
blast a way into markets that have been closed to you” (Soward, 1930, 998).
As might be expected from an incumbent running in bad economic times, the
Liberal-Progressive government didn’t have much of a chance. It was too late for
Mackenzie King to hope for reelection and the economic situation was obviously
worse than he thought. The electoral results can be seen in table 3.15 (Soward, 1930,
996):
Table 3.15: 1930 Canadian Federal Election
Province Lib. Cons. Progr. United Labour Indep. Total
Farmer
Prince Edward I. 1 3 4
New Brunswick 4 10 14
Nova Scotia 1 10 11
Quebec 40 24 1 65
Ontario 22 59 1 82
Manitoba 1 11 2 14
Saskatchewan 11 8 2 21
Alberta 3 4 9 7
British Columbia 5 7 1 1 14
Yukon 1 1
Total 88 137 2 10 3 2 245
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The electoral system worked against the Liberal Party this time. While the Lib-
erals only lost 0.9% of the national vote, they lost 37 seats. The Conservatives’ vote
went only from 45.3 to 48.8 %, but they gained 46 seats (Beck, 1968, 202-203). While
small, this victory was followed by the most dramatic change in the direction of Cana-
dian immigration policy since the Confederation.
Selective Immigration Policy
This was a changing point for immigration policy in Canada. Prime Minister’s
Bennett campaign was based on trade restrictions, and as soon as his government
started immigration restrictions were implemented. According to Kelley and Trebil-
cock (1998, 216): “By March 1931, admissible immigrants were limited to American
and British subjects from the predominantly white dominions such as Britain, Ire-
land, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa
who had sufficient money to sustain themselves; agriculturalists with sufficient means;
and wives and minor children of Canadian residents.”
At the time, welfare assistance was primarily a responsibility of the provinces.
But during the depression, the risk of provincial bankruptcy became a real concern.
The federal government spent ten times the resources on public relief it had spent
in the last year (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998, 230). That was not enough, and there
were concerns about the fiscal deficit these actions would cost, so the number of
deportations for becoming a public charge increased significantly in the Depression
years. Several groups called this practice inhumane, since many of these immigrants
had been in Canada for many years. Some municipalities, like Winnipeg even refused
to report immigrants on relief because they were unemployed.
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As would be predicted from the theory presented previously, right of center gov-
ernments facing a fiscal crisis are not likely to restrict the types of immigrants by
implement a selective immigration policy, but to restrict the number of immigrants
the country receives. The Bennett administration started what became to be known
as the “White Canada” policy. In either case, even the mass deportations had in some
cases a “welfare state” rationale. A common thread through Canadian history is the
consideration of fiscal and economic factors when designing or applying immigration
policy. It comes as no surprise then that Canada was the pioneer in implementing
points systems as tools for attracting high-skilled immigration.
The end of the “White Canada” era: The Points System
The crisis
For the first five years after Bretton Woods, Canada maintained a pegged exchange
rate, as was required by the system. However, because of the swings in commodity
prices Canada was forced to adjust its pegged exchange rate in July 1946 from 909¢
to parity, and later in September 1949 back to 909¢ (Schembri, 2008, 5). As a
consequence, in 1950 the Bank of Canada decided to implement a floating exchange
rate. Because of higher commodity prices, the Canadian dollar appreciated by 12%
in the next year and half. There was also an increase in foreign direct investment
from the U.S. in natural resources, causing some inflationary pressures, so in 1950 and
1951 direct restrictions on credit were implemented. In the following years, monetary
policy was stable: the Canadian dollar traded at a premium versus the U.S. dollar,
F.D.I. flows continued, inflation shrank, and the economy grew. The stability of
this period was such, that it inspired the development of the Mundell-Fleming model
(Boughton, 2003).
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By 1957, the honeymoon was over. The Canadian economy started to slow down
and the Bank of Canada had to tighten economic conditions. In 1959, a significant
spread developed between Canadian and American interest rates. Higher interest
rates in Canada attracted capital inflows which appreciated the currency. This caused
inflationary pressures, which led the Bank of Canada to tighten monetary conditions
further. This fact was combined with an increase in the unemployment rate from 6.5
% when 1960 started to 8.7% at the end of the year (Schembri, 2008).
The period of monetary and political instability around this is called “the Coyne
Affair.” James Coyne was appointed Governor of the Bank of Canada by the Liberal
government in 1956. Once the Liberals lost power two years later, he faced a lot of
political pressures from the Conservative government, particularly from the Ministry
of Finance, Donald Fleming. 53 Fleming and Coyne had opposite views on monetary
policy and fiscal policy, and would often contradict each other. The situation became
a crisis when, in 1960, the Directors of the Bank of Canada increased Coyne’s pension
from $12,000 to $25,000, making the governor’s salary and pension greater than those
of the members of Parliament, including the Prime Minister (Siklos, 2007, 11). Adding
fuel to the fire, in 1961, Coyne announced publicly a set of proposals to reduce
unemployment, such as a sweeping tax and spending policy changes. This angered
the government since they considered it an intromission. At the same time, Fleming
publicly disagreed about the volatility of the interest rates and the merits of a pegged
rate. The truth of the matter is that the 1935 Bank of Canada Act did not define
the role of the government and the governor in monetary policy. The Bank was not
really independent. The governor had veto over the Bank of Canada’s board, but
53No to be confused with J. Marcus Fleming, from the Mundell-Fleming model who was an
economist at the International Monetary Fund at the time, along with Robert Mundell (Boughton,
2003).
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the Cabinet could support or disallow the veto. Moreover, according to the Bank of
Canada Act the Directors could appoint the governor, but the Act didn’t establish
whether they could remove him (Macfarlane, 2008). Furthermore, the Directors were
not able to act independently since the Bank was not statutorily independent from
the government. In a letter to Fleming, Coyne remarked that:
The Bank of Canada Act provides that the directors shall appoint the
government, with their choice being subject to approval by Government.
Obviously, the directors are intended to exercise their own judgement in
this matter, and take the initiative. On June 3, I (Coyne) asked the
directors who had come to Ottawa who they were going to appoint in my
place, and the answer was “We don’t know. We haven’t been told that
yet” (Coyne, 1961).
In February, the cabinet unanimously disapproved Coyne’s reappointment, but
they had no unilateral authority to do so, and they didn’t inform him or the public
of their decision. On May 30, Fleming and Coyne met and the governor was asked to
present his resignation, because the Diefenbaker government was going to implement
expansionary policies with which he would disagree. Coyne refused and argued he
could not be forced out by the cabinet. The Cabinet announced the next day that
they would take legislative action to remove Coyne. On June 20, along with the
budget, a piece of legislation was proposed to remove Coyne from the Bank of Canada.
The Liberals accused the government of causing a constitutional crisis, proposing the
budget and Coyne’s resignation together, and accused the Conservatives of using
Coyne as a scapegoat for the failing economy. The Conservatives refused to give
Coyne a hearing in Parliament, and since they had a majority they passed the bill.
However, they did not have a majority in the Senate. The Banking Committee there
did have a hearing with Coyne. The Committee concluded that the bill should not be
further debated and that Coyne had not acted inappropriately (Macfarlane, 2008).
On July 14, Coyne resigned complaining about the lack of independence of the Bank
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of Canada from the government, but arguing the committee verdict had re-vindicate
him. He was substituted by Louis Rasminky who plead to amend the Bank of Canada
Act to determine the roles of the Bank of Canada and the government in monetary
matters (Siklos, 2007). This Directive Power states that if a conflict occurred between
the government and the Bank of Canada, the government is required to publish a
directive in the Canada Gazette, and under these circumstances the governor would
likely resign (Schembri, 2008, 10).
The government budget did include expansionary policies with which Coyne would
disagree since they would conflict with a floating exchange rate, by this time Mundell
and Fleming had explained why.54 The 1961 budget included expansionary spending
increases, and the government also expressed a desire to depreciate the dollar, so they
began to sell Canadian dollars in the foreign markets. The dollar declined around
5%. More downwards pressures caused an speculative attack on the dollar. The gov-
ernment reaffirmed in April 1962, that it would not set a fixed exchange rate, that
caused the Canadian dollar to fall sharply, and in May the government had to re-peg
at 0.925 US ¢. Raminsky was afraid of depleting Canada’s reserves. The downward
pressures continued, so Canada applied for a drawing of $300 million to the I.M.F.
on June 24, 1962. This rescue was conditioned with a financial plan to restore confi-
dence in the Canadian dollar which included balancing the fiscal budget, reducing the
current account deficit and imposing temporary import surcharges (Bordo, Gomes,
and Schembri, 2009, 17). The next year, Conservatives lost power and the new Prime
Minister, Lester Pearson promised in his campaign to balance the budget.
The Coyne Affair was not about immigration policy, but monetary policy and
central bank independence, however, the fiscal deficit that ensued had a very impor-
54For a history of the Mundell-Fleming model please see: Boughton (2003).
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tant effect on immigration through the increased importance of the welfare programs
in Canada and the question of how to control the fiscal deficit and provide public
programs in parallel with increasing immigration flows. In 1958, universal hospital
coverage was implemented, which added to other “welfare” measures such as unem-
ployment insurance, and there were talks about universal health insurance. Unlike the
United States, Canada’s welfare state at the time was a combination of means-tested
and universal programs (Myles, 1998, 351). As a consequence, increasing immigration
numbers -without taking skill levels into account- would increase the number of recip-
ients and public spending levels in welfare programs. It is under those circumstances
that the government tries to implement a selective immigration policy to compensate
the need to populate with the need to reduce public spending.
Political Parties
Economically, the post-war period in Canada was characterized by the Coyne Af-
fair. But, politically, the post war years were also very active in Canada, particularly
in the ten years before the implementation of new selective immigration politics with
five elections and two Prime Ministers. The 1957 election brought an end to twenty
two years of liberal governments. The results of the election are summarized in table
3.1655:
55Source: Parliament of Canada http://www2.parl.gc.ca/
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Table 3.16: 1957 Canadian Federal Election
Province S.C. Liberal Progressive- C.C.F. Liberal- Ind. Total
Conservative Labour
Alberta 13 1 3 17
British Columbia 6 2 7 7 22
Manitoba 1 8 5 14
New Brunswick 5 5 10
New Foundland 5 2 7
& Labrador
Northwest 1 1
Territories
Nova Scotia 2 10 12
Ontario 20 61 3 1 85
Prince Edward 4 4
Island
Quebec 62 9 1 3 75
Saskatchewan 4 3 10 17
Yukon 1 1
Total 19 104 112 25 2 3 265
This election came after two important issues. The first one was the role played
by Lester Pearson, a Liberal who later became Prime Minister, on the Suez Canal
conflict. The Conservatives accused him of being an “chore boy” for the United
States, while the Liberals argued it was better than being a colonial errand boy for
Great Britain. The second is economic. The arguments that the Conservative Party
candidate, John Diefenbaker, made were that Canada was overtaxed even when there
was a surplus and that he would implement agricultural protections for wheat farmers
in the West (Meisel, 1960). The Liberals got a larger percentage of the popular vote
(42.3% vs. 39.1%), but less seats (Regenstreif, 1960, 349). Immigration was not one
of the campaign issues.
John Diefenbaker was a newly elected leader for the Progressive-Conservatives,
after George Drew resigned in 1956. He was in many ways considered an outsider. He
had a German name in a mostly English party and he came from Saskatchewan, in the
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prairies, unlike most previous Prime Ministers which came from Eastern Provinces.
As a consequence, he focused his campaign on the average Canadian, or the “little
man” in the prairies and the WesT while also managing to keep voters from the
English speaking East happy. The province were he had the least support was Quebec,
were he made little effort to campaign (Beck, 1968). Given the minority government
status, Diefenbacker called for elections less than ten months after he was first elected,
running on the basis that to govern he needed a majority government. Diefenbaker
was still able to blame former Liberal governments for Canadian ills since so little
time had passed since he became Prime Minister. His campaign colloquially, could
be called “giving the new guys a chance.” This time, the Progressive Conservatives
campaigned in Quebec, unlike the election a year before. In Montreal during the
campaign he talked about “equal respect for two great cultures” and called anglophone
and francophone Canadians “equal partners” (Beck, 1968, 322). The switch was also
strengthen by the fact that the Liberal candidate, Lester Pearson, was not a Quebec
native unlike St. Laurent.
The results of this election are in table 3.17 56:
56Source: Parliament of Canada http://www2.parl.gc.ca/
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Table 3.17: 1958 Canadian Federal Election
Province Liberal Progressive- C.C.F. Liberal- Total
Conservative Labour
Alberta 17 17
British Columbia 18 4 22
Manitoba 14 14
New Brunswick 3 7 10
New Foundland 5 2 7
& Labrador
Northwest Territories 1 1
Nova Scotia 12 12
Ontario 14 67 3 1 85
Prince Edward 4 4
Island
Quebec 25 50 75
Saskatchewan 16 1 17
Yukon 1
Total 47 209 8 1 265
This was the largest majority government in the history of Canada to that date.
Diefenbaker, promised to divert around 15% of trade with the United States to Great
Britain and provide cash advances for stored grains. In the meantime, the Liberals
also changed leaders. Louis St. Laurent retired and was substituted a few moths
before the election by Lester Pearson, a Nobel Peace Prize Winner and diplomat.
There were two factors that helped the Conservatives have a majority government
were the switch of Quebec from strongly Liberal to Progressive-Conservative, and
the transfer of the support for the Social Credit to the Conservatives and the almost
disappearance of the C.C.F.. The first was due, for the most part, to the fact that
the Liberal candidate was not a “native son.” The second is more complicated. The
Social Credit was a product of agrarian discontent in the West during the Depression.
This party’s scapegoat was the banking system, which they saw as an instrument of
the East to exploit farmers, and it had a religious foundation which played well in
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that area. In the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), a Socialist Party,
the fall in votes might have been due to weak Unions and the fact that blue and white
collar workers in urban areas had similar preferences, in other words there was a lack
of class consciousness (Regenstreif, 1960).
By 1960, the economic slowdown had started and in 1961, Diefenbaker dispute
with the Governor of the Bank of Canada took place, and some argued the Prime
Minister response was arrogant, and he was punished by some voters (Wrong, 1963).
In the words of Beck (1968): “In 1958 Canadians seemed to ascribe to John Diefen-
backer some of the qualities of a divinity. By 1960 his clay feet were showing” (Beck,
1968, 329). On April 17 of 1962, it was announced that there would be Federal Elec-
tions in June. Diefenbaker stressed in is campaign that, in his opinion, Liberals were
“soft on communism.” Pearson’s campaign was based on resolutions the Liberals had
arrived at in their 1961 Convention, that were for the most part related to economic
growth, fiscal balance, and job creation.
At first, the campaign was lackluster, but in May things changed. On May 2,
Diefenbaker announced the devaluation of the Canadian dollar to 92.5 ¢for each
American dollar. The Prime Minister treated as a gimmick to help exporters and
the tourist industry, instead of acknowledging the country was facing financial diffi-
culties. Pearson suggested it was a panic response, but Diefenbaker denied it. The
polls suggested Pearson had an advantage, but the voters were strongly divided across
a rural (P.C.)-urban (Liberals) cleavage. The election was very close. The Progressive
Conservatives won, but were unable to have a majority government, The results are
in table 3.18 57:
57Source: Parliament of Canada http://www2.parl.gc.ca/
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Table 3.18: 1962 Canadian Federal Election
Province Liberal P.C. S.C. New Democrats Liberal- Total
Labour
Alberta 15 2 17
British Columbia 4 6 2 10 22
Manitoba 1 11 2 14
New Brunswick 4 4
New Foundland 6 1 7
& Labrador
Northwest Territories 1 1
Nova Scotia 2 9 1 12
Ontario 43 35 6 1 85
Prince Edward 4 4
Island
Quebec 35 14 26 75
Saskatchewan 1 16 17
Yukon 1 1
Total 99 116 30 18 1 265
Just six days after the election, Diefenbaker announced he would implement an
austerity program, which included tariff surcharges for imports, substantial cuts in
government expenditures and arrangements for $1 billion from the International Mon-
etary Fund (Beck, 1968, 351).
Then, in January a crisis was caused because the Canadian government didn’t
acquire the nuclear weapons it had agreed to buy when along with the United States
to create a North American Air Defense Command. The United States accused
Canada of reneging its commitments. On February 3, Douglas Harkness, the Minister
of Defense resigned over disagreements with Diefenbaker. The next day, the Liberals
along with the small parties brought down the government through a non-confidence
vote.58.
58Canada: Diefenbaker’s Shambles, TIME, February 15, 1963.
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The election took place in June, and the campaign was centered on the failed econ-
omy and on whether Canada should have nuclear weapons. Immigration policy, was
at the time, not a campaign issue. The main cleavage was the prairies (Diefenbaker’s
core voters) vs. the rest of the country, and can be seen on table 3.19:59
Table 3.19: 1963 Canadian Federal Election
Province Liberal P.C. S.C. New Democrats Liberal- Total
Labour
Alberta 1 14 2 17
British Columbia 7 4 2 9 22
Manitoba 2 10 2
New Brunswick 6 4 10
New Foundland 7 7
& Labrador
Northwest Territories 1 1
Nova Scotia 4 7 11
Ontario 52 27 6 1 85
Prince Edward 2 2 4
Island
Quebec 47 8 20 75
Saskatchewan 17 17
Yukon 1 1
Total 129 95 24 17 1 265
On September 7, 1965 Lester Pearson called for elections that year, the third
in four years. Diefenbaker tried to bring down the government so that he could be
the Prime Minister during the 100 anniversary of the Confederation, which caused
divisions among the Conservatives. Also, the flag debate in 1964 had worsened the
relationship between the two large parties. At the end, Pearson succeeded in changing
the flag, removing British symbols from it. His government had been controversial
also because he refused to send Canadian troops to Vietnam.
59Source: Parliament of Canada http://www2.parl.gc.ca/
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Pearson ran his campaign on increasing the welfare state in Canada through uni-
versal health care, a new pension plan and new labor regulations, as a continuation
of the general direction his government had taken. Diefenbaker, instead, ran his
campaign mostly as a witch hunt for criminals in the government, along with tax
decreases (Beck, 1968, 383). While the Liberals won the election, the lack of a ma-
jority government was seen by some as a defeat, but Pearson managed to be one
of the most influential Prime Ministers in Canadian history, mostly because of the
accomplishments of his second period, including revamping immigration policy and
implementing universal health care. The Parliament, however, stayed practically
identical, as can be seen in table 3.20:60
Table 3.20: 1965 Canadian Federal Election
Province Liberal P.C. N.D. R.C. S.C. Ind. Ind. P.C. Total
Alberta 15 2 17
British Columbia 7 3 9 3 22
Manitoba 1 10 3 14
New Brunswick 6 4 10
New Foundland 7 7
& Labrador
Northwest Territories 1 1
Nova Scotia 2 10 12
Ontario 51 25 9 85
Prince Edward 4 4
Island
Quebec 56 8 9 1 1 75
Saskatchewan 17 17
Yukon 1 1
Total 131 97 21 9 5 1 1 265
60Source: Parliament of Canada http://www2.parl.gc.ca/
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Selective Immigration
The first immigration action after World War II took place on May 28, 1946 when
the cabinet passed P.C. 2071 allowing Canadian residents to sponsor first degree
relatives from Europe besides orphaned nieces and nephews under the age of sixteen
(Knowles, 2007, 161). The Prime Minister at the time, Mackenzie King, started to
suggest that immigration to Canada should be based on the economic needs of the
country. In 1947, he suggested changes were necessary:
The policy of the Government is to foster the growth of the population of
Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek
to ensure the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers
of immigrants as can be advantageously absorbed in our national economy
. . . I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights
in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It
is not a “fundamental human right” of any alien to enter Canada. It is a
privilege.61
This statement started to change the direction of Canadian immigration away
from ethnic concerns and back to economic concerns and selective immigration. It
also developed into what became the Immigration Act of 1952. This law clarified sev-
eral immigration procedures, but also gave the Minister of Citizenship discretionary
powers: the power to prohibit or limit the admission of immigrants on almost any
basis and potentially gave the Minister the last word on every individual immigration
case (Hawkins, 1988, 102).
The new law clarified the immigration policy, but it didn’t address issues of dis-
crimination on the basis of national origin or establish how to determine which im-
migrants are economically beneficial for Canada. Diefenbaker, however, used his
oratorial skills to defend the cause of civil rights for all, regardless of race, but the
61Prime Minister Mackenzie King, in House of Commons Debates, May 1, 1947.
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immigration policy contradicted those convictions. It was not until the end of his
government, in 1962 when the Minister if Citizenship and Immigration, Ellen Fair-
clough, that the “White Canada” policy was eliminated. She wanted to reduce the
number of low skilled immigrants while eliminating discrimination on the basis of
race and creed. The 1952 Act stated in section 20 that the eligible immigrants were:
• “British subjects by birth or naturalization in the United Kingdom, Australia,
New Zealand or the Union of South Africa and citizens of Ireland;
• citizens of the United States of America; and
• citizens of France born in France or in Saint-Pierre and Miquelon Islands
if the person had sufficient means to maintain himself until he secured employment”
(Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998, 326).
In 1962 these conditions were substituted so that a person could be admitted to
Canada “who by reason of his education, training, skills or other special qualifications
is likely able to establish himself successfully in Canada and has either sufficient means
to support himself or has secured employment” (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998, 332).
This made Canada the first of the largest countries in international immigration (the
others were Australia and the United States) to eliminate immigration policies that
discriminate on national origin. While this was a big step, it did not state which skills
or special qualifications made an immigrant more likely to establish herself. This all
depended on the Ministry of Citizenship.
On the last day of 1964, Prime Minister Lester Pearson announced that a White
Paper 62 on immigration policy management would be prepared and presented by
62According to the Canadian Parliament website, “It is in 1939 that the term ”white paper” was
first applied to a government document in Canada. The Minister of Finance, Charles A. Dunning,
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the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The white paper took longer than
originally expected, and in the meantime Pearson created a new bureaucracy, the
Department of Manpower and Immigration, on December 17, 1965. This new de-
partment would take responsibilities from both the Department of Citizenship and
Immigration -which was dismantled- and the Department of Labor (Hawkins, 1988,
151). This established the precedent that immigration policy was economic policy
and that labor and immigration policy had to be somewhat coordinated.
The White Paper was released finally on October 1966 (Marchand, 1966). The
document stated that in order to succeed, Canadian Policy had to be selective in
order to complement, and not substitute the roles of Canadian natives in the economy.
This is when the idea for what would become Canada’s selective immigration policy
in modern times first appeared.
Specifically, it says:
“Most immigrants coming to Canada to work are therefore selected in
accordance with carefully established criteria and are encouraged to settle
in places where a known demand exists for their talents. Such immigrants
tend readily to stimulate economic growth through the contribution of
skills, ideas, new techniques, or financial investment. Others are able to
fill specific shortages of professional or skilled manpower in the national
labour force. The high cost of training professional and skilled people
-engineers, doctors, skilled technicians, etc.- is a measure of the benefit
derived from the arrival in Canada of appropriate numbers of already
trained professional and technical personnel. Much of the same can be
said of the advantages conferred on Canada by immigrants with capital
or entrepreneurial skills” (Marchand, 1966, 10).
announced in the House the government’s intention to ”follow this year and possibly in future
years, as the house may determine, the practice which is followed in Great Britain and also in
Australia of putting together what might be called the statistical and accounting information and
explanations into one document which is filed as a white paper and published as an appendix to
the budget.”(2) To this day, the budget papers are often referred to as economic white papers.”
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/Pages/WhitePapers.aspx
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Since the country was in the midst of an economic debacle after the the Coyne
Affair, fiscal concerns were one of the main reasons for reforming immigration policy.
The last section of the White Paper is titled “Financial and other assistance to immi-
grants,” and it deals with the fiscal costs of immigrants who fail to settle down (find
employment) particularly “in respect of welfare and medical care, for which federal
aid is limited to truly emergency measures designed to prevent any immigrant suf-
fering actual privation” (Marchand, 1966, 39). The conclusion is that “an outright
subsidy for immigrants would be very costly if applied universally and discriminatory
if it were not” (Marchand, 1966, 38), meaning in other words that with the status
quo at the moment, subsidizing welfare for immigrants would be too costly, but just
giving it to some would be unfair.
In short, this White Paper stated that Canada’s immigration policy should be
based on the long term needs of the country. While the Paper was signed by Jean
Marchand, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, the points system is the brain
child of Tom Kent, who was the Deputy Minister (Knowles, 2007, 194).
A Joint Committee was formed with members from the Senate and the House
of Commons to implement these recommendations. With the White Paper as an
inspiration or basis, in 1967 the “Norms of Assessment Points Scheme” was imple-
mented in 1967. Besides the points system, a very innovative characteristic of this
reform is that there is no formal quota. This meant that if an applicant obtained
enough points, she or he would be admitted to Canada regardless of the number of
immigrants admitted that year.
The allocation of points in 1967 is described in table 3.21 (Kelley and Trebilcock,
1998, 359):
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Table 3.21: Allocation of Points in Canada in 1967
Independent applicants Points
Short term factors
Arranged employment or designated occupation 0 or 10
Knowledge of English and/or French 0-10
Relative in Canada 0-5
Area of destination 0-5
Long term factors
Education and training 0-20
Personal qualities 0-15
Occupational demand 0-15
Occupational skill 1-10
Age 0-10
The new immigration selection was approved by a Joint Committee of the Senate
and the House of Commons with no objections on April 1967, and became effective
on October 1 of the same year (Hawkins, 1988, 162).
While there were no objections in the Joint Committee, interest groups expressed
their support or rejection of the points system in the months before it was imple-
mented. At first, some Conservatives, such as Richard Bell who had been a Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration in the past was critical on the restrictions on spon-
sored immigration. The Anglican Church opposed, stating its beliefs on “redemption,
reform, and forgiveness” (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998, 355). Labor organizations were
divided: the Canadian Labour Council objected restrictions on sponsored immigrants
but the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association favored a selective policy. Contrary to
the predictions of a factor endowment model, capital owners, represented by the
Canadian Chamber of Commerce also supported it. One of the abundant factors in
Canada, land, opposed the bill. The Canadian Federation of Agriculture was against
the points system because it did not consider farm labor a skill job, making recruit-
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ment harder. Once the reform was implemented, it received a warm welcome in the
media and there were few complaints (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998, 356-359).
The specific allocation of points has changed through the years, but no government
has attempted to discard the points system. As a matter of fact, several countries
have tried to implement one using Canada as an inspiration, as was discussed in
chapter 1.
Several studies have attempted to analyze whether the Canadian immigration
system had the intended economic effects. Li (2003), summarizes several of them and
concludes “the cumulative difference between what immigrants contribute in taxes
and what they receive in benefits represents a net benefit to native-born Canadians”
(Li, 2003, 88).
Conclusions
While in terms if the type of welfare state they have, there is no question Canada
and the United States are very similar, their immigration policy is very different.
In a way, it comes as no surprise that Canada was the pioneer in implementing
a points system since they had selective immigration policies back in the nineteenth
century. Furthermore, with the exception of the period between the Great Depression
to the late fifties and early sixties, immigration in Canada has always been consid-
ered economic policy, and one that can foster economic growth. Historically, similar
considerations were more rare in the United States. Nonetheless, both countries are
large countries of immigration which would be hard to imagine without the very large
immigration flows of the XIX Century and recent decades.
The case studies show several factors which influence these differences. Economic
considerations have existed in American immigration debates, but in many cases
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political factors were not conducive to implementing a points system. While in 1967,
Lester Pearson had a minority government -the closest thing to a divided government
in a parliamentary system- and he faced some Conservative opposition he was a
very popular Prime Minister who had already implemented universal healthcare in
Canada, which showed he clearly wanted to expand the welfare state, while reducing
the fiscal deficit as was required by the I.M.F. in 1962, just before he took office. As
a matter of fact, 1968 when Pearson announced his retirement and Pierre Trudeau
(also a Liberal) was elected Prime Minister, he inherited a fiscal surplus (Beck, 1968),
unlike Pearson who came to power after an IMF rescue.
The key difference between the failed attempts of implementing a points system in
the United States and the successful attempt in Canada is the timing of the proposal,
and more specifically the political (Pearson was a Liberal, while both Bush Presidents
are Republican) and the economic situation of the country (the crisis in the 1960s
made fiscal consideration more important in the minds of both legislators and voters
in Canada, while in 1989-1990 and 2007 the priorities in the minds of American voters
and legislators were not necessarily fiscal, and more related to international security
and terrorism).
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Chapter 4
“Corporatist” Welfare States:
Germany and France
Immigrants that pay high levels of taxes are fiscally better for any receiving coun-
try, but the more “universalist” the welfare system is the more the government would
have to spend for every new immigrant. This makes policy makers less likely to imple-
ment a points system, even if they would benefit from it because the marginal fiscal
impact of ,highly skilled immigrants will be smaller. The purpose of this chapter is to
find how fiscal crises and left of center governments affect the choice of immigration
policies in “corporatist” welfare states, such as Germany and France. My predictions
are that since these systems have more generous welfare systems, in times of fiscal
distress we are more likely to observe restrictions in the total number of immigrants
allowed into the country, and not the type of immigrants being admitted, because
high-skilled immigrants would still be eligible to receive the same welfare benefits
that low skilled workers would enjoy so their net fiscal contribution would be smaller
than in liberal welfare states where welfare is targeted towards the poor.
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There is evidence of this difference between welfare systems in the current litera-
ture. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that in countries like France and Germany the
granting of social benefits was not a contested issue, in contrast with liberal welfare
states (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 27).1
In this chapter, I will describe how the fiscal crises and left of center governments
have historically affected the selection of immigration policy in two paradigmatic
cases of Corporatist Welfare States: Germany and France. According to the theory
described in Chapter 1, these two events are expected to make this countries either
restrict the number of immigrants they receive or move towards a more selective pol-
icy. However, since their welfare systems are more universalistic (less decommodified,
using Esping-Andersen terms), this move is expected to be less dramatic than in
Liberal Welfare States.
4.1 Germany
Kommt die Deutsche Mark, bleiben wir, kommt sie nicht, geh’n wir zu ir
(If the Deutsche Mark comes, we stay, if not, we leave for it.)
Slogan used by East Germans and Eastern Europeans (Thra¨nhardt, 1999, 30).
While German (and before unification, West German) immigration figures would
indicate Germany to be one of the largest countries of immigration, with flows only
second to the United States, until the 2000s the country officially considered itself to
be “not an immigration land” (kein Einwanderungsland). While at first sight that
might look contradictory, this disconnection between practice and reality has to do
with Germany’s definition of immigrant and of citizenship. Many of the foreign work-
1These welfare states are also called “Northern Continental Christian Democratic” (Huber and
Stephens, 2001, 265) and “Coordinated Market Economies” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, 21).
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ers that arrived in Germany were ausslieder or Ethnic Germans, coming mostly from
Eastern Europe. These combined with the fact that since at least 1913, citizenship
is based on ethnocultural basis2, implied that these foreigners were not considered
immigrants, but German citizens.
Furthermore, German immigration policy in the XX Century favored temporary
worker programs, not permanent immigration. The German language, however, dif-
ferentiates between the words “Zuwanderung” and “Einwanderung”, both of these
are translated to English as “immigration”, but have very different political meaning.
The first one refers to immigration that has a temporary (shorter) character, while the
second one is understood as immigration that implies permanent settlement (Schmidt,
2002, 21). As a consequence, the official position of the German government towards
immigration during the XX Century is not necessarily contradictory. For the most
part, Germany has been a land of temporary migration or Zuwanderungsland.
This is relevant because one of the differences between points systems and special
visas for highly skilled workers (such as the American H1-B or the German Green
Card) is that the former imply permanent migration. This difference became partic-
ularly salient during the discussion of the 2002 Immigration Law in Germany which
included the proposal of a points system, and can help explain its failure.
The Political System of Germany
The current political system of Germany originates from the Constitution or Ba-
sic Law that the FRG promulgated in 1949. While the Reunification Treaty con-
tained changes to the Basic Law, the changes were consequences of reunification,
2This understanding was codified in the German Citizenship Law of 1913, the Reichs-und Staat-
sangeho¨rigkeitsgesetz wich dates back to 1913 (Faist, 1994, 54)
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such as the allocation of seats given to East Germany in the Bundesrat and the
creation of a new La¨nder or province (Roberts, 2009, 36-37). The system is a semi-
parliamentary democracy, commonly called a “Chancellor democracy,” characterized
by a strong Chancellor, and a relatively weaker Federal President (closer to a con-
stitutional monarch). The Federal Chancellor “determines the guidelines of policy”
(Article 65 of the Basic Law), to the point where Adenauer was both Chancellor
and his own Foreign Minister from 1951 to 1955. The Chancellor is elected by the
Bundestag and appointed by the President and can only be removed if the Bun-
destag passes a constructive vote of no confidence, where a successor is named the
simultaneously (Roberts, 2009, 122-134).
The political system was thus designed to be very stable, with the probable excep-
tion of government coalitions which change often. For Lijphart the German political
system can be classified as a “Centripetal Democracy” where society is homogeneous,
but elite behavior is adversarial, where instead of a grand coalition government, there
are two large coalitions competing for power, and where government coalitions are
considered provisional (Lijphart, 1977, 117-118).
Germany is also the prototype of a mixed electoral system. Part of the Bundestag
members are elected in a majority system and the rest through proportional represen-
tation. Every voter has two votes. The first is for a constituency candidate (Germany
has 299 single member constituencies distributed among the La¨nder according to pop-
ulation density) and the second for a party list for the La¨nder. Voters can split their
vote and choose a party for their first vote and another for the party list. Once the
“first vote” seats have been assigned, the rest of the seats are allocated according
to the percentage of second votes. This electoral system makes it almost impossible
for a party to form government by itself, so coalition formation is an essential part
of the political process (Roberts, 2009). This is relevant for the implementation of
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immigration policy. Since coalitions are usually necessary to create government, we
expect immigration policy to be more moderate: a very radical reform could endanger
the stability of the government coalition.
The “Foreigners” Law of 1965
Immigration Policy
After World War II, West Germany lacked an immigration law. Most of the im-
migration was arranged through bilateral agreements (Castles, 1985; Marshall, 2000)
and was only concerned with short term labor requirements, under the belief that
immigrants would only remain in the country for a short period of time and would
not make demands for social benefits (Castles, 1985, 522). These situation remained
until the 1960s when the Ausla¨ndergesetz or “Foreigners” Law was approved in 1965
to make temporary migration more flexible and to give the federal government more
control. These permits were only granted if West German workers were not available.
Immigrants were not granted political rights or a right to residency, but they were
able to access some social benefits. The temporary work permits were of limited du-
ration, could be restricted to a specific company and the authorities could withdraw
the permit at any time (Castles, 1985, 522-523).
While the purpose of this law was to restrict immigration, it still granted foreign
workers welfare benefits they could not access before the law was implemented. As
a consequence, the law did not prevent the settlement of “temporary” immigrants.
The main consequence of this law was then fiscally negative (more welfare spending).
The rationale behind this law had little to do with the fiscal crisis and more to do
with the political symbolism of “foreigners” (Castles, 1985).
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Political Parties
The political environment in West Germany in the early 1960s was characterized
by the end of the Adenauer Era. Konrad Adenauer was the founder of the Christian
Democratic Union (right of center party) and had been Chancellor of West Germany
since 1949. By 1961, he was 85 years old and the beginning of the construction of
the Berlin Wall affected his popularity. According to Pulzer (1995, 73), Adenauer
didn’t visit West Berlin until days after the Wall was built, failing to recognize how
important and traumatic the event was for Berlin and how much it could affect
public opinion. When he finally arrived in West Berlin, he was booed and as a
consequence his government coalition3 almost lost his overall majority, making a
coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) necessary to avoid a government
of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The results of the 1961 election gave the
CDU/CSU around 45% of the total vote, the SPD received 36% and the FDP around
13% (Burkett, 1975, 139-140), so while a coalition between the SPD and FDP could
not have formed government, the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition was viable. Still
the FDP had several demands on the table. The terms the FDP put on the coalition
negotiation table included the demand that Adenauer retired before the next election.
The Chancellor was also losing popularity inside his party because of his friendship
with De Gaulle and his support of French-German Friendship Treaty.4 Other CDU
leaders were concerned that such a treaty would endanger US support. Adenauer
finally resigned in October of 1963, and Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of Economics
was appointed Chancellor. The coalition was fragile, but the imminence of the 1965
3His party had governed with the CSU or Christian Social Union.
4That Treaty was finally signed by Adenauer before his resignation and was known as the Elysee
Accord (Pulzer, 1995, 74).
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elections helped keep the government intact. Erhard gained reelection, but neither
the economy nor foreign policy were successful. Economic growth rates started to
decline from the record levels of the 1950s when he was Ministry of Economy. In
1966, the government coalition collapsed over the fiscal deficit. While Erhard wanted
to raise taxes, the FDP preferred spending cuts. As a consequence, Erhard resigned
and a coalition was formed between the CDU and the SPD (Pulzer, 1995, 75).
According to Faist (1994) the CDU/CSU coalition, of which both Adenauer and
Erhard were members, tried to cast immigration as a cultural and ethnic issue (the
Ausla¨nderproblem). Their concern was not about redistribution or the consequences
of foreign workers in the welfare state, but on keeping West Germany “German.” This
sheds light on why the 1965 Foreigners’ Law granted immigrants access to welfare
benefits, but not political rights. The concern of the government coalition was not
economic, but political, even during the beginning of the end of the economic miracle
in the FRG.
The arrival of the Social Democratic Party to the government also brought a
change in the agenda on immigration, emphasizing policies of guestworker integration
and attempts to move from a ius sanguinis citizenship policy5 to one of ius soli6, but
also brought to the debate arguments about the effect of immigration on wages, since
blue collar workers and unions were part of the support group for the SPD (Faist,
1994).
5Citizenship based on blood or ancestry.
6Citizenship based on where a person is born.
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Fiscal Crisis
The West German economy in the 1950s and early 1960s was characterized by
a long period of economic growth. During the 1950s the German Gross National
Product grew, on average, 8.2% a year (Kerber and Hartig, 1999, 340). The architect
of the “German Miracle” after World War II was Ludwig Erhard, Ministry of Econ-
omy for Adenauer. According to Kerber and Hartig (1999) his policies were based
on what later was called “supply side economics,” and at the time in Germany was
called “Ordoliberalism.” Currency was kept at a low level to favor an export-oriented
economy, liberalizing trade, and reforming the tax system to favor capital accumula-
tion through tax cuts. While Ordoliberals wanted to reform welfare statism to favor
market productivity, Germany had a long tradition of social security, dating from the
XIX Century, which was very popular in Germany. The Adenauer and Erhard solu-
tion was called a “social market economy,” an attempt to combine market economy
and tax cuts with redistributive policies. The government welfare measures had also
a foreign policy objective: Adenauer wanted to show the Germans living in the GDR
that capitalism delivered better welfare than socialism (Pulzer, 1995, 65).
Because of the financial constraints created by the social market economy, re-
strictions were implemented on the availability of liquid funds, as a consequence the
production of investment goods decreased and so did the number of private companies.
In 1965, when the “Foreigners Law” was discussed in the Bundestag, total public debt
was 69.6 DM, 40% larger than the previous year (Feiler, 1967, 354). Erhard wanted
to raise taxes, the FDP preferred spending cuts, but to my knowledge there was no
debate of using the Foreigners Law to increase public income. These pressures in a
Liberal Welfare State would have created a fertile environment for the implementa-
tion of selective immigration policies. In contrast, temporary workers (zuwanderers)
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were granted access to welfare programs. The right of center coalition of CDU and
CSU was more concerned about keeping the FRG culturally German than about the
fiscal impact of immigration on the welfare state. This goes in line with the main
theory of this project: left of center parties are more likely to implement selective
immigration policies, especially in Liberal Welfare States.
The end of the recruitment of foreign workers
Immigration Policy
In November 23, 1973 the government decided to put a stop to the recruitment of
temporary workers as a response to the oil embargo in arab countries. While this was
not the only policy that West Germany implemented, it was one of the most prominent
ones. As Hollifield (1992, 75-76) argues, foreign workers were an “industrial reserve
army” with few political protections, so states and employers would be expected
to discriminate against them in times of recession. This halt in recruitment was
implemented unilaterally, without prior consultations with other countries and while
the official argument was economical in nature, there were also political reasons.
Trade Unions were pleased with the decision, but some employers attempted to lobby
for exceptions but it was politically difficult to oppose the new policy since it was
widely supported by public opinion (Hollifield, 1992).
The ban, however, didn’t have the expected effects. While the number of newly
recruited temporary workers decreased, the new law had two consequences: putting
rotation of temporary workers to an end and increasing family based immigration.
The first meant that foreign workers that would leave to be replaced by others and
return in a later year decided to stay for good (Marshall, 2000, 12). The second that
such foreigners’ brought their families to Germany. This settlement put a strain to
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the welfare system, which relied heavily on local governments because of he federal
nature of West Germany. They had to deal with housing, education, and health care
of the new immigrants. The German authorities tried to stop family immigration
by granting family members temporary residency permits while denying them work
permits (Hollifield, 1992, 85). While the immigration reforms might have alleviated
some of the pressures on the employment market, it did nothing to help the public
budget since foreigners continued being eligible for welfare benefits, in contrast with
Liberal Welfare States, such as the United States where they would not be eligible
for unemployment benefits. The implementation of a points system would not have
been reasonable in 1973 Germany neither, since high-skilled immigrants would also
be able to receive welfare benefits and increasing their tax rate to make them fiscally
beneficial would have provided them with no incentive to migrate there.
Political Parties
The 1969 election marked the end of the “Grand Coalition” between the CDU/CSU
and the SDP and the beginning of the era known as Ostpolitik or the opening to the
East. The Social Democrats were worried that the CDU/CSU coalition would at-
tempt to implement a first-past-the-post system (a majoritarian system such as the
one existing in the United States or Great Britain). The Chancellor (Kiesinger) had
announced his intention to implement the electoral reform in 1973, which the Social
Democrats opposed. Furthermore, there were disagreements over economic policy be-
tween the Minister of Economics, Schiller, from the SDP and the CDU/CSU coalition
over the revaluation of the Deutsche Mark, and also over Ostpolitik, favored by the
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SDP (Burkett, 1975). At the end, the Social Democrats gained 1.25 million votes
which allowed them to form a government with the FDP.7
The coalition elected Willy Brandt (leader of the SDP) as Chancellor. The change
of parties was very relevant for immigration since both parties had different views of
immigration. While Adenauer, and the CDU/CSU were in favor of an ethnical and
cultural concept of citizenship, the SDP wanted to emphasize integration policies
for the guestworker population (Faist, 1994). According to Pulzer (1995, 111-119)
Brandt’s government was characterized too by the Ostpolitik and in particular the
Moscow Treaty, signed on August 12, 1970 between West Germany and the USSR,
followed by similar agreements with other Eastern European countries, and in 1971
the “Four-Power Agreement.” Besides recognizing the sovereignty of the GDR it es-
tablished formal relationships with East Germany and other soviet republics. Brandt
also wanted to allow emigration of the remaining ethnic Germans in Poland, and a
fraction of them, 60,000 of them got exit permits in the following five years.8 More-
over, in May of 1972 the two Germanys signed the first bilateral transit agreement of
civilians. The Ostpolitik and all it implied was strongly opposed by the CDU/CSU
(even though the agreements were favored by public opinion), and Brandt’s govern-
ment coalition was fragile. In the summer of 1972, Karl Schiller, the Minister of
Economic Affairs resigned because of disagreements over economic policy: he wanted
to cut federal spending and the Chancellor didn’t, and Schiller refused to implement
restrictions to capital mobility to reduce inflation, an unpopular position in the gov-
7Freie Demokratische Partei Deutchlands or Free Democratic Party of Germany.
8The emigration issue was finally settled in 1975 with the Helsinki Final Act, when in exchange
of a West German monetary contribution for Polish war victims, Poland allowed the emigration of
125,000 ethnic Germans (Pulzer, 1995, 114)
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ernment at the time.9 This resignation meant Brandt had to end his government,
according to the Basic Law. In September 22, however, his cabinet abstained on the
vote of no confidence. The final vote was defeated 248-233, so an election had to
be called (Burkett, 1975, 121-122). The Social Democrats emerged for the first time
as the largest political party, their vote increasing by 3.2% and the FDP vote by
2.6%. This election was in a way a referendum in favor of the Ostpolitik and a very
successful one.
Fiscal Crisis
In some ways, the global economy was more important to change immigration
policy than domestic pressure. In October 1973 the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) implemented an oil embargo in response to the United
States’ role in the Yom Kippur War. This caused a spike in gas prices around the
world, including Germany. Ikenberry (1986) defines the German reaction to the oil
embargo as a “Competitive Accelerated Adjustment” characterized by letting the
economy run its course and absorb the shock, while the government sped up the
process strengthening, but not controlling energy companies (Ikenberry, 1986). The
increase in prices caused by the global economy brought increases in unemployment,
affecting first of all the temporary workers, who according to the Foreigners’ Law were
eligible to receive government provided unemployment protection, the main reason
behind the end of the recruitment of temporary workers era. It was seen as a policy
to alleviate unemployment and protect the fiscal health of the government (Hollifield,
1992; Marshall, 2000). While not all temporary workers were low-skilled, the fact
that all of them were eligible to benefit from the government’s welfare programs, a
9West Germany: Unhooking the Locomotive, TIME Magazine, July 17, 1972.
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selective immigration policy, such as a points system, would have made little sense in
West Germany at the time (even in times of fiscal crisis) since high-skilled foreigners
legally could rely as much on the welfare state (Castles, 1985) and would not be as
fiscally beneficial for the state as they were in Canada or Australia, countries that
had a points system at the time.
Unification of the two Germanys
Political Parties
By early 1989 the pressure to democratize the GDR was high given the reforms
implemented by Gorvachev, but the General Secretary of the Socialist Party (SED),
Erich Honecker, maintained his hard-line approach, even as the Party lost thousands
of members. Then, in September Hungary opened its border with Austria, which
allowed thousands of East Germans to flee to West Germany through Austria. Finally,
on October 18 the Politburo members forced Honecker to resign as head of state and
was substituted by Egon Krenz, who promised free elections in 1990. In the following
months, several parties and coalitions were created and the SED changed its name
to “Party and Democratic Socialism” (PDS) in an attempt to distance itself from
the Honecker regime. The election took place on March 18, and the results were
(Braunthal, 1996, 130):10
10Alliance for Germany was a coalition between the CDU, Democratic Awakening, and the DSU.
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Table 4.1: 1990 Volkskammer Elections
Party Percent Seats
CDU 40.8 163
DSU 6.3 25
Democratic Awakening 0.9 4
SPD 21.9 88
PDS 16.4 66
League of Free Democrats 5.3 21
Alliance 90 2.9 12
Democratic Farmers Party 2.2 9
Greens and Independent Women’s’ Association 2.0 8
National Democratic Party 0.4 2
Democratic Women’s’ League 0.3 1
United Left 0.2 1
Other 0.4 -
Total 100 400
The winners of the election favored unification, and the Volkskammer (controlled
by the Alliance for Germany) voted on October 3 to dissolve the Volkskammer and
unite with the Federal Republic of Germany, but negotiations started earlier. Specif-
ically on September 12, in Moscow, when the foreign ministers of each of the World
War II allies’ signed the “Treaty of Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” and
relinquished their occupation rights over the German territory (Harris, 1991).
The first Bundestag election of the united Germany was called for December 2,
1990 and the results were (Kitschelt, 1991, 122):
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Table 4.2: 1990 Bundestag Election
Party Percent Seats
CDU/CSU 43.8 319
SPD 33.5 239
FDP 11.0 79
Greens (West) 3.9
Greens/ Alliance 90 (East) 1.2 8
PDS 2.4 17
The Greys 0.8
Republicans 2.1
All Others 1.3
Total 100 662
The election was framed around the notion of one Germany, which benefited the
Christian Democrats leaded by Helmut Kohl. The Social Democrats were headed by
Oskar Lafontaine, who criticized the economic burden that unification would be im-
posed on West Germany. In the words of Kitschelt: “At least implicitly, his campaign
posed the question why East Germans should be entitled to West German affluence
although they had not contributed to it” (Kitschelt, 1991, 133).
While the campaign was run on the basis of unification, it is important to remem-
ber that immigration and the welfare state were fundamental issues in the process.
The population in West Germany increased suddenly by around 16 million people,
who by their economic development levels would need more state provided welfare,
besides several ethnic Germans moving from other former soviet nations. All of these
individuals-regardless of skill level-were entitled according to the Basic Law to receive
the same welfare benefits as any other German, and the concern about unification
coming from the SPD originated in this issue.
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Immigration Policy
On April 1990, months before the official unification but after negotiations had
started, the 1965 Foreigners’ Law was reformed. The revisions included making ac-
cess to German citizenship easier, granting more rights to long-term foreign residents,
and facilitating immigration for German-born individuals who had not been in Ger-
many for a long period of time. This was a reform of huge importance. Until that
date, German citizenship was based on blood (jus sanguini) and afterwards it became
also based on where a person is born (jus soli), a similar citizenship policy to other
countries like the United States or Great Britain. Months later, in July, the Ethnic
German Reception Law was enacted, allowing even more Ethnic Germans to immi-
grate. Along with these reforms, the Christian Democratic government headed by
Helmut Kohl (before and after unification) signed bilateral agreements with several
Eastern European countries to allow temporary workers to immigrate and work in
sectors with labor shortages (Menz, 2009).
While all of these reforms were integral part of the unification process, they were
not implemented only under an economic rationale, but on the idea that East Germans
were citizens according to the Basic Law, and as a consequence had the right to access
the same benefits as West Germans (Faist, 1994, 54). A fundamental characteristic
of the German welfare state is a higher degree of universality than in liberal welfare
states, and while the 1965 Foreigners’ Law was reformed, the immigrants’ right to
access government provided welfare stayed constant. These reforms had a political
and historical reason, and not so much a fiscal one. Nobody was fooled: these reforms
were fiscally costly for the government but necessary for a peaceful unification.
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Fiscal Crisis
While before unification, the Minister of Finance, Theo Waigel, publicly said:
“Our policy is: there will be no tax increases for financing German unification”
(Mu¨nter and Sturm, 2002, 181), the Christian Democratic government had to change
its position soon after and a solidarity tax was implemented, along with raises in
the fuel and insurance taxes. The tax increases were not enough given the low level
of economic development in the East, and as a consequence public debt had to be
increased as well. Before unification German public debt was relatively low, compared
to other industrialized economies. According to Mu¨nter and Sturm, public debt from
1985 to 1985 amounted to 43% of the GDP, while during the following decade it was
around 64%. These fiscal pressures were unlike any other the country had experienced
and it would take long to recover.
This was exactly the economic environment in which a country with a less generous
welfare state would have tried to implement a selective immigration policy, however,
in the German case the income to finance the fiscal deficit caused by unification
had to come from somewhere else. The Foreigners’ Law since 1965 gave immigrants
access to goverment welfare, and East Germans were German citizens according to
the Basic Law, and eastern Europeans with German ancestry were ausslieder and
also considered Germans according to citizenship law. In order to “use” immigration
for fiscal benefits, the Basic Law and Citizenship Law would have had to be reformed
first.
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Selective immigration policies in Germany: The 2000s
Political Parties
The popularity of Helmut Kohl’s goverment went down in the 1990s as unemploy-
ment continued to increase and economic growth was slow, so the SPD went on the
offensive and attacked the Kohl government to prepare for the 1998 election. While
Oskar Lafontaine, the president of the party, wanted another chance to run against
Kohl, Gerhard Schro¨der, president of the Bundesrat had higher approval among voters
and also wanted to be the candidate for Chancellor. When Schro¨der was reelected in
the Lower Saxony election (where SPD had declined for eight consecutive elections),
the SPD elected him as candidate in March of 1998. Schro¨der campaign positioned
in the ideological center (Umarming der Mitte), appealing to white collar workers,
civil servants, and the like. His moderate position was successful, and he was able to
take the Christian Democrats completely out of office and form a coalition with the
Greens (Conradt, 2000).
The Schro¨der government started losing popularity fast, not because of friction
with the Greens, but internal conflict. While Lafontaine, the President of the party,
became Minister of Finance, he disagreed with Schro¨der’s platform. Lafontaine
wanted a mostly Keynesian economic policy, while Schro¨der wanted a more centrist
policy. Lafontaine ended up resigning on March of 1999. While in almost any other
situation that would have given the CDU/CSU a big bump in the polls, that was not
the case because it was made public that Helmut Kohl, as Chancellor, had falsified
party accounting and hidden campaign donations from electoral authorities and as
a consequence had to resign. To make matters worse, his successor as party chair-
man, Wolfang Scha¨uble had to follow Kohl’s steps when it was announced that the
accounts of the CDU’s parliamentary group, which he chaired, also had irregularities.
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Scha¨uble was substituted by Angela Merkel, who was potentially an electoral asset
for the Christian Democrats in areas where they were usually weak. In contrast with
Kohl and Schla¨ube, Merkel was female, protestant, and East German, all groups that
usually supported the SPD. For the 2002 election the CDU/CSU coalition, however,
had doubts about her and proposed instead Edmund Stoiber, Chairman of the CSU,
as candidate (Pulzer, 2003). While the coalition increased its vote share in the 2002
elections it was not enough to gain the majority of the Bundestag.
It’s very relevant in this context to remember that while the Chancellor’s coalition
didn’t change, the second legislative chamber, the Bundesrat is elected through a
different process. The governments of each of the German La¨nder (equivalent of
provinces or states) sends three or more representatives to the Bundesrat (Becker,
2003). As a consequence, if a majority of local governments are from a different party
than the Chancellor, there can be “divided government.”
Fiscal Crisis
Schro¨der won the 1998 election in part because of promises to improve Germany’s
economy, which was still struggling to recover from unification. During the first
part of his government, Schro¨der promoted supply-side economic policies to stimulate
the economy, such as an austerity budget, tax cuts for corporations and individuals
and limited pension reform (Busch, 2009; Camerra-Rowe, 2004), which is why the
Chairman of the Party and Ministry of Finance, Oskar Lafontaine, resigned from
the government. The Schro¨der reforms did not help solve two of the main economic
problems the country was facing at the time: unemployment and a public debt that
did not meet the levels required by the Maastrich Treaty. As a consequence, Schro¨der
took a 180 degree turn in the traditional policies of the Social Democrats, a plan
he called: Agenda 2010. This plan attempted to reduce the role of the state and
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promote individual responsibility. It was the first time that the SPD attempted to
shrink the size of the welfare state: Agenda 2010 included plans to reduce taxes,
increase privatizations, reduce homeowner allowance, a merger of unemployment and
social welfare benefits, easing job protection regulations, and no pension increases in
2004 (Busch, 2009).
Needless to say that while the plan was approved by the Bundestag in 2003, it was
not very popular among some of its traditional support groups, such as labor unions
and small businesses (Busch, 2009). For a left of center government to implement
this reform, strong fiscal tension needs to exist. It is under these circumstances that
the proposal to implement a selective immigration policy became relevant: only after
a reduction of the German corporatist welfare state to make it closer to a British
or American system does the implementation of a points system becomes fiscally
beneficial. With a very generous welfare state, even a very high-skilled immigrant is
likely to rely more on publicly provided welfare than what she contributed through
taxes.
Selective Immigration Policy
By the late 1990s it had become clear in Germany that more high-skilled immi-
grants were necessary to maintain the competitiveness of the German economy in
global markets. Moreover, the media criticized often the fact that without an inflow
of productive young workers, the pension system, one of the pillars of the welfare
state, would collapse (Menz, 2009). And immigration had traditionally been one of
the strong areas for the Social Democrats, who had the opportunity to do something
about it after their victory in 1998.
The first step taken by the Schro¨der government was to implement the “2000 IT
sector migration program,” a recruitment plan to attract a total of 20,000 high-skilled
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immigrants through special visas, deceitfully named Green Cards. These program
faced very strong opposition from the Christian Democrats, who responded with
the slogan Kinder statt Inder (“Children instead of Indians”) indicating they rather
train German children for technology jobs than give them to Indians (Menz, 2009;
Kruse, Orren, and Angenendt, 2003). The Schro¨der government, and in particular
the Interior Ministry, Otto Schily, wanted to move further in terms of high-skilled
immigration and had the support of the business community who liked the move to
the ideological center in the Social Democrats. Schily named then the former Bun-
destag President, a Christian Democrat, Rita Su¨ßmuth. The commission included
academics, legal experts, and politicians from all parties and was entrusted to for-
mulate expert, independent advise. At the same time, several independent proposals
were being developed by different parties and by Schilly himself. The Commission
finally presented its findings in July of 2001, and the most significant part of the
report was the first sentence: Deutchland ist ein Einwanderungsland (Germany is a
land of “permanent” immigration). For most of its modern history, Germany had
adamantly denied this, and its policy was based mostly on ethnic Germans (not con-
sider immigrants) and temporary workers (zuwanderers). It is hard to understand
the difference in English, or most languages, but the political debate that ensued had
its source in the two different German words to describe an immigrant.
The other conclusions of the Su¨ßmuth Commission were improving integration
and satisfy the economic needs of the country, including an aging population, global-
ization, and the fact that a number of highly qualified positions could not be filled,
even with the high unemployment levels Germany experienced (Kruse, Orren, and
Angenendt, 2003; Menz, 2009; Schmidt, 2002). In 2002, Schilly introduced a bill as a
response to the Su¨ßmuth Commission’s suggestions which included a points system
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to attract high skilled immigrants.11 The bill was voted in the Bundestag in March
1st and it received support from the SPD/Green government coalition, and a handful
of CDU members who broke ranks. The FDP and PDS abstained and the majority
of the CDU/CSU voted against (Kruse, Orren, and Angenendt, 2003), which was
enough to pass the bill.
The next step was to pass the bill in the Bundesrat, for a first round of voting. The
Bundesrat is composed by representatives appointed by the local governments from
the La¨nder, and the Social Democratic majority was much more precarious since two
La¨nder, Bremen and Brandenburg, were governed by Red-Black coalitions of CDU-
CSU and the SPD. By March 22, when the first round of voting took place, all La¨nder
had made a decision, but the Land of Brandenburg was divided and was the pivotal
Land. The Minister President, Manfred Stolpe (SPD) and his coalition partner, Jo¨rg
Scho¨nbohm (CDU) reached no agreement and entered a split vote. The Basic Law,
however, established that all representatives from a Land in the Bundesrat have to
vote unanimously, or abstain. When the Bundesrat President, Klaus Wowereit (SPD),
called Brandenburg to vote, Stolpe said “The Land of Brandenburg votes yes.” But
Scho¨nbohm protested to the President, who ignored him and recorded a consensus
“yes” vote for Brandenburg. The bill was handed over to the Bundespra¨sident who
signed the act into law on June 25, and the implementation of the points system was
established for January 1, 2003. Nonetheless, six La¨nder governed by the opposition
(Baden-Wu¨rtenburg, Bavaria, Hesse, the Saar, Saxony, and Thuringia) asked the
Constitutional Court to abrogate the law because the voting in the Bundesrat was
incompatible with the procedures established in the Basic Law. The CDU/CSU
opposed the law because it didn’t limit the number of immigrants, only altered the
11The specific details about the allocation of points were not established in the law.
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type of immigrants that would enter Germany and saw the constitutional controversy
as a way to delay the implementation of the law. The Court delivered its decision right
before the implementation date, on December 18. The Court ruled the Brandenburg
vote had to be counted as invalid. Since Brandenburg was the pivotal vote, there were
not enough voted to pass the law which was declared invalid on procedural grounds
(Becker, 2003; Kruse, Orren, and Angenendt, 2003).
In 2003, Schilly introduced an identical bill. However, local elections in the Fall
had changed the political balance in the Bundesrat, so the opposition demanded
91 changes to the law in order to vote in favor of it. One of these changes was
removing the points system. The FDP supported the points system for demographic
reasons, but the Christian Democrats opposed it under the argument that that high-
skilled immigrants would move to Germany because they were eligible for welfare
benefits, and since these immigrants since would not be ethnically German would not
integrate. At the end, the points system was removed from the bill in exchange for
more temporary visas for high-skilled workers and allowing foreign college students to
remain in the country for one additional year (similarly to the United States system).
The law was finally passed in July of 2004 by both chambers (Menz, 2009).
Conclusion
While Germany was very close to implementing a points system, the law that
emerged from the Su¨ßmuth commission was brought down on more than procedural
grounds. The opposition to the reform from the CDU/CSU coalition was based in
part on the fact that Germany had always been a country of permanent migration
(Einwanderung), and a points system, unlike a temporary visa would grant residency
to immigrants. They didn’t necessarily oppose attracting more high-skilled immi-
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grants, as the 2004 law increases work visas for them, but they opposed permanent
immigration (Schmidt, 2002).
The German case highlights the importance of the three conditions present in the
theory described in Chapter One. It would be almost unimaginable for the CDU/CSU
to propose a points system, but for a free-markets supporter, left-center Chancellor
such as Scro¨der, it makes perfect political and economic sense given his political
support of small businesses and his plans to reduce the budget deficits, such as Agenda
2010. The latter shows also how the political viability of proposing a points system is
dramatically increased by a fiscal crisis. The problem for Schro¨der was that given the
universalistic nature of the German welfare state the fiscal impact of a points system
would be much smaller than the one observed in Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom.
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4.2 France
La grande originalite´ de la France par rapport aux E´tats-Unis, qui explique le phe´nome`ne
soit passe´ inaperc¸u aux yeux des historiens pendant longtemps, tient dans le paradoxe
d’une formation sociale repre´sentant d’un coˆte´ le mode`le acheve´ de la nation (par
l’anciennete´ de sa formation, par l’homoge´ne´ite´ de sa population, par la rigidite´ de ses
cadres politiques) mais qui, d’un autre coˆte´, a e´te´ oblige´e, pour ne pas sombrer, de fair
appel a` l’immigration massive, ce qui a bouleverse´ la composition de sa population initiale
(Noiriel, 2006, 338).
The big originality of France in comparison with the United States, which has been
ignored by historians for a long time, is the paradox of a social formation, represented on
one side by an achieved model of nation (for its ancient formation, the homogeneity of its
population, and the rigidity of its policy frameworks) which, on the other side, was forced,
in order to survive, to open itself to massive immigration, which has changed the
composition of the initial population which created it. (Noiriel, 2006, 338).
Political System of France
France’s political system has changed more than many of its counterparts in the
last half of the XX Century. After the Liberation of France in World War II, the
Fourth French Republic was shaped. On May 5, 1946 a referendum was taken on
the institutional design of the new Republic, and it was determined that the country
would have two legislative chambers, the Parliament and the Conseil de la Re´publique.
The Communists and Socialists didn’t want a Senate, but there was fear that a
majority in the Parliament would not have enough “checks and balances” for the
Parliament and Prime Minister. That is why they compromised on a second chamber,
but one less powerful than a traditional Senate (Kedward, 2005, 356).
he Fourth French Republic was characterized by Lijphart (1977) as a prototype of a
centrifugal democracy, characterized by both a plural society and adversarial elites. In
his words: “The French Fourth Republic is often regarded as the outstanding example
of unstable, innefective, and immobilist democracy” (Lijphart, 1977, 114). Parties
found it almost impossible to have a majority in Parliament, so Prime Ministers were
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unable to risk their survival in the government with the implementation of unpopular
reforms. This became particularly obvious with the Algerian War. So in 1958, Charles
de Gaulle called the nation to suspend the government and create a constitutional
system. He proposed a semi-presidential system with a strong President elected for a
seven year period who would have executive powers to run the country, but that still
would consult with the Prime Minister and Parliament. On June of 1958, de Gaulle
was appointed head of government and given the power to rule by decree until the
constitutional referendum, which took place in September, when the Fifth Republic
started (Kedward, 2005). This strong presidencial figure has been important and has
distingushed French immigration policymaking from that of other countries in that
most reforms have been implemented by presidential ordinances and not parliament
votes, as will be described in the following sections.
Furthermore, the creation of the French Fifth Republic brought important institu-
tional changes to the country. Besides separate presidential elections, the Parliament
is elected by a majority-minority electoral system. On the first ballot absolute ma-
jority is necessary, but in the second round which only includes candidates with more
than 12.5% of the vote are barred from the second ballot (Lijphart, 1999, 146). As a
consequence, the effective number of parties in France has been, on average, around
3.5 in contrast with countries single member districts that tend to have only two par-
ties (Lijphart, 1999) and has allowed the emergence of extreme right anti-immigration
parties such as the Front National.
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The Fourth French Republic: The Laissez faire regime
Immigration policy
After the end of Nazi occupation France needed workers for reconstruction, and
World War II had brought the loss of 600,000 French adults. This made immigration
a pressing concern because the other options discussed for satisfying the labor needs
needed for rebulding the country were unpopular: Either increasing retiring age, using
more women as workers, or redistributing of labor (Watson, 1952, 3). The De Gaulle
government also wanted to re-populate the country with young people, because the
with the lost of mostly young citizens during the war the avergae population age had
increased, so the government was worried about the future of the country as a “great
power.” Left wing parties, in particular, demanded a government monopoly over im-
migration matters, so that native labor could be protected in times of unemployment
and their preferences went in line with another powerful group, the Commission of
Manpower, in charge of designing the first economic plan of the new Republic. While
politically more conservative, they argued that to meet their production goals, im-
porting workers of various skills was necessary, and they supported a government
monopoly on the matter to be able to send the foreign workers home when they were
not necessary anymore. As a consequence of this consensus, in November 2, 1945 the
Office National d’Immigration or National Office of Immigration (ONI) was created
by an ordinance (Freeman, 1979; Money, 1999; Watson, 1952)
In theory, employers would ask the ONI for foreign workers by name or occupation,
and the Office would recruit them and do the necessary paperwork to recruit them.
But in practice, the process was cumbersome and the employers returned to their
pre-war practice to recruit workers themselves. The government didn’t really object
since workers were necessary anyway. At that point, the government didn’t provide
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immigrants with many social benefits but the immigrants did provide economic gains
tot he country so the laissez faire practice continued until the 1960s (Freeman, 1979).
Given the lack of access to the welfare system, immigrants were fiscally beneficial,
even if they had low skill levels because the government wasn’t funding them at the
time, so restricting labor flows or implemented a selective immigration policy would
have made little sense. According to the theory in chapter one, the latter would occur
when low skill immigrants rely more on the welfare state than high-skilled immigrants
during times of fiscal crisis. At the time, in France, none of these conditions were
found.
Fiscal crisis
The French Economy during the Fourth Republic was characterized by rapid
growth rates, but also high levels of public and private investment in comparison
with the interwar period. The reconstruction of the country required new roads,
schools, and similar investements from both public and private actors which increased
the demand for capital in France at the time. According to Kindleberger (1963) in
the period before the Second World War, government credit was the main source of
capital formation, but during the reconstruction there was a more varied set of op-
tions: self financing of private companies, government funds derived from foreign aid,
public debt, and inflationary finance from the rediscounting of the Bank of France
(Kindleberger, 1963, 127). While the French government had a public deficit, there
was no fiscal crisis at the time given the other options for financing investment. As a
consequence, the fiscal cost of the laissez faire immigration was not a concern: immi-
grants did not access the welfare system and taxes were not the only source of public
investment for reconstruction.
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Political Parties
The Fourth French Republic was characterized by its political instability, since no
Prime Minister stayed in power for over two years, and the government switched from
left to right almost every time the government changed. DeGaulle decided to retire
after the Liberation, but still was a central political figure during the unstable Fourth
Republic, and provided political continuity which might explain why the political
system didn’t fall sooner than it did, and why DeGaulle was the one who ended
it. The death of the Fourth Republic, however, was not brought by its political
instability, but because of the failure to decolonize Algeria (Kedward, 2005). In
terms of immigration, the political instability that characterized France during the
postwar years didn’t affect immigration policy. There was consensus that in order to
rebuild the country and its economy after the war the country needed more manpower,
and immigration was the way to get it, so different government ideologies didn’t
imply immigration changes (Freeman, 1979; Kennedy-Brenner, 1979). Furthermore,
according to the theory presented in chapter one, selelctive immigration policies,
moreover, are not likely to be implemented in times of economic boom, such as the
French Fourth Republic.
The Fifth French Republic and the beginning of immigration
restriction
Immigration policy
At the end of the Fourth Republic and as a consequence of the conflict with
Algeria, the French welfare state started to be available for foreign workers. On
December 29, 1958, the Fonds D’Action Social (Social Action Funds) were created
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by an ordinance to improve the living conditions of Algerians, but on April 24, 1964
a decree mandated the F.A.S. to extend its services to all foreign workers living in
France. Some of the funding for the F.A.S. comes from immigrants themselves, but
the rest comes from a state subsidy to the budget of the Ministry of Labor (Kennedy-
Brenner, 1979, 21). As a consequence, at least some of the burden comes from public
funds, and the public concerns over immigrants’ reliance on the French welfare state
started.
Furthermore, the laissez faire immigration made sense during reconstruction, but
public pressure to institutionalize the system in the late 1960s were the source of a
bureaucratic re-structuring. In 1966, the Office of Population and Migration was cre-
ated with the goal to give employers incentives to participate in the state recruitment
programs. When that proved insufficient, two ordinances in 1967 changed dramati-
cally the immigration system: The first one on July 15 required employers to register
all foreign workers within twenty four hours of hiring them, and the second one on Au-
gust 21 required partial reimbursement by employers of socail security expenditures
if one of their foreign employers had failed to obtained the proper medical examina-
tions (Money, 1999, 108). In reality, the number of immigrants increased after those
ordinances through recruitment of the O.N.I., but these new immigrants worked in
specific industries with labor shortages (Freeman, 1979; Money, 1999) indicating that
perhaps, the government didn’t intend to stop immigration altogether, but to select
immigrants more carefully.
According to the theory presented in chapter one, reforms towards more selective
immigration policies, such as points systems, are more likely to occur in liberal wel-
fare states, with left of center governments in times of fiscal crisis. While the French
welfare state is more corportatist and universal than in a liberal welfare state, and the
Fonds d’Action Social extended that welfare to all immigrants, each of this charac-
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teristics by themselves are likely to provide incentives for a relatively more selective
immigration policy, such as the re-structuring of the immigration bureaucracy. In
the next section, I will discuss how the economic situation of the country affected its
immigration policy.
Fiscal crisis
The bureaucratic changes in terms of immigration that occured in 1966-67 hap-
pened at the same time as a relative small recession hit France. While in part the
domestic production fell -around 1.6%- because of a decrease in exports, the source of
the crisis was fiscal. One third of industry at the time was at least partially publicly
owned, and the 160 public companies accumulated deficits of over one billion francs
in 1966.12 As a consequence, unemployment rose around one percent during those
years (Nickell, Nunziala, and Ochel, 2005), which can explain why in this case, the
concern was not whether the new immigrants would pay more in taxes than what
they use in welfare, it was about alleviating the unemployment pressures caused by
ill-functioning public companies (Hollifield, 1992).
Political Parties
For the first decade of the Fifth French Republic, the President was General De-
Gaulle. While his popularity as a war hero gave him plenty of legitimacy, and he
was able to win the Presidential elections during the 1960s, he did not attempt to
destroy party politics in the Parliament. In 1958, immediatly after the new republic
was founded, he created a new party, the Union por la Nouvelle Re´publique (UNR)
which along with other smaller partied provided DeGaulle with parliamentary sup-
12Information taken from: France: A Troubled Economy, TIME Magazine, Friday June 23, 1967.
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port. However, in 1968 student protests and a strike and takeover in the Renault
plant at Boulogne-Betancourt, brought social instability to the country, and reduced
his support in Parliament. DeGaulle thought institutional changes would bring stabil-
ity back: he proposed to remove all legislative functions from the Senate and increase
regional representation and power. Since his referenda had always been successful, he
thought he would succeed, but three quarters of the de´partments (French equivalent
of states) voted against it. DeGaulle resigned as President and was susbtituted by
Georges Pompidou, a former Prime Minister, that DeGaulle had removed from power
(Kedward, 2005).
The participation of immigrants in the strikes of 1968, and DeGaulle’s resignation,
brought important changes to immigration in France. The foreigners who participated
in the protests were arrested and “transported to their frontier of choice” arguing it
was a matter of national security (Freeman, 1979, 85). No selective immigration policy
was implemented after the government change: both DeGaulle and Pompidou were
members of the UNR, a right of center party, and the consequences of the recession
were more strongly felt in the labor market than in the budget deficit. In summary,
none of the conditions that the theory presented in chapter one suggests would make
the implementation of a selective immgiration policy more likely.
The oil embargo: A halt in immigration flows
Political Parties
1974 was a very active political year in France. The President that had succeeded
DeGaulle, Georges Pompidou, died in office on April 2, 1974 and elections were
called for May of the same year. Immigration policy was not the main campaign
issue, in part because the positions of the front runners did not differ much: Vale´ry
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Giscard D’Estaing, a Gaullist and member of the Independent Republicans, talked
about improving the living conditions of immigrants. And, his closest opponent,
Franc¸ois Mitterrand, a Socialist, had a platform that promoted improvements in living
conditions of immigrants in the short run, and in the long run the implementation
of improvements for labor; such as reduction of work hours, and advancement of
retirement age, reforms which in his opinion would limit immigration by themselves
(Freeman, 1979, 96). The election was very close. In the first round, Mitterand came
first, and Giscard D’Estaing second, with almost 10% less of the vote. However,
in the second round, Giscard D’Estaing won with only 50.8% of the vote, against
Mitterand’s 49.19%. (Kedward, 2005, 454-456).
While the election was not won or lost on the basis of the candidates positions re-
garding immigration, the government of Giscard D’Estaing brought some of the most
important changes in immigration, such as stopping recruitment of foreign workers.
His position was to restrict immigration numbers in order to better provide them with
welfare benefits, in contrast with left of center governments in less generous welfare
states, who, according to the theory presented in this dissertation, would be more
likely to restrict the type of immigrants, and not the total number of foreign workers.
In France, high-skill workers would have still implied higher government spending
since they would be eligible to receive government provided welfare, regardless of
their income.
Immigration policy
The most drastic change in immigration policy in France came on July 3, 1974,
when a newly appointed secretary of state for immigration, Andre´ Postel-Vinay an-
nounced a temporary ban on all immigration of temporary workers(Money, 1999,
112). While one of the rationales for restricting immigration was the economic crisis
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caused by the oil embargo, Postel-Vinay wanted time to implement new measures
to improve the conditions of immigrants in France. He demanded the construction
of 15,000 additional lodgings reserved for immigrants, a plan with a cost of a billion
francs. Postel-Vinay resigned and was replaced by Paul Dijoud, who made the ban
on temporary workers permanent in October, with the goal of stabilizing immigration
at its current level (Freeman, 1979, 96-97).
While the halt in immigration occured during an important financial crisis, the
reforms was not to implement a more selective policy, but tobe able to provide better
welfare to immgirant workers alreaady in the country. Implementing a points sys-
tem at this point in France would not have reduce the fiscal impact of immigrants
since even high-skilled immigrants would have been eligible for government welfare.
In a liberal welfare state, in contrast, since the welfare state is means-based, and
not universal high-skilled immgirants are fiscally beneficial in times of bad economic
enviroments.
Fiscal crisis
As in the rest of the world, the oil emabrgo had a negative economic impact in
France, that was worsened by the end of the French colonies in Africa. France’s
response was to oppose the American position in the oil conflict and trying to form
ties with Arab countries. According to Kahler (1982), Giscard D’Estaing’s logic was
that any improvement in the oil supply brought to France because of diplomatic
maneuvers would be helpful to avoid a long term deficit on the balance of payments.
Besides trying to improve relations with Arab countries, France’s strategy in face
of the crisis was to increase trade with developing countries (Kahler, 1982). While
the halt in immigration recruitment in 1974 was also part of the attempt to face the
crisis (Hollifield, 1992), it was not an central component of the anti-recession plan,
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in the same way it was in other countries (such as Australia, which implemented a
points system that year). One of the reasons for this might be that the impact of the
crisis in France was increasing the external deficit (which was already high because
of decolonization), more than causing a budget crisis, and a selective immigration
policy would not be effective to improve the trade balance, but would be effective in
a liberal welfare state to improve the fiscal balance.
The 1980s: The Mitterrand era
Political parties
Presidential elections were called for April of 1981. While a couple of years be-
fore, Giscard D’Estaing looked like the obvious winner, conflicts in Africa made his
popularity decrease. The main campaign issue was unemployment and Mitterrand,
a Socialist, proposed to create thousands of new jobs in the public sector. Immigra-
tion was again not a factor by which we could differentiate the two front runners:
both of them proposed to imporve the living conditions of foreigners already living
in France, but to restrict new labor flows. In the first roud, Giscard D’Estaing polled
only slightly higher than Mitterrand (28.5% vs. 25.8 %), in part because the other
prominent gaullist at the time, Jacques Chirac ran under a new party Rassemblement
pour la Re´publique (Rally for the Republic, RDR) that he created when he left the
UDF because of disagreements with Giscard D’Estaing. Chirac called his party the
legitimate heir of DeGaulle, and the split in the Gaullist vote clearly hurt Giscard
D’Estaing. In the second run, Mitterrand won 51.7% of the vote. For the first time
since the Fifth Republic was created, Gaullists didn’t control the Presidency. After
winning, Mitterrand dissolve the National Assembly and called for elections, giving
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the Socialists absolute majority in Parliament, without the need to create a coalition
with the communists (Kedward, 2005, 476-484).
According to the main theory presented in chapter one, left of center candidates,
such as Franc¸ois Mitterrand, are more likely to implement selective immigration poli-
cies, such as a points system, as a way to avoid painful cuts in the welfare state.
However, in a corporatist welfare state such as France where the eligibility for govern-
ment provided welfare is not based on economic need (means-based), but is universal
a points system would not necessarily help fund the welfare system. High-skilled im-
migrants would use the welfare system, so even if they pay more taxes than low-skilled
immigrants, the fiscal impact on the welfare state would be smaller. As a consequence,
Mitterrand’s attempted to fund extensions in the welfare state, not through selective
immigration, but through tax increases (Kedward, 2005, 486).
Fiscal crisis
The arrival of a socialist government offered people hope for solutions to the French
sluggish economy during the 1970s. Those feeling were short lived. Between 1976 and
1979 the French economy grew, on average, over 3% a year, in contrast with growth
rates averaging 1% from 1980 to 1985, inflation rates exceeded 13% and the budget
deficit rose to over 100 billion francs (Tuppen, 1988, 3). The response of Mitterrand
was to launch an austerity plan, strenghtening the Franc, and modernizing indus-
try (Kedward, 2005, 493-495). Because a fundamental part of his platform was the
extension of the welfare state, and the creation of employment through government
growth, spending cuts were not central to the socialist government, which made in-
creasing public income necessary. Mitterrand achieved that through tax increases on
the rich (Kedward, 2005; Tuppen, 1988), but it was not enough to compensate the
increase in public spending. A points system would have helped fund the extension
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of the welfare programs, but only under a system in which welfare programs were
targeted at the poor -such as a Liberal Welfare State-, not in a welfare system with
more universal eligibility, such as France.
Immigration Policy
Mitterrand brought to France not only socialism to France, but also changes in
immigration. He did not attempt to remove the ban implemented in 1974, but he
introduced several changes to immgiration during his first year in office. The first
one was a reform of the 1945 law in two areas: exemption from repatriation for
minors and guarateeing due process of law for foreigners. The second one was the
implementation of penalties for employers hiring illegal immigrants, and the third one
extended freedom of association rights to foreigners (DeLey, 1983, 202-206). While
these reforms were very prominent, Mitterrand also implemented changes in terms of
selective immigration policy and the relation of immigrants with the welfare state.
First, the Exceptional Regularization of 1981-1982 stated that all undocumented im-
migrants that arrived in France before 1981, and could produce a valid work contract
would be eligible for regularization (DeLey, 1983; Menz, 2009). This law had the pur-
pose of rewarding those immigrants that were contributing economically to France.
The second measure related to the welfare state was the implementation of a special
education program for foreign children, the extension of social security benefits to
immigrants, particularly but not exclusively, for those that had just arrived in France
from Lebanon and Poland to escape political turmoil (DeLey, 1983, 209).
The immigration reforms implemented by Mitterrand were selective in the sense
that they favored immigrants that were employed and contrubuting economically to
France, regarding of skill level. But they were not fiscally beneficial since welfare
benefits for immigrants were extended further. According to the main theory pre-
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sented in chapter one, in a liberal welfare state, such as Canada, the United States,
or Great Britain, high-skilled immigrants contribute more in taxes than what they
receive in government provided benefits because welfare programs are directed at the
poor. However, in a welfare system in which welfare benefits are universal and more
generous, such as France, the fiscal distinction between high and low skilled immi-
grants becomes so small that using selective immigration policies to fund the welfare
state is not an option as effective as tax increases.
L’immigration choisie: The attempt to implement a points
system
Political parties
The 2002 French Presidential Election has been one of the most important in terms
of immigration issues. For most of the campaign, polls predicted that the candidates
that would go to the second round would be Jacques Chirac (RPR) and Lionel Jospin
(Socialist), but surprinsinlgy the two front-runners ended up being Chirac and Jean-
Marie Le Pen from the Front National an extreme-right anti-immigration party. The
difference between Jospin and Le Pen was very small: aroind 200,000 votes or 0.6
% of the total vote (Miguet, 2002, 209). The reason behind this electoral surprise
was the large number of candidates, 16 to be exact, running for the presidency, the
consequence of which was fragmentation in the electorate, and particularly in the left
along with a low turnout (Miguet, 2002). Le Pen’s platform was based on crime and
unemployment and blamed foreigners from both, arguing the way to fix both was to
deport all immigrants living in France. He had even made public statements arguing
all races were not equal, and dismissed the Holocaust as a historical detail. The
“earthquake” caused by Le Pen’s second place in the first round mobilized several
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voters, in the left and the right, who expressed their opposition to Le Pen in several
marches, as large as those of 1968 with slogans such as “Youth Against the Extreme
Right” and “I’m Ashamed of Being French.” Many of these marches were supported
by all the other political parties, who asked their voters to support Chirac (Golsan,
2003). On the second round, Chirac won with 82% of the vote, the largest presidential
majority in history, and the UMP (the traditional Gaullist Party, which Chirac had
abandoned in the 1970s to create his own party) obtained the majority of seats in
the National Assembly and reunited with the RPR to create a single Gaullist party,
making Jean Pierre Raffarin the Prime Minister (Miguet, 2002, 213). The impact
of this election in terms of immigration cannot be dismissed. The outcome of the
first round indicated that for a considerable portion of the electorate immigration
policy was perceived to be too lax and insufficient. So immigration became one of
the main issues in Chirac’s second term. He appointed Nicolas Sarkozy as Minister of
the Interior with the mission to reform the country’s immigration system (Marthaler,
2008).
Fiscal crisis
During his presidency, Chirac show little interest on economic matters. While the
economy grew moderately during his government, public debt and unemployment
continued to be chronic issues. Unemployment was consistently around 10% and
around 22% for young workers. High unemployment levels, particularly for the young
means less contributions to public welfare and retirement programs (Boisgrollier,
2006). This is worsened by the lack of competitiveness of some French industries in
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the global market, even though during part of the Chirac government a weak Euro
helped exporters, and the 35 hour week which he didn’t reform 13.
The fiscal needs of the French government to fund retirement and welfare programs
could have been ameliorated by a selective immigration policy, as described in chapter
one, but that would only be possible under a less generous welfare system. High-skilled
immigrants in France would still be eligible for most government provided welfare, and
even if their tax contribution is higher than the contribution of low skill immigrants,
their fiscal impact at reducing the fiscal deficit and funding retirement and welfare
programs would be marginal at best because the French government would have to
fund access to the welfare system for those new immigrants.
Selective Immigration Policy
Sarkozy proposed two main immigration bills during his tenure as Minister of the
Interior. The first one in 2003 (Law 2003-119 of 26 November 2003 on immigration
control, the residence of aliens in France and nationality) had the goals of restricting
the number of illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers. This law was an attempt to
appeal to Le Pen’s voters in order to neutralize the Front National political power
(Marthaler, 2008; Menz, 2009).
The second Loi Sarkozy (Law 2006-911 of 24 July 2006 on immigration and inte-
gration) proposed just after the immigrant riots in the Parisian suburbs, was the first
attempt to implement a selective immigration policy in France. Sarkozy’s emphasis
was on selective immigration (l’immigration choisie) rather than imposed immigration
(l’immigration subie). The latter was made up asylum-seekers and family reunifica-
tion, while the latter would be tailored to the economic needs of the country with
13“Chirac’s Legacy is a Challenge for his Successor”, by Matthew Lynn, Bloomberg, March 13,
2007
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highly qualified workers who would be selected though a points system (Marthaler,
2008). Sarkozy’s argument was that immigration in France had a negative connota-
tion because it wasn’t linked to the country’s needs. His logic was that in countries
with selective immigration policies xenophobia and extreme right parties are weaker
than in France, so selective immigration would be a defense against racism.14. This
original received very strong opposition from the Socialists and other opposition par-
ties, opposed the idea of selective immigration as Sarkozy originally described it. The
bill went through over 300 amendments in the National Assembly and the Senate,
before the final version was approved, which instead of a points system included a
three year visa, similar to the American H1-B, a (carte de compe´tences et talents).
Since the left opposed it, among other issues, under the argument that it would hurt
developing countries, potential immigrants had to sign an agreement that they would
return to their country of origin (Murphy, 2006).
While the final law had little similarities with selective immigration systems in
liberal welfare states, it was the first time since the halt in temporary immigration
recruitment in 1974 that immigration policy in France was linked to the economy,
and that immigrants were talked about because of their economic contribution. Fur-
thermore, as Menz (2009, 148) explains, it meant a return to “actively solicited and
chosen economic migration.” Nonetheless, a more decicively selective immigration
policy, such as a points system, would be more likely to happen under a different
type of government and a different type of welfare system. The pressure to move to
the ideoloical right to neutralize Le Pen made Chirac’s goverment more conservative,
and points systems, according to the theory presented in chapter one, tend to be
implemented by left of center governments that are trying to help fun their welfare
14“Sarkozy justifie l’immigration “choisie” ” Le Figaro, April 28, 2006
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system. Furthermore, Sarkozy’s proposal didn’t restrict access to welfare benefits to
recipients of the cartes de compe´tences et talents, so using this immigration reform
as a fiscal policy would have been inneficient.
Conclusions
Like Germany, France was also close to implement a points system, however, given
the political and economic situation at the time the event was unlikely to succeed.
Unlike their counterparts in the United States, immigrants in France are eligible for
many of the same welfare programs than citizens enjoy. As a cosnequence, the gap
between the fiscal contribution of highly and low skill immigrants is smaller than in
liberal welfare systems, in which I predict the implementation of points systems is
more likely. Furthermore, the election of 2000, forced the Gaullists to move further
to the right to appeal to some of the Front National voters. As the theory presented
earlier predicts, however, points systems are more likely to be proposed by left of
center parties.
The French case is a clear example of the differences in immigration in more
generous welfare states, where policy is less motivated by fiscal reasons (since the
welfare benefits are seen as a fundamental right, even for immigrants) than by other
issues. In such cases, therefore, we observe restrictions in the number of immigrants
admitted (for example, the French halt in immigration recruitment in the 1970s) than
restrictions in the type of immigrants the country is likely to attract.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This dissertation started with a discussion on policy divergence in globalization,
and it seems appropriate to end it talking about the same issue. Some of the lit-
erature in International Political Economy argues that we should expect to observe
convergence in immigration policies because of a “race to the bottom” to compete for
the taxes of high-skilled immigrants (Shachar, 2006). Others contend that trade and
immigration are substitutes (Mundell, 1957), and as a consequence, if we observe con-
vergence in trade policy the same should occur for immigration. In reality, however,
we observe a wide divergence in immigration policies: Some countries favor families,
others favor foreigners of the same ethnicity, and some favor high-skilled immigrants.
This dissertation attempts to provide an answer to this paradox by focusing on three
domestic factors: the type of welfare state, the government ideology, and the fiscal
situation of the country.
Using quantitative and qualitative historical approaches, I have found that the
presence of these three conditions creates a very fertile environment for the imple-
mentation of points systems, which have been shown to attract more high-skilled
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immigrants (Borjas, 1999). That was the case in Canada, the first country to im-
plement a points system in 1967, when Leaster Pearson, a Liberal, implemented this
system after the Coyne Affair caused a spike in the budget deficit, as was described
in Chapter 3. In contrast, only a subset of these conditions was present in Germany
in 2002, a more generous welfare state than Canada, but also with a fiscal crisis and
a left of center government. Germany failed to implement a points system, in part
because of procedural mistakes in the Bundesrat. However, the German case shows
that while the presence of all three conditions provides a more likely enviroment for
the implementation of a points system, each of these conditions help increase the
probability of a succesful reform towards points system.
As a conclusion, labor flows are different from other globalization issues in the
way they affect the domestic political and economic environment. Immigrants live
and work in the communities where they pay their taxes and that in some cases will
provide welfare benefits for them. This is very different from the impact of trade or
capital inflows: with the reduction in tariffs and the race to the bottom in capital taxes
the fiscal impact of these factor movements is much smaller than for immigration. As
a consequence, participants in the debate over policy divergence should pay attention
at domestic factors.
I believe the theory and findings of this project can inform not only the literature
on the political economy of immigration, but also other areas of globalization by
highlighting the importance of looking at political and economic variations at the
domestic level to understand variation at the international level. Furthermore, while
political scientists have shown how globalization constrains domestic political and
economic factors, this dissertation turns the causal arrow around and shows that
domestis factors also constrain globalization, which can help provide insights into
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further research on the relation between global economic policies and the nation
state.
157
Bibliography
Abbot, Edith. 1924. Immigration. Select Documents and Case Records. Chicago, IL:
The University of Chicago Press.
Agresti, Alan. 2002. Categorical Data Analysis. Wiley Series in Probability and
Statistics. 2nd ed. Wiley-Interscience.
Avery, Doland. 1972. “Canadian Immigration Policy and the ”Foreign” Navvy, 1896-
1914.” Historical Papers/ Communications historiques 7(1): 135–156.
Barro, Robert J., and Jong-Wha Lee. 2000. International Data on Educational At-
tainment: Updates and Implications. Working Paper. 042 Center for International
Development, Harvard University.
Beck, J. Murray. 1968. Pendulum of Power. Canada’s Federal Elections. Scarborough,
Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada.
Becker, Florian. 2003. “The Decision of the German Constitutional Court on the
Immigration Act.” German Law Journal 4(2): 91–106.
Belot, Michele V.K., and Timothy H. Hatton. 2008. Immigrant Selection in the
OECD. Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 571. The Australian
National University.
158
Biden, Joseph R. 1989. Immigration Act of 1989. Report together with Additional
and Minority Views, Report 101-55, Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Congress,.
Blake, Donald E. 1979. “1896 and All That: Critical Elections in Canada.” Canadian
Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 12(June):
259–279.
Boisgrollier, Nicolas de. 2006. The Challenge of Reforming France. U.S.-Europe Anal-
ysis Series 32 The Brookings Institution Washington D.C.: .
Bordo, Michael, Tamara Gomes, and Lawrence Schembri. 2009. Canada and the IMF:
Trailbrazer or Prodigal Son? Discussion Paper 2009-1 Bank of Canada.
Borjas, George J. 1991. Immigration Policy, National Origin, and Immigrant Skills:
A Comparison of Canada and the United States. Working Paper 3691. National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Borjas, George J. 1999. Heaven’s Door. Immigration Policy and the American Econ-
omy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Boughton, James M. 2003. “On the Origins of the Fleming-Mundell Model.” IMF
Staff Papers 50(1): 1–9.
Braunthal, Gerard. 1996. Parties and Politics in Modern Germany. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Brochmann, Grete, and Tomas Hammar, eds. 1999. Mechanisms of Immigration
Control. A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies. Oxford, UK:
Berg.
Bucken-Knapp, Gregg. 2009. Defending the Swedish Model. Social Democrats, Trade
Unions, and Labor Migration Reform. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books.
159
Burkett, Tony. 1975. Parties and Elections in West Germany. The Search for Stabil-
ity. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Busch, Andreas. 2009. “Schro¨der’s Agenda 2010 2010: From ’Plan B’ to Lasting
Legacy?” In Germany’s Gathering Crisis. The 2005 Federal Election and the Grand
Coalition, ed. Alister Miskimmon, William E. Peterson, and James Sloam. Palgrave
Macmillan pp. 64–80.
Cairns, Alan C. 1968. “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada,
1921-1965.” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science
Politique 1(March): 55–80.
Camerra-Rowe, Pamela. 2004. “Agenda 2010. Redefining German Social Democracy.”
German Politics and Society 22(Spring): 1–30.
Carens, Joseph H. 2003. “Who Should Get in? the Ethics of Immigration Admis-
sions.” Ethics & International Affairs 17(1): 95–112.
Carter, David B., and Curtis Signorino. 2009. Back to the Future: Modeling Time
Dependence in Binary Data. Technical report University of Rochester.
Castles, Stephen. 1985. “The Guests Who Stayed. The Debate on ‘Foreigners Policy’
in the German Federal Republic.” International Migration Review 19(Autumn):
517–534.
Cerna, Lucie. 2009. “The varieties of high-skilled immigration policies: coalitions and
policy outputs in industrial countries.” Journal of European Public Policy 16(Jan-
uary): 144–161.
160
Chaloff, Jonathan, and Georges Lemaitre. 2009. Managing Highly-Skilled Labour
Migration: A Comparative Analysis of Migration Policies and Challenges in OECD
Countries. Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 79 OECD.
Chambers, Edward J. 1964. “Late Nineteenth Century Business Cycles in Canada.”
The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne
d’Economique et de Science Politique 30(August): 391–412.
Cohen, Alon, and Assaf Razin. 2008. The Skill Composition of Immigrants and the
Generosity of the Welfare State: Free vs. Policy-Controlled Migration. Working
Paper 14459 National Bureau of Economic Research.
Conradt, David P. 2000. “The 1998 Campaign and Election: An Overview.” In Power
Shift in Germany. The 1998 Election and the End of the Kohl Era, ed. David P.
Conradt, Gerald R. Kleinfeld, and Christian Søe. Vol. 5 of Modern German Studies,
New York, NY: Berghahn Books, pp. 1–18.
Corbett, David. 1951. “Immigration and Canadian Politics.” International Journal
6(Summer): 207–216.
Coyne, James E. 1961. “Letter to Donald Fleming, Minister of Finance.”.
Curry, Timothy, and Lynn Shibut. 2000. “See The Cost of the Savings and Loan
Crisis: Truth and Consequences.” FDIC Banking Review 12(December): 26–35.
Cusack, Thomas R. 1999. “Partisan Politics and Fiscal Policy.” Comparative Political
Studies 32(June): 464–486.
Cusack, Thomas R., and Pablo Beramendi. 2006. “Taxing work.” European Journal
of Political Research 32(June): 43–75.
161
Dean, Edgar Packard. 1949. “How Canada Has Voted: 1867 to 1945.” Canadian
Historical Review 30(3): 227–248.
Defoort, Cecily. 2007. Migrations Qualifiees et Capital Human: Nouveaux Enseigne-
ments tires d’une base de donees en panel. Docteur en economie. Universite de Lille
2.
DeLey, Margo. 1983. “French Immigration Policy Since May 1981.” International
Migration Review 17(Summer): 196–211.
Dunae, Patrick A. 1984-1985. “Promoting the Dominion: Records and the Canadian
Immigration Campaign.” Archivaria 19(Winter): 73–93.
Egal, Zahra, and Andrew Sobel. 2009. “Capital mobility and state social welfare
provisions in the late 1800s.” In Challenges of Globalization. Immigration, social
welfare, global governance, ed. Andrew C. Sobel. New York, NY: Routledge pp. 154–
173.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Douglas A. Irwin. 2009. The Slide to Protectionism in the
Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why? Working Paper 15142 National
Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge MA: .
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Facchini, Giovanni, Anna Maria Mayda, and Prachi Mishra. 2007. Do Interest Groups
Affect Immigration? Discussion Paper 3183 Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Bonn, Germany: .
Fairchild, Henry Pratt. 1917. “The Literacy Test and Its Making.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 31(May): 447–460.
162
Faist, Thomas. 1994. “How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immi-
gration in German Partisan Discourse, 1978-1992.” West European Politics 17(2):
50–71.
Farmer, Ruth S.J. 1996. “Economic Deregulation and Changes in New Zealand’s
Immigration Policy: 1986 to 1991.” People and Place 4(3).
Feiler, Margaret. 1967. “West Germany.” American Jewish Year Book 68: 349–376.
Freeman, Gary P. 1979. Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies.
The French and British Experiences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Freeman, Gary P. 1986. “Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State.”
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 485(May): 51–63.
Freeman, Gary P. 1995. “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic
States.” International Migration Review 29(Winter): 881–902.
Gallagher, Michael. 1991. “Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Sys-
tems.” Electoral Studies 10(1): 33–51.
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennet. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Develop-
ment in the Social Sciences. MIT Press.
Gimpel, James G., and James R. Edwards. 1999. The Congressional Politics of
Immigration Reform. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Allyn and Bacon.
Global Migration Barometer. 2008. Executive Summary. Technical report . Sponsored
by Western Union, prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit.
Goldin, Claudia. 1993. “The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the
United States, 1890 to 1921.” National Bureau of Economic Research 4345.
163
Golsan, Richard J. 2003. “The Le Pen Moment.” SubStance 32(1): 128–142.
Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. “The second image reversed: the international sources of
domestic politics.” International Organization 32(4): 881–912.
Grattan, Michele. 1993. “Immigration and the Australian Labor Party.” In The
Politics of Australian Immigration. Canberra: Bureau of Immigration Research
pp. 127–142.
Green, Alan G. 1976. Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy. Toronto:
Macmillan of Canada.
Green, Alan G., and David A. Green. 1995. “The Effectiveness of the Point Sys-
tem and Other Instruments.” The Canadian Journal of Economics 28(November):
1006–1041.
Green, Alan G., and David A. Green. 1999. “The Economic Goals of Canada’s Immi-
gration Policy: Past and Present.” Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques
25(December): 425–451.
Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2010. “Attitudes Towards Highly Skilled
and Low Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment.” American
Political Science Review 104(February): 61–84.
Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, eds. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hanson, Gordon H. 2005. Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance
and Political Opposition to Open Borders. Washington D.C.: Institute for Interna-
tional Economics.
164
Harris, Chauncy D. 1991. “Unification of Germany in 1990.” Geographical Review
81(April): 170–182.
Hartland, Penelope. 1960. “Canadian Balance of Payments since 1868.” In Trends
in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century, ed. The Conference on Re-
search Income, and Wealth. NBER: UMI pp. 717–756.
Hatton, Timothy J., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2005. “A Dual Policy Paradox: Why
have trade and immigration policies always differed in labor-scarce economies?”
NBER (11866).
Hawkins, Freda. 1988. Canada and Immigration. Public Policy and Public Concern.
Canadian Public Administration Series. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press.
Heald, Morrell. 1953. “Business Attitudes Toward European Immigration, 1880-
1900.” The Journal of Economic History 13(Summer): 291–304.
Heichel, Stephen, Jessica Pape, and Thomas Sommerer. 2005. “Is there convergence
in convergence research? An Overview of empirical studies on policy convergence.”
Journal of European Public Policy 12(October): 817–840.
Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policies.” American
Political Science Review 71(December): 1467–1487.
Higham, John. 1952. “Origins of Immigration Restriction, 1882-1897: A Social Anal-
ysis.” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 39(June): 77–88.
Hiscox, Michael. 2001. International Trade & Political Conflict. Commerce, Coali-
tions and Mobility. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
165
Hix, Simon, and Abdul Noury. 2007. “Politics, Not Economic Interests: Determi-
nants of Migration Policies in the European Union.” International Migration Re-
view 41(1): 182–205.
Hoffmann, Charles. 1956. “The Depression of the Nineties.” The Journal of Economic
History 16(June): 137–164.
Hollifield, James F. 1992. Immigrants, Markets, and States. The Political Economy
of Post-War Europe. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Huber, Evelyn, and John D. Stephens. 2001. Development and Crisis of the Welfare
State. Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press.
Ikenberry, G. John. 1986. “The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to
Oil Shocks in the 1970s.” International Organization 40(Winter): 105–137.
Iversen, Torben. 2005. Capitalism, Democracy and Welfare. Cambridge University
Press.
Jaccard, James. 2001. Interaction Effects in Logistic Regression. Quantitative Appli-
cations in Social Sciences Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Johnson, Joseph French. 1908. “The Crisis and Panic of 1907.” Political Science
Quarterly 23(September): 454–467.
Johnston, Richard, and Michael J. Percy. 1980. “Reciprocity, Imperial Sentiment,
and Party Politics in the 1911 Election.” Canadian Journal of Political Science /
Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 13(December): 711–729.
Joppke, C. 1998. “Why liberal states accept unwanted immigration.” World Politics
pp. 266–293.
166
Kahler, Miles. 1982. “International response to economic crisis: France and the Third
World in the 1970s.” In France in the Troubled World Economy, ed. Stephen S.
Cohen, and Peter A. Gourevitch. London: Butterworth Scientific pp. 76–96.
Kam, Cindy D., and Robert J. Franzese. 2007. Modelling and Interpreting Interactive
Hypotheses in Regression Analysis. University of Michigan Press.
Kane, Edward K. 1992. “The Savings and Loans Insurance Mess.” Society pp. 4–10.
Kedward, Rod. 2005. La Vie en Bleu. France and the French since 1900. New York,
NY: Allen Lane.
Kelley, Ninette, and Michael Trebilcock. 1998. The making of the mosaic. A History
of Canadian Immigration Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Kennedy-Brenner, Carliene. 1979. Foreign Workers and Immigration Policy. The
Case of France. Development Centre Studies. Paris, France: Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development.
Kerber, Wolfang, and Sandra Hartig. 1999. “The Rise and Fall of The German
Miracle.” Critical Review 13(3-4): 337–357.
Kindleberger, Charles. 1963. “The Postwar Resurgence of the French Economy.” In
In Search of France, ed. Stanley Hoffmann. Cambridge MA: Harvard University
Press pp. 118–158.
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. “Making the Most of Sta-
tistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation.” American Journal
of Political Science 44-2: 341–355.
167
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1991. “The 1990 German Federal Election and the National Unifi-
cation: A Watershed in German electoral history?” West European Politics 14(4):
121–148.
Knowles, Valerie. 2007. Strangers at our gates. Canadian Immigration and Immigra-
tion Policy, 1540-2006. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
Kruse, Imke, Henry Edward Orren, and Steffen Angenendt. 2003. “The Failure of
Immigration Reform in Germany.” German Politics 12(December): 129–145.
Lane, A.T. 1984. “American trade unions, mass immigration and the literacy test:
1900-1917.” Labor History 25(1): 5–25.
Li, Peter S. 2003. Destination Canada. Immigration Debates and Issues. Don Mills,
ON: Oxford University Press Canada.
Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Macfarlane, Daniel. 2008. “The Value of a ”Coyne”: The Diefenbaker Government
and the 1961 Coyne Affair.” Past Imperfect 14: 120–142.
Marchand, Jean. 1966. White Paper on Immigration. Ottawa: Minister of Manpower
and Immigration.
Marshall, Barbara. 2000. The New Germany and migration in Europe. Europe in
Change Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
168
Marthaler, Sally. 2008. “Nicolas Sarkozy and the politics of French immigration
policy.” Journal of European Public Policy 15(April): 382–397.
McGillivray, Fiona. 2004. Privileging Industry. The Comparative Politics of Trade
and Industrial Policy. Princeton University Press.
Medina, Mariana. 2007. “Ideal Point Estimation on Immigration in the U.S.”.
Meisel, John. 1960. “The Formulation of Liberal and Conservative Programmes in the
1957 Canadian General Election.” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Polit-
ical Science / Revue Canadienne d’Economique et de Science Politique 26(Novem-
ber): 565–574.
Menz, Georg. 2009. The Political Economy of Managed Migration. Nonstate Actors,
Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Meyers, Eytan. 2002. “The causes of convergence in Western immigration control.”
Review of International Studies 28: 123–141.
Miguet, Arnauld. 2002. “The French Elections of 2002: After the Earthquake, the
Deluge.” West European Politics 25(47): 207–220.
Money, Jeannette. 1999. Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigra-
tion Control. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Mudde, Cas. 1999. “The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the
Immigration Issue.” West European Politics 47(July): 182–197.
Mundell, Robert A. 1957. “International Trade and Factor Mobility.” American Eco-
nomic Review 47 (3): 321–335.
169
Mu¨nter, Michael, and Roland Sturm. 2002. “Economic Consequences of German
Unification.” German Politics 11(December): 179–194.
Murphy, Kara. 2006. France’s New Law: Control Immigration Flows, Court the
Highly Skilled. Report for the migration information source Migration Policy In-
stitute Washington D.C.: .
Myers, Gustavus. 2005. The history of Tammany Hall. Michigan Historical Reprint
Series Ann Arbor, MI: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan Library.
Myles, John. 1998. “How to Design a “Liberal” Welfare State: A Comparison of
Canada and the United States.” Social Policy & Administration 32(December):
341–364.
Nickell, Stephen, Luca Nunziala, and Wolfang Ochel. 2005. “Unemployment in the
OECD since the 1960s. What do we know?” The Economic Journal 115(January):
1–27.
Noiriel, Ge´rard. 2006. Le creuset franc¸ais. Second ed. Paris, France: E´ditions du
Seuil.
Noyes, Alexander D. 1894. “The Banks and the Panic of 1893.” Political Research
Quarterly 9(March): 12–30.
Price, Lee. 2005. The boom that wasn’t. The economy has little to show for $860
billion in tax cuts. Briefing paper. Economic Policy Institute Washington D.C.: .
Pulzer, Peter. 1995. German Politics 1945-1995. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Pulzer, Peter. 2003. “The Devil They Know: The German Federal Election of 2002.”
West European Politics 26(April): 153–164.
170
Regenstreif, Peter. 1960. “The Canadian Election of 1958.” Western Political Quar-
terly 13(June): 349–373.
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2009. This time is different. Eight
Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Reitz, Jeffrey R. 2004. “Canada: Immigration and Nation-Building in the Transition
to a Knowledge Economy.” In Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective, ed.
Wayne A. Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press pp. 97–134.
Rich, Georg. 1989. “Canadian Banks, Gold, and the Crisis of 1907.” Explorations in
Economic History 26: 135–160.
Richmond, Anthony. 1976. “Recent Developments in Immigration to Canada and
Australia.” Comparative Sociology 17: 183–205.
Roberts, Geoffrey K. 2009. German politics today. Second ed. Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Press.
Rockoff, Hugh. 1990. “The Wizard of Oz as a Monetary Allegory.” Journal of Political
Economy 98(August): 739–760.
Rothbard, Murray N. 2007. Panic of 1819. Reactions and Policies. Auburn, AL:
Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Roy, A.D. 1951. “Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings.” Oxford Economic
Papers 3(2): 135–146.
Rybczynski, T. M. 1955. “Factor Endowment and Relative Commodity Prices.”
Economica 22(88): 336–341.
171
Safarian, A. Edward. 1959. The Canadian Economy in the Great Depression. Cana-
dian Studies in Economics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Schaafsma, Joseph, and Arthur Sweetman. 2001. “Immigrant Earnings: Age at Im-
migration Matters.” Canadian Journal of Economics 34(November): 1066–1099.
Schaltegger, Cristoph A., and Lars P. Feld. 2009. “Are fiscal adjustments less suc-
cessful in decentralized governments?” European Journal of Political Economy
25(August): 115–123.
Schembri, Lawrence. 2008. “Canada’s Experience with a Flexible Exchange Rate in
the 1950s: Valuable Lessons Learned.” Bank of Canada Review 2008(Spring): 3–15.
Schmidt, Doris. 2002. “The New German Immigration Law.” Presented at the confer-
ence ”Extending the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security through Enlargement.”
Centre for European Policy Studies.
Schou, Poul. 2006. “Immigration, integration and fiscal sustainability.” Journal of
Population Economics 19: 671–689.
Shachar, Ayelet. 2006. “The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competi-
tive Immigration Regimes.” New York Univerity Law Review 81(April): 101–158.
Shanks, J. Merrill, and Warren E. Miller. 1991. “Partianship, Policy and Performance:
The Reagan Legacy in the 1988 Election.” British Journal of Political Science
21(April): 129–197.
Sharp, Walter R. 1926. “The Canadian Election of 1925.” American Political Science
Review 20(February): 107–117.
172
Siklos, Pierre L. 2007. Revisiting the Coyne Affair: A Singular Event That Changed
the Course of Canadian Monetary History. Department of Economics Working Pa-
per Series. 2007-01 Wilfrid Laurier University.
Silber, William L. 2007. The Great Financial Crisis of 1914: What Can We Learn
from Aldrich-Vreeland Emergency Currency? Papers and proceedings American
Economic Association.
Smith, Kent W., and M.S. Sasaki. 1978. “Deccreasing Multicollinearity. A Method
for Models with Multiplicative Functions.” Sociological Methods 8(August): 35–56.
Solomon, Barbara Miller. 1989. Ancestors and Immigrants. Boston, MA: Northeastern
University Press.
Somerville, Will. 2007. Immigration under New Labour. The Policy Press. University
of Bristol.
Soward, Frederic H. 1930. “The Canadian Elections of 1930.” American Poltical
Science Review 24(November): 995–1000.
Stonecash, Jeffrey M., and Everita Silina. 2005. “The 1896 Realignement.” American
Politics Research 33(January): 3–32.
Storesletten, Kjetil. 2000. “Sustaining Fiscal Policy through Immigration.” Journal
of Political Economy 108(April): 300–323.
Storesletten, Kjetil. 2003. “Fiscal Implications of Immigration. A Net Present Value
Calculation.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105(3): 487–506.
Stulz, Rene M., Rohan Williamson. 2003. “Culture, openess, and finance.” Journal
of Financial Economics 70: 313–349.
173
Sullivan, John L., Amy Fried, and Mary G. Dietz. 1992. “Patriotism, Politics, and the
Presidential Election of 1988.” American Journal of Political Science 36(February):
200–234.
Thra¨nhardt, Dietrich. 1999. “Germany’s Immigration Policies and Politics.” In Mech-
anisms of Immigration Control. A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation
Policies, ed. Grete Brochmann, and Tomas Hammar. Oxford, UK: Berg pp. 29–59.
Timlin, Mabel F. 1960. “Canada’s Immigration Policy, 1896-1910.” The Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne d’Economique et
de Science Politique 26(November): 517–532.
Tuppen, John N. 1988. France under recession, 1981-1986. Albany, NY: State Uni-
versity of New York Press.
Usdansky, Margaret, and Thomas J. Espenshade. 2000. The H-1B Visa Debate in
Historical Perspective: The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Foreign-Born Workers.
Working Paper. 11 The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies UCSD: .
Wasem, Ruth Ellen, and Chad H. Haddal. 2007. Point Systems for Immigrant Selec-
tion: Options and Issues. Reports for congress. Congressional Research Service.
Watson, Cicely. 1952. “Recent Developments in French Immigration Policy.” Popu-
lation Studies 6(July): 3–38.
Wellisch, Dietmar, and Uwe Walz. 1998. “Why do rich countries prefer free trade
over free migration? The role of the modern welfare state.” European Economic
Review 42: 1595–1612.
Wilson, Stewart J. 2006. “Factor accumulation in Canada before the Great Depres-
sion: investment and immigration dynamics.” Empirical Economics 31: 261–275.
174
Wrong, Dennis H. 1963. “Canadian Politics in the Sixties.” Political Science Quarterly
78(March): 1–12.
Zeidel, Robert Fredric. 1986. The Literacy Test for Immigrants: A Question of
Progress. Dissertation for Ph.D. in History Marquette University.
Zolberg, Aristide R. 2006. A Nation by Design. Immigration Policy in the Fashioning
of America. Harvard University Press.
175
